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 This dissertation engages the question of why German political elites acc pted the 
use of force during the 1990s and started to commit the country’s armed forces to 
multilateral peacekeeping missions. Previous governments of the Federal Republic had 
opposed foreign deployment of the military and Germany was characterized by a unique 
strategic culture in which the efficacy of military force was regarded as negative. The 
rediscovery of the use of force constituted a significant reorientation of German security 
policy with potentially profound implications for international relations. 
I use social role theory to explain Germany’s security policy reorientation. I argue 
that political elites shared a national role conception of their country as a dependable and 
reliable ally. Role expectations of the international security environment cha ged as a 
result of a shift to multilateral intervention as means to address emerging security 
problems after the Cold War. Germany’s resistance to the use of force was viewed as 
inappropriate conduct for a power possessing the economic and military wherewit al of 
the Federal Republic. Elites from allied countries exerted social pressure to have 
Germany contribute commensurate with capabilities. German political eltes adapted role 
behavior in response to external expectations in an effort to preserve the national role 




Security policy reorientation to maintain Germany’s national role conception was 
pursued by conservative elites who acted as 'role entrepreneurs’. CDU/CSU politicians 
initiated a process of role adaptation to include the use of force for non-defensive 
missions. They persuaded Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Green party politicians that 
the maintenance of the country’s role conception necessitated a reorientation in security 
policy to accommodate the changes in the security environment.  
 The dissertation uses structured, focused and comparative case study 
methodology to trace the process of role adaptation in the understandings of German 
parliamentary elites. It finds that German policy orientation was a product of external 
expectations which increased in their socializing impact as intervention norms became 
more concrete and ethnopolitical violence increased in intensity. As a constructivist 
account of the normalization of German foreign policy, the dissertation finds that oci l, 
rather than utilitarian considerations were primarily responsible for initiat ng the 
reorientation of German security policy. The finding that social expectations caused a 
reorientation in the security policy of a great power strengthens social constructivist 
claims about the impact of norms in international relations. The dissertation also 
contributes to knowledge on processes of domestic norm promotion and national 
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The Puzzle of German Security Policy Reorientation  
 
Since the mid-1990s, the Federal Republic of Germany has deployed combat 
forces outside its national territory. German involvement in multilateral peace 
enforcement missions of the UN, NATO and EU constitutes a significant departure from 
previous policy parameters. Until 1995, German elites had categorically ruled o t 
participation of their country’s armed forces in any military activity not directly linked to 
the defense of NATO territory. As such, Germany’s decision to use military force outside 
German and NATO territory is an indication of a major shift in the country’s security 
policy orientation since reunification.  
The reorientation of a state’s established foreign policy parameters remains an 
intriguing phenomenon in foreign policy analysis which routinely emphasizes the path-
dependent nature of foreign policy. The German case is particularly interesting because 
policy change involved security policy and the use of force. These are considered areas of 
‘high politics’ in which states tend to protect their policy autonomy. Germany’s 
rediscovery of the use of force also conflicted with the value of antimilitarism that 
defined the country’s strategic culture since World War II. Political elites and the general 
public shared a negative view on the efficacy of force in international relations. Thus, the 
security policy reorientation was the more significant because it contradicted German 
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identity and breached a cultural taboo on the use of force that had existed since World 
War II (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006, 1). The antimilitarism in German strategic culture 
suggests that policy reorientation was not initiated domestically but, instead, was 
primarily a function of external factors. Was Germany encouraged by itsallie  to 
abandon its long-term stance on the use of force in favor of a more active and possibly 
militant role in international politics? If so, what was the basis for external xpectations 
of German security policy and what was the social process by which the majority of 
Germany’s political elite came to accept their country’s military responsibilities in global 
society? 
Germany carried the heavy military burden as the frontline state against the 
Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Political elites had promoted the country’s 
remilitarization and integration into NATO in 1955 but had categorically ruled out the 
use of force for any objective other than territorial self-defense. They viewed the 
country’s militant past as a historical burden which established a special responsibility to 
eschew military force and promote cooperation through the support of international 
institutions and law. This elite view of Germany’s role and appropriate foreign policy 
actions in global society is frequently referred to as civilian power role conception (Maull 
1990).    
Civilian powers are trading states that exhibit a preoccupation with economic 
concerns. They rely on international law and consensual policy formulation withi  
multilateral forums to pursue their interests including those pertaining to national 
security. Defense expenditures as percentage of GDP are low when compared to states f 
equal power. Foreign policy is characterized by a tendency towards diplomatic reticence 
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and reluctance to engage in high-profile leadership behavior. The civilian power r le 
differs from the traditional state role in a number of important ways.   
Traditional or normal roles of states are defined by two central elements: National 
interests and relative power. Normal states take as their natural right the ability to 
formulate and pursue their national interests with or without international consent. Th  
use of force in pursuit of the national interest is considered a state prerogative. As the 
relative power of the state increases, a normal state will increasingly value policy-making 
autonomy over policy-making influence (Rittberger 2001).1 At the level of a great power 
which possesses considerable political, economic, military and cultural where ithal, the 
foreign policy behavior of states will be characterized by relatively fr quent divergence 
from international standards and recourse to the use of military force. Great powers will 
seek out and deploy advanced military technologies for their national defense including 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Within international organizations, great powers 
will attempt to control the agendas and processes of norm creation while resisting 
constraints imposed by such standards on their own policy autonomy.   
The Federal Republic of Germany is considered a great power that plays a civilian
power role. Unlike other powerful states, the country has allowed its foreign policy to be 
constrained by the international organizations it is enmeshed in to a degree that th
pursuit of national interests is no longer easily ascertainable. Germany has been a strong 
advocate for the expansion of the supranational authority of the European Union. It has 
                                                
1 Realists argue that the insecurity created by an an rchical system establishes clear state preferences for 
security policy autonomy. Less powerful states have more to gain by surrendering some autonomy in return 
for gaining influence within international organizations. As the relative power of a state increases, the 
search for policy autonomy becomes a more prominent feature of state security policy. See Rittberger 
(2001) for a more detailed discussion. 
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supported the expansion of international law and shown a preference for multilateral 
foreign policy making. The country’s security rests on multilateral arrangements 
foremost of which is NATO. Fully integrated into NATO’s force structure, G rmany 
does not have the independent military command structure that other great powers take a  
their sovereign right. Even though Germany does pursue its own interests in multilatera  
fashion, the country has been willing to accept an unusually high level of constraint on its 
ability to autonomously formulate and pursue national interests. The origin of this‘odd’ 
behavior for a great power is generally traced to Germany’s defeat in World ar II and 
the long period it spent as occupied and semi-sovereign state. Countries like Germany 
and Japan are also seen as prototypes of an emerging category of trading states that re 
adapted well to conditions of interdependence that are beginning to characterize modern, 
global society.  
The restoration of German sovereignty which came with the end of the Cold War 
allowed its political elites greater leeway to define their country’s role conception.  
Growing insecurity and instability accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union also created a strong rationale for elites to shed the civilian role they had 
allowed Germany to play in favor of a less restrained, normal role that would allow for 
greater policy autonomy in addressing specific German security needs. Conservative 
elites quickly seized on the opportunity to normalize German role behavior but the 
civilian power role proved resilient even as international pressure mounted to have 
Germany contribute in military ways to the maintenance of regional and global security. 
The Persian Gulf War of 1991 marked the dawn of a new global security era that 
was both less stable than the bipolar order of the Cold War but also offered expanded 
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possibilities for multilateral intervention. American and UN requests for military 
assistance to liberate Kuwait clashed with central elements of Germany’s role conception 
as civilian power. Parliamentary elites maintained negative views on the efficacy of force 
and widespread antiwar demonstrations confirmed the enduring strength of antimilit ris  
in German strategic culture. The government declined military contributions on the basis 
of a longstanding interpretation of the country’s Basic Law under which extraterritorial 
missions of the armed forces were deemed unconstitutional. Under international pressure 
to contribute commensurate with capabilities, decision-makers resorted to making 
significant financial and material contributions to compensate for their non-compliance 
with the request for military assistance. Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher 
also promised that they would initiate the necessary domestic changes allowing for 
military contributions in the future. Germany’s ‘checkbook diplomacy’ caused 
consternation on the part of its closest allies and criticism of being a ‘free rider’ stung 
elites who had prided themselves on maintaining the country’s role as predictable, 
calculable and reliable member of the Western value community.  
Within a relatively short time span, German contributions to international peace-
keeping efforts and NATO out-of area missions increased. About 450 Bundeswehr 
soldiers were dispatched for medical support functions as part of the United Nations 
mission in Cambodia (UNTAC) between 1991 and 1992. Germany deployed 1700 troops 
for humanitarian relief operations as part of the United Nation Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM II) and Operation Hope in Somalia between 1993 and 1994. The country also 
participated in the humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo between 1993 and 1995 and the 
German Navy helped enforce a weapons embargo on Yugoslavia during Operation Sharp 
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Guard in the Adriatic Sea in 1992. German crews on NATO AWACS planes helped 
monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Operation Deny Flight in 
1993 and fighter jets were deployed for UN reconnaissance missions in Bosniaduri g the 
summer of 1995.  These missions had mostly been in support of humanitarian and 
reconnaissance objectives with the government taking great care to avoid the possibility 
of military combat. Each deployment caused a major debate among elites as opposition 
members from the Social-Democratic Party, Alliance 90/Greens and the Reformed 
Communist Party heavily criticized foreign policy actions they perceived as deviating 
from behavior associated with Germany’s civilian role.   
The main divergence from Germany’s tradition of abstaining from the use of 
force for non-defensive purposes occurred at the end of the Bosnian Civil War in 1995 
when a majority of parliamentarians chose to help enforce the Dayton Agreements by 
contributing to NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. This first deployment 
of combat troops outside of Germany since World War II marked a turning point in 
German security policy after which participation in UN and NATO missions increased 
significantly.  
Germany supported IFOR’s follow-up mission in Bosnia by contributing combat 
troops to NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996. Indicating the formation of a new 
elite consensus, the measure was passed in the Bundestag by an overwhelming majority. 
Another significant taboo was breached when German fighter aircraft partici ted in 
NATO combat missions during the Kosovo Crisis in 1999. During the 78-day air 
campaign Operation Allied Force against Serbia, Germany also performed high profile 
leadership and mediation roles for the coalition. Remarkably, German contributions to air 
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combat operations took place under a cabinet controlled by the former opposition which 
had vehemently opposed reorientation during the early 1990s.2  After the terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center, Germany supported the US campaign against international 
terrorism by contributing to the challenging mission in Afghanistan in 2001. As part of 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Germany deployed thousands of 
troops in the hostile environment of Afghanistan and took over leadership functions when 
the United States passed control over to NATO command. The creation of special 
commando forces in the late 1990s and their use in secret combat operations in 
Afghanistan also shows German tendencies to assume a more prominent role in wor d
politics.   
Germany now deploys thousands of troops in crisis spots around the world.  Like 
other powers engaged in international activities the German public has had to get used to 
increasing numbers of military casualties.  For many outside observers, the acceptance of 
the use of force and the growing international deployment of the Bundeswehr as part of 
the foreign policy of the Federal Republic has been nothing short of dramatic, if not 
revolutionary. The country is developing a new reputation by contributing to international 
security management commensurate with its power and by actively seeking out 
command-and-control positions.  
Change is also indicated by Germany’s more determined diplomatic efforts to 
increase its international profile and status. In a clear sign of a growing post-unification 
                                                
2 In 1995, Germany committed both fighter aircraft and troops to the crisis in Bosnia which did not see
action. At the time, Green Party leader Joschka Fischer criticized the parliamentary decision as the 
‘German Rubicon’ (“Letzter Versuch”, Der Spiegel, July 3, 1995, 26). After becoming the Foreign Minister 
in a Red-Green coalition government just two years l ter, Fischer found himself supporting aerial combat 
during the Kosovo Crisis.   
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self-consciousness, Germany led an initiative to reform the United Nations Security 
Council under Chancellor Schröder (Schöllgen 2004, 10). At the core of the series of 
proposed institutional and membership-related reforms was Germany’s desire to be 
included as permanent member.  While the objective failed, Germany has continued to 
pursue the goal of ‘taking on greater responsibility’ by securing a seat in the Security 
Council as indicated by Chancellor Merkel’s address to the United Nations in 2007 
(Merkel 2007).  
A final indicator suggesting that German role conceptions might be undergoing 
change is Germany’s “absolute deviation from multilateralism and the turn to 
unilateralism” (Maull 2004, 17). The unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 
1991, the growing unwillingness to serve as the European Union’s ‘paymaster’ during the 
1990s and the confrontational stance taken against the United States during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are noteworthy examples of a more assertive German role in 
European and global politics. Also significant was the German government’s refusal to 
back the US-led invasion of Iraq even if it had been authorized by the United Nations 
Security Council (Masala 2004, 2).  Elite discourse since 1995 in which national interests 
and the country’s power are more openly acknowledged further confirm that some kind 
of change is underway (Baumann 2002).  
Germany appears to be assuming a new role in international society with foreign 
policy behavior increasingly characterized by the tendency to more openly define and 
pursue national interests in ways more similar to that of ‘normal’ great powers like the 
United Kingdom or France. What prompted this fundamental change in role conceptions 
of which the use of force is considered a central aspect? Two major schools in 
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international relations theory provide differing accounts for the observed behavioral 
changes with opposing implications for international stability.   
 
The Importance of the Study 
 
For power-based explanations of national policy change including structural 
realism, the German security policy reorientation represents the beginning of a process of 
normalization with foreign policy behavior adjusting toward the less inhibited pursuit of 
national interests. During the Cold War era, residual rights of the quadripartite owers 
had restricted Germany’s foreign policy autonomy.  The bipolar distribution of power in 
Europe further reduced national policy latitude and sustained security cooperation on the 
basis of joint alliance objectives. The changes in the international system after the end of 
the Cold War and restored German sovereignty are viewed as primary causes for th  
normalization of policy conduct. Germany has the inherent capabilities of a great power. 
Faced with the less secure, multi-polar order of the post-Cold War era, Germany is seen 
as naturally seeking to increase its policy-making autonomy on security issues.3 
Unilateral policy actions and the open pursuit of national interests are expected to replace 
the emphasis on multilateralism and consensus-seeking that characterized previous 
security policy parameters. German foreign policy will become less predictable which 
could have profound ramifications for European and international security.  Realist 
assumptions and the associated connotations for German foreign policy are contested by 
liberal schools of thought that emphasize the impact of domestic and international 
institutions.     
                                                
3 Some realists content that the current unipolar world rder is relatively stable and will characteriz the 
international system for many years to come. See Wohlforth (1999). 
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 Neoliberal institutionalists regard German enmeshment in international 
institutions as relatively irreversible condition that will guide the preference formation of 
decision-makers for years to come. German participation in international institutions has 
greatly benefited the country which derives considerable national benefits from economic 
and political integration. Neoliberal institutionalists can claim that Germany has not 
abandoned its traditional inclination to support the expansion of the regulatory powers of 
international institutions. Germany has consented to additional losses in autonomy t  
supranational authority since reunification.4 The continued existence of the most 
important domestic institutions of the Federal Republic in the newly unified Germany 
further supports the argument that policy continuity rather than change is to be expected. 
Germany maintains a ‘semi-sovereign’ political system in which power is decentralized 
among different tiers in society. The constitution saw no significant revisions in regard to 
executive powers and the constitutional court has repeatedly supported the right of 
parliamentary approval in issues of military deployment. Germany maintains the military 
institutions created after the end of World War II. The absence of a joint chief of staff, 
the unique form of civil-military relations and the reliance on a conscripted rather than 
professional army continues to inhibit the development of a more assertive security 
policy. From an institutional point of view, the increasing assertiveness found in 
Germany’s global role appears as relatively inconsequential.  Increasing military 
involvement in peace enforcement operations may be viewed as arising naturally from a 
                                                
4 For instance, Germany supported further economic integration in the form of the European Monetary 
Union even though this entailed sacrificing the Deutsche Mark as important symbol of its postwar 
economic revival and success. 
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trading state’s practical concern for economic and political stability in international 
politics. 
 Realist and institutional approaches employ variants of utilitarianism as main 
operative logic informing the foreign policy preferences of politicians. Both appro ches 
downplay the importance of cultural variables according to which the interests of policy 
makers are ‘constructed’ in interactive social processes.  Social constructivists over that 
angle by assuming that the relations between actors within the international environment 
are structured by common understandings and normative principles about what 
constitutes appropriate behavior. This dissertation contributes to the social constructivist 
tradition.    
 
A Social Argument for Security Policy Reorientation 
 
Following constructivist logic, I argue that the reorientation of German security 
policy that started after reunification was a function of social pressure from the 
international community which convinced German political elites to adjust their 
country’s role behavior by embracing the use of force to support multilateral peace
enforcement missions.5 Since reunification, leaders of important Western states and 
international organizations have confronted parliamentary elites in Germany with 
expectations to contribute to international stability through the use of military force.  
Conservative elites promoted role adjustment during the 1990s on the basis of external
expectations because they were concerned about their country’s reputation as reliable and 
predictable ally. Elites from the center and the left vehemently opposed changes in 
                                                
5 Rathburn (2004, 3) defines peace enforcement as “the use of military coercion by third parties to impose 
peace among conflicting groups or force an improvement in humanitarian conditions”.  
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security policy. They argued that the maintenance of Germany’s civilian power r le 
necessitated the maintenance of a policy stance based on the rejection of the use of force. 
They lost their argument against policy adjustment because their role conc ption was not 
affirmed by the international environment.  
I propose that the international environment of the early post-Cold War era 
constituted a type of social structure characterized by shared security understandings 
(threat perceptions and necessary responses) and the specific contributions or role 
expectations (functions) of important member states. Role conceptions are used to
encapsulate the understanding shared by policy-making elites about the status of their 
state within the social environment and its obligations towards the collective. In short, 
elite conceptions of state status and function within the environment can be associated 
with understandings of appropriate state behavior.    
 Normative standards in the early post-Cold War environment changed under the 
impact of a significant increase in the number of domestic conflicts and expanding 
possibilities for multilateral action.6 An emphasis on state sovereignty and 
nonintervention had characterized the Cold War period during which the standoff 
between two antagonistic alliances had reduced the possibilities for intervention in the 
domestic affairs of sovereign states. The breakup of monolithic societies in Eatern 
Europe was accompanied by the temporary surge in the number of ethno-political 
conflicts. Domestic instability replaced national survival as preeminent threat. The 
normative accent placed on the preservation of sovereignty was qualified by the
                                                
6 According to Gurr (2000), the number of ethnopolitical conflicts increased dramatically during the early 
1990s and has since then declined substantially.  
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increasing acceptance of the principle of multilateral intervention designed to reduce the 
threats emanating from the instabilities within states. Changing threat perceptions 
coupled with emerging possibilities for military action prompted the development of new 
strategic doctrines by international institutions. The principle of deterrence r ceded into 
the background and was unseated by that of rapid intervention. Important system actors 
were being called upon to restructure their internal ideational and material capabilities in 
line with the evolving consensus on the emergence of a new security environment that 
was less stable and predictable than the one that had characterized the Cold War. The 
transformation of security perceptions, principles and response capabilities after the Cold 
War had a profound impact on German security policy.    
 Innate material capabilities conferred upon Germany the social status of a great 
power. As such, the country was perceived to have special responsibilities for the 
maintenance of peace and stability in Europe. During the Cold War, German 
responsibilities were met through the country’s unequivocal commitment to the NATO 
alliance. Germany served as the frontline state against the Warsaw Pact. German elites 
allowed the militarization of German territory and supported the seamless int gration of 
the Bundeswehr into alliance structures.  The emergence and solidification of intervention 
standards after the Cold War transformed the nature of responsibility. Within the context 
of the altered threat and response perceptions, German responsibilities could only be met 
by restructuring and deploying the Bundeswehr in peace enforcement missions outside of 
the country’s territory. Since Germany’s traditional role conception of a civilian power 
specifically ruled out such behavior as inappropriate, socialization by leaders of 
important reference states and institutions occurred to bring German role behavior in line 
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with the altered role expectations. Socialization occurred internationally throug  a 
process of role adjustment in the form of a series of German learning experiences called 
role episodes.7  Internally, role adjustment was initiated and pursued by leaders of the 
conservative Christian-Democrats (CDU/CSU) who acted as ‘role entrepreneurs’.8  
 Conservative elites with traditionally Western orientations and ideologically 
higher inclinations to use force were able to persuade other members of Germany’s 
political elite through the effective use of Germany’s role conception as a ‘reliable and 
predictable ally’ within the ‘Western value community’. Role entrepreneurs presented 
behavioral adaptation as necessary to maintain the traditional role concepti within the 
social reference group. They utilized a range of persuasive techniques centered on the 
argument that the requirements for maintaining international security had changed and 
that Germany had to meet its obligations to alliance and Western community. Failure to 
adapt by including the use of force was presented as leading to political and social 
isolation. Opponents of reorientation argued for the continuation of the antimilitant stance 
of the past. Their role conception of Germany as civilizing power in global politics was 
not affirmed by international expectations and an increasingly more volatile security 
environment. Eventually, many of the opponents changed their positions and either 
supported or acquiesced in Germany’s acceptance of the use of force. Inter-elite 
processes of persuasion were significantly influenced by the fluctuating strength of 
external expectations.     
                                                
7 The concept of role adaptation is taken from a theory addressing behavioral change in organizations 
(Kahn et al. 1966).  
 
8 Role entrepreneur is an appropriation of the term ‘norm entrepreneur’ used by Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998) to denote domestic actors who promote an externally generated normative standard at the domestic 
level. Role entrepreneurs promote new behavioral sets in the foreign policy orientation of their states.  
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 The ability of social messages to affect actor behavior - the effectiveness of 
socialization - is influenced by factors of message coherency and consistency. The 
socializing power of normative standards increases as these become more concrete 
through the process of codification and their systematic application by an international 
organization. The natural tendency of other state actors to interpret standards accoring to 
their national interests and produce ‘normative noise’ to exert influence diminishes a  
standards of appropriate action become more clearly defined and more consistently 
applied. Variance and potential delays in actor socialization are to be expect d as 
normative standards evolve. Intervention standards and response mechanisms became 
more concrete after the Cold War as the emphasis shifted from deterrence to addressing 
internal insecurities through multilateral intervention. The pressure on German politicians 
to comply with expectations steadily increased over the observed time period. Social 
messages became effective in modifying the security policy behavior of the Federal 
Republic only after advanced degrees of codification and application of intervention 
norms had been reached.   
 Additional factors important in understanding variance in compliance with 
external demands are the interests of domestic elite actors themselves. Socialization 
initially involves the transformation of elite behavior. Elite actors may also internalize 
new values and develop different identities which result in altered behavioral preferences. 
Identity change is difficult, complex and characterized by internal confi ts. The 
transformation of established identities and policy preferences may be supported by 
utilitarian considerations. External demands of behavior create political opportunities for 
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some elite actors which then make the adoption of new standards desirable from an 
instrumental point of view.  
 The decades of the 1980s and 1990s produced important changes in Germany’s 
party landscape. The three-party system that had defined much of the post-war era began 
to give way to a five-party system. A virulent Green Party and a reform d communist 
party (PDS) emerged on the left while the extreme Republikaner Party gained support on 
the far right. As a general disillusionment with politics (Politikverdrossenheit) was 
undermining membership in the main catch-all parties, Christian-Democratic 
(CDU/CSU) and Democratic Socialist (SPD) parties struggled to redefine themselves in 
the changing landscape. External expectations of Germany’s proper role in global politics 
during the early 1990s influenced the process by which the main parties sought to 
redefine their policy platforms. Foreign expectations established standards of appropriate 
foreign policy behavior that influenced perceptions of electoral viability 
(Regierungsfähigkeit). Increasingly, political elites embraced the externally generated 
demand for the use of force to establish themselves and their parties as viable contenders 
for governance. In sum, the dissertation investigates the relationship between ext rnally 
generated role expectations and the micro-level interests of parliament ry elites. It 
primarily focuses on the socialization of state elites but also considers the process by 
which elites contribute to the evolution of social environments through role performance, 
role avoidance or role challenges.   
 Within the constructivist agenda, the contribution of this study is found in the 
application of a cultural model to understand the process of behavioral change. Cultural 
models generally view social constructions as independent variables. This tends to lead to 
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a preoccupation with stability coupled with the neglect of factors explaining normative 
transformation. I am proposing that a combination of insights culled from foreign policy 
analysis, strategic culture, role theory and norm diffusion literature allows us to better 
understand the important phenomenon of foreign policy reorientation. 
 Foreign policy analysis illuminates factors that influence the behavior of states. 
The field consists of an often eclectic mix of theories operating at one or several l ls of 
analysis. Characteristics of the international system including the distribution of power, 
the level of institutionalization and the cultural components of international society have 
been considered as influences on state behavior at the structural level. At th  state level of 
analysis, internal processes including bureaucratic politics, intra- and intergroup 
dynamics and the cognitive processes and personal attributes of high-ranking decision-
makers are just some of the elements that are routinely examined for their influ nce on 
state foreign policy formulation. Two puzzles, in particular, have occupied resea chers in 
the field. The first one is the relationship and relative influence of internal and external 
factors on processes of state foreign policy formulation. The second puzzle is the 
explanation of policy restructuring which is thought to occur relatively infrequently due 
to constraints imposed by domestic path-dependencies created by culture and institutions 
on one hand and constraints imposed by the external environment on the other. This 
dissertation contributes to both problems through the use of a social theory which 
employs the concepts of roles and role behavior.  
 Roles are important concepts within the context of the turn to culture, ideas and 
norms in international relations theory. Role theory offers a complementary account of 
the constructed nature of international politics to Wendt’s (1992; 1999) emphasis of 
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identities, Onuf’s (1989) consideration of speech acts or Kratochwil’s (1991) use of law. 
As properties of the collective, roles establish behavioral expectations on the basis of an 
actor’s status, functions or responsibilities within a social environment. When actors
internalize the behavioral patterns associated with certain roles, the behavior becomes 
part of their identity. Role-related actions then constitute appropriate behavior and 
deviation from the socially validated behavior becomes ‘psychological painful’. By 
linking security policy conduct to state roles and viewing policy changes as a type of role 
adaptation occurring in response to altered role expectations, the dissertation contributes 
directly to the current constructivist research agenda on state socialization.   
 Socialization is defined as the adoption of the norms, values, attitudes and 
behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system (Sigel 1970, vii). By showing 
that Germany underwent behavioral changes in the paramount area of security in 
response to external socialization processes, the dissertation supports constructivist 
claims about the impact of international norms on state behavior.  By considering th 
impact of strategic culture on elite role conceptions, I also add to the knowledge on 
processes of international norm diffusion and domestic resonance. Normative standards 
are transferred to the state level through the adaptation of elite role conc pti s. This 
allows for an explanation of norm diffusion even in the absence of resonance with mass 
publics, institutions or strategic cultures.  
The contemporary debate between rational and reflectivist approaches in 
international relations theory finds utilitarian-rationalist approaches including realism and 
liberalism on one side and social constructivism on the other. The approaches suggest 
two competing decision-making logics.  Rationalism assumes that actors weigh costs and 
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benefits of potential policy actions. Behavior is motivated by utilitarian and self-serving 
considerations. It is considered instrumental because it is based on the logic of
consequences. The position of reflectivism is linked to the logic of social appropriateness. 
Here, actors consider the validity of their actions within the context of cultural 
constructions including morals, norms, or community values.  By focusing on 
socialization processes, I intend to contribute primarily to the tradition of reflectivism. 
However, I reject the position of pure reflectivism in favor of one that views the ac ions 
of actors as being motivated by both types of logic. This raises the question of h w the 
adaptation of role behavior was ‘useful’ to German elites pursuing a range of 
instrumental objectives during the ongoing process of international socialization. By 
including the domestic dimension of elite interests, this dissertation bridges the divide 
between the two positions in an effort to contribute to greater clarity about their 
relationship in actual policy situations.   
  Strategic culture is part of the category of foreign policy approaches that views 
state behavior as consequence of domestic characteristics. The central premise of 
strategic culture is that states exhibit differential foreign policy behavior due to value sets 
generated by unique historical and cultural development trajectories. These value sets 
impose broad cultural restraints on elite and public preferences. They define standards of 
acceptable foreign policy behavior. A central issue in the study of strategic culture has 
been the utility of the concept given that national foreign policy may at times deviate 
from the culturally defined value set. Germany’s rediscovery of the use of force is an 
excellent example of this problem.   
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 German strategic culture is widely acknowledged to have changed profoundly 
after World War II. The collective trauma incurred by two lost world wars is believed to 
have generated a new national culture informed by the central value of antimilitarism.9 
Since 1945, political elites and the general public view the efficacy of military force as 
negative with a smaller part of the population rejecting force under any circumstance. 
Antimilitarism in German culture produces a dilemma for strategic culture approaches 
attempting to account for the turn to military force during the 1990s. Did German culture 
change in important ways after reunification or does the policy divergence from the value 
of antimilitarism indicate problems within the paradigm? Strategic culture studies of the 
‘third generation’ suggest the possibility of culture as “the product of more recent 
practice and experience” (Johnston 1995a, 41).10 Newer approaches also assume the 
existence of separate strategic cultures whose values may inform particular institutions or 
groups and act as intervening variables in policy formulation processes.11  
 The use of elite role conceptions has several advantages for the study of strategic 
culture and its use in foreign policy analysis. Elite role conceptions allow for the 
differentiation between the value-sets of political elites and society in Germany. 
Separating elites and society creates the potential to illuminate processes of domestic 
                                                
9 Antimilitarism refers to the cultural rejection ofmilitaristic and nationalistic norms held responsible for 
what is widely regarded as the ‘German catastrophe’. The term catastrophe conjures up a cluster of 
collectively shared negative and traumatic memories. These memories include the elements of 
authoritarianism, militarism and jingoism (which expressed itself in a unique form of foreign policy realism 
called Geopolitik). The conjunction of these elements is generally perceived as dotting a unique 
development path (Sonderweg) which culminated in the disrespect for international law, internal 
suppression, genocide and war. See Markovits and Reich (1997) on the importance of collective memory in 
structuring cultural parameters in modern Germany. 
 
10 Johnston (1995a) categorizes strategic culture studies in three generations of scholars.  
 




value transformation occurring through elite leadership. Elites also act asinterface 
between external and domestic cultures. Showing that socialization occurred effectiv ly 
shows how strategic cultures - long viewed as generated by internal elements - may be 
influenced and even reshaped by external factors. The inclusion of elite actions nd 
external influence suggests that strategic cultures of states ought t be viewed as much 
more malleable and temporary constructions than previously thought.  
 
Methodology and Case Selection  
 
The dissertation employs a structured, focused and comparative case study 
methodology to investigate the impact of external expectations on the role conceptions of 
German elites between 1990 and 1995. The term structured refers to a method in which 
cases are compared by asking the same general questions to guide data collection. This 
allows for a systematic comparison and accumulation of the findings. The method is 
focused because it investigates specific aspects of the cases as determined by a theory-
guided selection in the analysis of cases.12 It differs from a rich historical account in that 
it is based on an analytical explanation in which some of the ric ness of the account is 
lost. In return for disregarding some of the case details, the researcher should be able to 
verify or falsify the processes among variables as established by the research design. The 
combination of rigor in comparison and detailed context in qualitative cas studies allows 
for the identification of variables and hypotheses, the testing of causal mechanisms as 
well as the development of typological theories, or contingent generalizations involving 
differentiated types of variables, cases and outcomes (George and Bennett 2005).   
                                                
12 Notable contributors to the method of structured, focused comparison have been Lijphart (1975), George 
(1979) and George and Bennett (1997; 2005). 
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Three cases between 1990 and 1995 were chosen for analysis. Each case involved 
an important security policy challenge after the Cold War in which German decision-
makers were confronted with external expectations of appropriate foreign pol cy conduct. 
Each case represents a role episode which consists of a complete cycle of role sending, 
the response by the focal actor, and the effects of that response on the role senders (Kahn 
et al. 1966, 277). German elites had the option to comply with, avoid or reject role 
expectations. Throughout the examined period, pressure on German elites to conform by 
participating in peace enforcement missions increased steadily as newly arising security 
challenges generated organizational responses in the form of revised strategic doctrines. 
The concretization of these doctrines increased the normative pressure on elites to giv  in 
to expectations regarding their country’s military contributions. In each case, German 
actions or inactions were vital enough to the international social environment to attract
international attention and incur criticism. Finally, during each role episode, elites were 
concerned about their country’s role in international politics but also wrestled with 
different diplomatic or domestic issues of their own which influenced their ultimate 
policy behavior. The social argument for reorientation is tested on the cases of th  
Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), the unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (1991-
1992) and the Bosnian Civil War (1992-1995).  
  Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 created the first major security 
challenge of the post-Cold War era. The United States and important NATO allies 
quickly developed a consensus on militarily reversing Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. 
NATO allies and the UN repeatedly requested German military assist nce in the 
multilateral effort. Foreign policy elites advocated a new role for Germany through 
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formal and informal channels. The country was to show greater responsibility by 
militarily contributing to international peace and stability. Germany was expected to act 
more commensurate with capabilities, deploying its resources in ways similar to other 
great powers. External expectations of German policy behavior ran counter to traditi nal 
role conceptions which disallowed decisive and military engagement in international 
politics. German elites were caught between international expectations to alter the 
country’s functions in international relations and the tradition of maintaining the civilian 
power role conception which had served the country well since 1945. Normative pressure 
to alter German behavior coming from important allies and the UN remained relatively 
ineffective. Intervention standards were only just beginning to change and German lites 
generally failed to grasp the profound changes occurring in the international security 
environment that necessitated the use of force.      
  Conservative elites attempted to meet international expectations and promoted 
role behavior changes on the basis of alliance solidarity.  They quickly backed down 
when challenged by their own coalition-partners and politicians from the left on the basis 
of elements of the traditional role conception. FDP politicians articulated concerns with 
the legal aspects of German participation while the SPD leadership emphasized negative 
views on the efficacy of force. Elite unity was maintained on the basis of the tradition l 
role conception. Germany declined military assistance and practiced checkbook 
diplomacy by contributing considerable amounts of financial assistance. Troops were 
deployed to defend NATO ally Turkey from a potential Iraqi attack but only after a 
diplomatically damaging domestic discussion. The rise in the number of conscious 
objectors and widespread demonstrations for peace throughout Germany indicated that 
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the general public continued to reject the use of force. The decisions of political eles 
were also influenced by important domestic concerns which made the maintenance of the 
traditional role conception advisable from a utilitarian point of view. 
  Concerns and issues pertaining to the reunification of Germany trumped all other 
areas of politics in 1990. The Persian Gulf War could not have occurred at a more 
momentous time in the country’s history. At the core of the complicated reunification 
process was the negotiation of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty which restored full sovereignty 
but had to be ratified by each one of the quadripartite powers. Elites were concerned 
about being perceived as playing too assertive a role at a momentous time when the fate 
of Germany was decided by foreign publics many of which remained apprehensive about 
renewed German strength and national ambitions after reunification.  With little guidance 
from international intervention norms, a somewhat euphoric mindset about newfound 
possibilities of international governance after the Cold War and the need to complete 
German reunification, elite role conceptions coalesced on the basis of the country’s 
civilian power role. The Persian Gulf War episode marked the beginning of the process 
of role adaptation. 
  In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. 
Nationalistic constitutions were passed that insufficiently protected the rig ts of the 
sizable Serb minority still residing in the newly independent states. Civil war broke out as 
the Serb-controlled Yugoslav army intervened to safeguard the territorial integrity of the 
state of Yugoslavia and protect the rights of the Serb minority. The international 
community withheld recognition of the two breakaway republics while hostilities 
intensified. German policy reactions first remained within the internatio l consensus to 
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maintain Yugoslav unity. In the fall of 1991, German politicians diverted from that 
consensus and mounted an intense diplomatic campaign to recognize Croatia and 
Slovenia. Chancellor Kohl and his foreign minister Genscher made informal assurances 
of official recognition to the leaders of the states. Germany began to play an increasingly 
more assertive role which eventually forced the European Union to move towards 
recognition. Having achieved its diplomatic objectives, Germany still found it necessary 
to extend recognition unilaterally in early 1992. This diplomatic act stunned international 
observers and alienated the country’s close allies. Heavy international criticism over the 
assertive role followed Germany’s first major unilateral action after th  Cold War.  
  The recognition episode saw international norms of sovereignty and state 
recognition clash with those of national self-determination and intervention. Normative 
latitude allowed individual countries to pursue their national interests. German elites  
bandwagoned on the recognition train after politicians noticed that dramatic politial 
action to stop the violence in Yugoslavia resonated with the electorate. Germany’s 
unilateral recognition may be understood in terms of elite electoral interests and the need 
to resolve a major crisis without recourse to the use of force within the context f 
underdetermined normative standards regarding intervention that characterized the 
international social environment at this time. 
  The Bosnian Civil War between 1992 and 1995 constituted the central period of 
German security policy reorientation. Here, lessons learned from the previous role 
episodes, in conjunction with the ongoing concretization of global security norms 
translated into increasing social pressure on German elites to change their country’s 
position on the use of force. Massive human rights violations in Bosnia and the failing 
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efforts of international institutions also contributed to changes in elite perceptions. The 
civilian power role conception based on the rejection of military force became 
increasingly untenable. The civil war featured a series of smaller role episod s including 
the 1993 decision to allow German crews to stay on NATO-run AWAC monitoring 
missions over Bosnia, the deployment of Tornado fighter jets for reconnaissance missions 
in June of 1995, and the eventual deployment of troops as part of the multilateral 
Implementation Force (IFOR) enforcing the Dayton Agreement. The 1994 decision of the 
Constitutional Court to allow German military participation in out-of-area actions as part 
of allied peace enforcement operations was widely regarded as historic, as was the 
country’s deployment of the largest contingent of troops outside of German territory 
since World War II. During the episode(s), Germany also joined the high-profile Contact 
Group which sought to negotiate an end to the conflict in Bosnia. Finally, the country 
developed a strong interest in gaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security
Council.  
 
Conclusion and Organization of the Dissertation 
 
 This dissertation explores a fundamental reorientation in security policy in the
case of Germany since reunification. The central principle under investigation is the use 
of force although the more general focus is on the conceptions elites hold about their 
country’s role in international relations after the Cold War. The main process of 
reorientation occurred between 1990 and 1995 when Germany sent significant numbers 
of combat troops outside of its territory for the first time since World War II. Since then, 
Germany has become a major contributor to international peace-keeping missions under 
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UN and NATO auspices. The country has also sought to increase its diplomatic profile as 
indicated by the country’s persistent attempts at acquiring a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council. Domestic institutions have been reshaped to accommodate role 
adaptation and long-standing interpretations of strategic doctrines have been chall nged. 
The German Constitutional Court supported out-of-area missions in 1993 and 1994 and 
the Bundeswehr has been restructured to develop the capabilities for rapid deployment 
outside of German territory. Germany’s embrace of the use of force remains at odds with 
its strategic culture that emphasizes the importance of unique post-war values and 
institutions inhibiting the use of force outside of German territory. This study proposes 
that security policy reorientation occurred as a function of new elite understandings of 
German responsibilities after the Cold War. These were generated by new und rstandings 
of the international security environment which established new role-specific 
expectations of important actors within the system.  
 The dissertation will proceed in the following way: Chapter 2 presents the cont xt 
and the outlines of a social theory explaining the process of security policy reorientation 
between 1990 and 1995 as well as the methodology employed.  Chapters 3, 4 and 5 apply 
the theory to three cases which are considered as role episodes because of their social 
nature: The Persian Gulf Crisis (1990-1991), the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia 
(1991-1992), and the Bosnian Civil War (1992-1995). The Bosnian Civil War is crucial 
to understanding reorientation because international expectations became concretized and 
role pressure to conform eventually forced German compliance. Because of its 
importance to the argument, the case is presented in greater detail with an emphasis on 
the following policy situations and debates: Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic Sea, 
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Operation Deny Flight over Bosnia-Herzegovina, Operation Deliberate Force and the 
enforcement of the Dayton Agreements through NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR).  
Chapter 6 revisits the theory, presents the findings, addresses contributions to ongoing 
debates in the research areas of norm diffusion, strategic culture and foreign policy 
















































Understanding the behavior of states is one of the most complex undertakings in 
political science. The over-simplified view of states as both unitary and r tional actors 
reacting to systemic challenges has long ceased to be of much use in foreign policy 
analysis. Approaches that focus on the interplay of domestic actors, institutions and 
processes frequently downplay or neglect the impact of the external milieu. More useful 
approaches will account for the unique characteristics of the state under observation 
while also considering the impact of external factors. A more complex theory “that 
considers…multiple levels and that grabbles with the intricacies of the link between 
domestic and international factors in foreign policy analysis is by nature mo  
cumbersome and messier” (Haar 2001, 8). The theory of foreign policy reorientation to 
be presented combines the quest for generalization with the need to include the unique 
details of processes within Germany.  
I begin by presenting a brief overview of the context of German security pol cy 
including a historical account of security policy during the Cold War period and the 
discussion of unique cultural and institutional factors. After that, this chapter will cover 
the main theoretical approaches to German foreign policy from which hypotheses about 
foreign policy preferences can be deduced. I then lay out a social theory of German 
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foreign policy reorientation. The chapter ends by presenting the methodology employ d 
including a list of research questions used for comparative analysis and the consid ration 
of data sources.      
 
The Context of German Security Policy 
 
German Security Policy during the Cold War 
 
Germany has played a crucial role in the history of the world. Divided into a 
patchwork of independent states, modern Germany was proclaimed after a war with 
France in 1871. The comparatively late consolidation of the state was followed by a fast-
paced modernization process. In the interest of national unity and power, democracy and 
liberal values were sacrificed by some and systematically suppressed by others. The 
nationalistic strategies pursued by the powerful state would weigh heavily on future 
generations. Associated with Germany’s modernization between 1864 and 1945 were 
aggressive wars, millions of military and civilian casualties as well as millions of murders 
perpetrated as part of the genocidal policies of the Third Reich. World War II resulted in 
Germany’s total military defeat, sociopolitical bankruptcy and utter physical destruction. 
Two newly emergent superpowers had finally dealt with the problem of unbalanced 
hegemony in Central Europe. The division of Europe resolved the German problem by 
keeping the Soviets out, the Americans in and the Germans down.13   
                                                
13 The original statement attributed to Lord Ismay was that “NATO was designed to keep the Americans in, 
the Russians out and the Germans down” (quoted in Ash 1993, 389).  Ash (1993, 358) writes that “both the 
Atlantic Alliance and the European Community were to save Europe from itself - that is, from reverting to 
the bad old ways of warring nation states -, to protect all of Western Europe from the Soviet Union and to 
protect the rest of Western Europe against Germany”.  
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The Federal Republic of Germany came into existence in 1949 when British, 
American and French occupation zones were merged and a new capital was establish d 
in Bonn. Also that year, the German Democratic Republic emerged from the Soviet 
occupation zone as a communist client state of the Soviet Union. Two central objectives 
determined the foreign policy of the Federal Republic during the early post-war years: 
The desire to reintegrate the country into the world community as a sovereign state after 
the total defeat and the reunification of the German nation.  
The historic burden created by the aggressive and nationalistic policies of the past 
weighed heavily on the new republic. To overcome this burden, Chancellor Adenauer 
pursued a foreign policy aimed at reestablishing trust with Germany’s former occupiers. 
The policy of Western integration (Westbindung) clearly prioritized the unequivocal 
positioning of Germany as part of the emerging Western alliance and, only to a secondary 
degree, involved efforts aimed at reunification. As part of Westpolitik and the goal of 
reintegration, German political elites pursued their country’s membership in inter ational 
organizations. Support for multilateralism and international governance would become a 
defining characteristic of post-World War II German foreign policy. Germany signed the 
Treaty of Paris in 1951 which established the European Coal and Steel Community, 
joined NATO in 1955, and also signed the Rome Treaty of 1957 which established the 
European Economic Community. The decision to rearm and join NATO was 
controversial given a profoundly altered strategic culture characterized by the central 
value of antimilitarism. Opposition parties used moral, financial and even constitutional 
arguments to prevent rearmament (Lantis 2002b, 73). In the end, rearmament and NATO 
membership was achieved with unique provisions assigning the Bundeswehr’s 340,000 
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combat forces to NATO rather than German central command. The German milit ry 
became an alliance army, designed to play its part in maintaining a credible deterrent. It 
was not intended to be a fighting force employable for the pursuit of Germany’s national 
security policy objectives. In return, allied countries stationed troops in Germany as 
defense against Soviet aggression and pledged to protect Germany through both 
conventional and nuclear means (Ibid.). Germany also renounced weapons of mass 
destruction in 1954 and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1975. When 
the Adenauer cabinet agreed to the stationing of US nuclear warheads on German soil, a 
contentious campaign against the decision erupted between 1957 and 1958. The nuclear 
weapons debate ended when the Social Democratic party dropped its resistance to 
Germany’s Western orientation. Elite preferences prevailed over public concern about 
stationing weapons of mass destruction.   
Compared to the diplomatic flexibility and innovation of Westpolitik, policy 
towards East Germany and Eastern Europe had appeared stilted and dogmatic. Political 
gestures including the use of the term Basic Law (Grundgesetz) for the new constitution 
to indicate the open-ended nature of German state building could not disguise the fact 
that German policy towards the East was dictated by Western priorities wh ch, in turn, 
became increasingly subjected to the imperatives of the Cold War.  
Between 1955 and 1969, the Federal Republic attempted to isolate and 
delegitimize the communist regime in East Germany through the use of an exclusive 
mandate to representation known as the Hallstein Doctrine. The policy directive 
threatened the termination of diplomatic relations with states that chose to recognize the 
Democratic Republic. It was applied inconsistently and alienated governments in many 
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parts of the world. It also prevented the establishment of relations with Eastern European 
countries because it ran counter to the interests of the Soviet Union. To correct that 
problem, Adenauer’s successor Erhard attempted to revitalize German foreig  policy in 
1963 by starting a diplomatic initiative to conclude friendship treaties with Eastern 
European states designed to isolate East Germany. However, the Soviet Union quickly 
countered these efforts by signing a mutual assistance treaty with East Germany in 1964. 
Even the successful establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania in 1967 would 
do little to validate a policy that had clearly failed in its primary objectiv  to reestablish 
ties with Eastern Europe without surrendering the claim to the exclusive mandate. A 
fundamental reorientation of foreign policy was needed. It would not be achieved until 
the cabinet of Willy Brandt in 1969. Chancellor Brandt’s foreign policy initiative known 
as Ostpolitik was designed to reconnect West and East through a series of important 
agreements.  
Brandt quickly moved towards a realistic acceptance of the territorial status in 
Europe by signing non-aggression treaties with Poland and the USSR. After that, the as 
yet unsolved status of Berlin was finally settled through the Four Power Agreement of 
1971 which affirmed joint quadripartite rights and responsibilities for Germany. With 
East Germany, the Federal Republic signed a comprehensive Basic Treaty in 1972 which 
extended de facto recognition to East Germany as ‘German state of the same nation’. As 
such, sovereignty of the East German regime was not fully recognized - a distinction that 
was lost on the rest of the world which quickly recognized the German Democratic 
Republic. The foreign policy reorientation was possible because the period of détente 
during the early 1970s had increased the policy latitude of German politicians. In turn, 
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German Ostpolitik became the centerpiece of superpower détente. The period culminated 
in the Helsinki Accords of 1975 in which 35 European countries and the US established a 
range of important provisions including the inviolability of borders and respect for 
territorial integrity. The norms supporting sovereignty were highly useful becaus  they 
allowed for the peaceful coexistence of diametrically opposed regimes duringthe Cold 
War. They would only be challenged when the Cold War ended and its associated 
security environment was superseded by one characterized by greater instabilit e .     
The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 effectively ended the period known 
as détente. Additional tensions had emerged over Soviet efforts to modernize its theatre
nuclear forces in Europe. With the deployment of the intermediate range SS-20 missiles 
in 1977, the growing imbalance in tactical missiles became a major cause for concern in 
Western Europe because the strategic arms control agreements SALT I and SALT II had 
neutralized US superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles.14 When NATO addressed 
the imbalance through the Double Track Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces in 
December 1979, Chancellor Schmidt agreed to have Intermediate Range Nuclear Forc s 
(INF) stationed in Germany. The Bundestag would approve Schmidt’s initial decision in 
1983 but the prospect of stationing large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in 
Germany again created major problems given the country’s antimilitant culture. A vocal 
peace movement opposing the deployment of INF weapons developed.15 The vehement 
public resistance would soon raise questions abroad about German reliability within the 
                                                
14 NATO, Special Meeting of Foreign and Defense Minister , The “Double-Track” Decision on Theatre 
Nuclear Forces, 1979, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27040.htm, accessed October 13, 
2009.  
 
15 A petition against INF deployment called the ‘Krefeld Appeal’ had received over 1.5 million signatures 
by 1982 (See Boutwell 1983, 80). 
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alliance.  The emergence of the movement was part of more fundamental processes of 
change within German society that had been ongoing since the late 1960s.16 The 
consequences of these social and political changes were now beginning to affect the 
traditional party spectrum and the positions of parties.   
The German peace movement had its roots in the anti-nuclear energy campaigns 
and the rise of environmental concerns of the 1970s. The political leadership of the 
diverse movement was provided by the Green Party. Formed in the 1970s as an 
antiestablishment party, the Greens were quickly gaining prominence among voters 
dissatisfied by the centrist consensus maintained by the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP. In the 
early 1980s, the party greatly benefited from its firm pacifist position and the stance 
against nuclear proliferation. Electoral support for the Green Party increased and in 1983, 
Greens first achieved parliamentary representation by garnering 5.6 percent of the 
electoral vote. By 1987, party support had soared to 8.3 percent as increasing numbers of 
formerly social democratic voters switched to a party that better represented their core 
concerns. Voter realignment processes also affected the CDU/CSU as main party on the 
right spectrum.    
In 1983, disenchanted members of the CSU formed the right-wing populist party 
Die Republikaner. Languishing for a number of years, the party’s electoral fortunes 
improved when Germany faced a surge in the number of refugees and illegal immigrants 
during the late 1980s. During the 1989 Berlin elections, the party took 7.5 percent of the 
vote, followed by 7.1 percent in the European elections (Betz 1993, 415). The federal 
elections of 1990 were relatively disappointing for the party because it failed to gain 
                                                
16 See Boutwell (1983) for a more detailed overview of the origins of the peace movement.  
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parliamentary representation. However, successes continued at the regional level where 
the rightwing party continued to siphon electoral support from the CDU/CSU by 
appealing to conservative voting groups. In April 1992, the Republiker Party received 
almost 12 percent of the vote in the state of Baden-Württemberg (Ibid.). Rightwin  
successes at the regional level had the potential to reduce CDU/CSU power in Germany’s 
upper house. Both SPD and CDU/CSU leaders were eager to prevent the other party from 
becoming a co-governing force in Germany’s federal system through control f the 
powerful Bundesrat. In sum, the successes of more radical parties on both sides of the 
spectrum generated pressure on established parties to reexamine their programs in an 
effort to maintain voter appeal.   
For the Social Democrats as traditional advocates for peace, the programmatic 
challenge posed by the Greens initiated discussions about abandoning centrist policy 
orientations maintained since Chancellor Schmidt. Influential party members began to 
argue that the party ought to move further to the left in order to regain the support of 
young voter groups who had been lost to the Greens (Berger 1998, 164). CDU/CSU 
politicians responded to pressure from the right wing by embracing the issue of 
immigration reform which they saw as fuelling support for more extreme positions. Both 
CDU/CSU and SPD were also struggling with considerable membership declines as 
citizens increasingly preferred grassroots engagement to active participation in the catch-
all parties.17 For liberal politicians of the FDP, the most pressing issue was the potential 
loss of their kingmaker position in coalition governments which was in danger of being 
                                                
17 See Kvistad (1999) for a more detailed overview of changes in participation and party membership 
during the early 1990s. 
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usurped by the Green Party. Thus, the years preceding reunification were characterized 
by realignment processes in the traditional party system which increased lite concerns 
about maintaining electoral support. These processes coincided with the dramatic chain 
of events that would radically transform international politics. 
 Mikhail Gorbachev took control of the Soviet Union in 1985. He ended the Cold 
War dynamic between the superpowers through a series of bold foreign policy moves.  
Perhaps most momentous among those decisions was his abandonment of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine which had threatened independent regime change in Eastern European countries 
with military intervention by the Soviet Union.18 A series of earthshaking transitions 
swept across Europe. The changes began with the legalization of the Solidarity 
Movement in Poland in April 1989 and culminated with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in December 1991. The Cold War effectively ended and its relatively stable 
bipolar security environment soon gave way to more uncertain conditions and new 
security threats. Nationalist conflicts, disintegrating states, genocide and large-scale 
refugee problems reemerged as security problems in Europe. The challenges of the new 
security environment created the need for revised threat definitions, response doctrines 
and capabilities to address the emerging problems associated with domestic instabilities. 
International organizations including NATO, UN, OSCE, EU and WEU responded by 
strengthening the emphasis on the principle of multilateral intervention. Rapid 
intervention doctrines and the expanding peacekeeping agenda of international 
                                                
18 The Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968 justified the external suppression of anti-socialist developments in 
socialist countries. It was articulated by the Soviet Union in response to liberal reforms in Czechoslovakia 
commonly known as the Prague Spring which were ended through the invasion of the country.  For a full 
text of the speech given by Soviet Leader Brezhnev see 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/pgc.asp?page=mod/1968brezhnev.html (accessed May 19, 2009).   
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organizations required new national capabilities thus prompting both reorganization and 
modernization of national militaries to accommodate the new mission spectrum. The 
required changes produced particular problems for Germany.  
Germany’s ‘alliance army’ was a blunt sword designed for little elsbut territorial 
defense against a massive attack. Antimilitarism had made achieving rearmament and 
NATO membership a heavily contested process in 1955. Now that the Cold War had 
ended, Germany’s public expected a ‘peace dividend’. Powerful antimilitary institutions, 
widespread pacifist attitudes and negative views on the efficacy of military force all made 
reorganization and modernization of the Bundeswehr a politically difficult goal. 
Nevertheless, the changing requirements created by the international security 
environment exerted pressure on the country’s elites and its public to consider the basis 
for a new consensus on Germany’s role in world politics.  
The overview of German security policy until reunification reveals three central 
contextual elements important in understanding the security policy reorientation of the 
1990s. The first element is the persistence of the value of antimilitarism characterizing 
the strategic culture of the Federal Republic. The public’s rejection of the use of force 
resulted in repeated challenges to government policy during the 1950s and early 1980s. 
The profound skepticism about both appropriateness and usefulness of military force 
present in strategic culture imposed constraints on elite decision-maki g in issues or 
policy actions involving the use of force. A second element is Germany’s strong 
preference for multilateral foreign policy and regional integration coupled with the 
aversion to having the country assume a leadership role in international political affairs 
(Hyde-Price 2003, 187). Political elites have literally been obsessed with having the 
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country appear as calculable and reliable partner who honors international commitments 
(Duffield 1999, 782). Lastly, the survey of Germany’s security policy during the Cold 
War period indicates the crucial role played by parliamentary elites. Elites redirected 
security policy at important junctures in the history of the Federal Republic. They 
pursued German remilitarization, firmly committed the country to the NATO alliance and 
consented to the stationing of nuclear weapons. At times, elite actions went contrary to 
public opinion and even deviated from central values established by strategic culture. It is 
plausible to view political elites as promoters and agents of the security polic
reorientation process that took place during the 1990s. Germany’s decision-makers 
reacted to external demands generated by a transformed security environment.      
 
Strategic Culture and Institutions  
 
A central problem for any explanation of foreign policy reorientation is the strong 
inertia attached to institutions and processes characterizing the domestic realm of policy-
making which makes radical and durable shifts in foreign policy comparatively rar 
phenomena (Volgy and Schwarz 1991, 617). A domestic ‘web of constraint’ is created by 
factors such as bureaucratic processes, the path-dependencies generated by prior 
decisions and institutions, ideological commitments and limitations imposed by national 
resources. This web restricts the ability of leaders to effectuate fundamental foreign 
policy change (Volgy and Schwarz 1994, 27).19 In part, the problem is due to a tendency 
                                                
19 Insights from organizational theory, in particular, suggest that institutions are more stable than the 
environment they operate in.  Resource constraints d high transaction costs associated with changes i  
organizational parameters tend to reduce the pace and xtent of adaptation.  Organizational inertia is further 
maintained through behavioral standards, selection biases in recruitment and socialization, tasks and 
operating procedures, rituals, jargon, perceptions and shared memories (Welch 2005, 32-33).   
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in foreign policy analysis to focus on stable patterns and to “treat breaks in patters s 
exceptions, as nuisances which complicate our task” (Rosenau 1976, 371).20 National 
policy path-dependencies are frequently the result of values contained within strategic 
culture which suffuse existing institutions and constrain individual preferences. German 
strategic culture and security policy institutions are characterized by a set of unique 
values which provided the context for policy reorientation of the 1990s. 
Strategic culture has been defined as “ideas, conditional emotional responses, and 
patterns of habitual behavior” (Snyder 1977, 8) or “a limited, ranked set of grand 
strategic preferences” (Johnston 1995, 38). The concept refers to enduring national 
tendencies that arise from unique and prolonged historical experiences (Longhurst 2004, 
17; Gray 1986, 36-7). Strategic culture acts a collectively shared framework, filte  or 
prism which determines individuals’ interpretation of reality (Poore 2004, 50). It suffuses 
society and its political institutions. It imposes constraints on elite action by establishing 
standards on what is considered natural and common sense (Kier 1995, 78; Duffield 
1999, 772). Crucial elements in strategic culture are the “modes of thought and actio  
with respect to force” (Gray 1986, 36-7; Johnston 1995; Longhurst 2004, 17). In its 
rejection of military force, German strategic culture since 1945 is considered unusual.  
 Germany underwent a permanent shift in its strategic culture after World ar II 
(Berger 1998; Duffield 1998; Longhurst 2004; Malici 2006).  A history of state 
repression, unilateral diplomacy and external aggression associated with values of 
militarism and hyper-nationalism culminated in two lost world wars which devastated the 
                                                
20 The statement retains considerable validity even given the democratic transitions of the 1990s and the 




country. These extreme and traumatic events produced a discontinuity in strategic culture 
(Longhurst 2004, 25). A condition of ‘collective infancy’ resulted during which Germans 
had to relearn “affective and evaluative schemes” including matters related to he role of 
the armed forces in society and the use of military force (Ibid.). The value of 
antimilitarism came to dominate Germany’s transformed strategic culture.  
Antimilitarism is the belief that war is generally indefensible and that military 
force is an inferior and preventable means of addressing disagreements between states. 
This negative view on the efficacy of military force results in critical predispositions 
towards military institutions and ideas within society. Antimilitarism as measured in 
terms of public attitudes on the utility of force has characterized German society since 
1945.  Heated domestic debates over rearmament during the late 1950s, the INF 
deployment during the 1980s and the Bundeswehr ‘out-of-area” missions of the 1990s 
indicate the powerful influence of antimilitarism in German culture. Even with the 
expanding military commitments since 1995, the German public continues to exhibit a 
profound skepticism about both appropriateness and usefulness of military force 
(Haumann and Petersen 2004, 316; Hyde-Price 2003, 187).21 Peace is considered an 
absolute value and the presence of gross injustices or violations of international lw in 
other countries does not automatically generate popular support for military ac ion
(Duffield 1999, 780). The power of antimilitarism in German state and society is further 
enhanced by the relative weakness of nationalism. Nationalism is perceived as enabler of 
                                                
21 A survey conducted in 1999 by the Allensbach Institute on the question of humanitarian intervention 
revealed a majority of young Germans (ages 14-19) opposing war under any circumstances (Haumann and 
Petersen 2004, 316). 
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militarism and major cause of war. Until the 1990s, the use of nationalist appeals and 
arguments in politics, common in other countries, was considered inappropriate.  
Antimilitarism and negative views on the efficacy of military force explain the 
public’s persistent opposition to increasing national defense spending. The majority of 
citizens supported reductions in defense expenditures after the Cold War. It has since 
favored keeping defense spending at the comparatively low levels of the post-Cold War 
era and even decreasing it (Berger 1998, 155). As percentage of GDP, defense spending 
has consistently declined since reunification and remains low in comparison with other 
great powers.22 The low military budgets and public resistance to even minor increases 
have acted as constraints on elite efforts directed at modernizing and reorganizing the 
Bundeswehr.      
 Calculability or predictability is the second key value in German strategic culture. 
Outside observers have frequently commented on the obsession of political elites to have 
Germany appear as calculable and reliable partner who honors international commitments 
- a concept Germans call Berechenbarkeit (Duffield 1999, 782). Multilateralism, defined 
as “the practice to co-ordinate national policies in groups of three or more states” 
(Keohane 1990, 731), is a behavioral manifestation of the value of calculability. A second 
behavior type is elite aversion to having Germany assume a leadership role in 
international political affairs (Hyde-Price 2003, 187). The central strategic values of 
                                                
22 In 1990, Germany spent 2.8 percent of GDP on defens , compared to 3.4 percent for France, 3.9 percent 
for the United Kingdom and 5.3 percent for the United States. By 1995, those numbers were 1.6 percent for 
Germany, 3 percent for France and the United Kingdom and 3.8 for the United States. German defense 
expenditures as percentage of GDP have continued to decline, reaching 1.3 percent of GDP in 2006 
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ht p://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4 (accessed March 
15, 2009). 
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antimilitarism and calculability are sustained by important national security institutions 
created after the militaristic institutions of the past had been abolished.  
  The German constitution or Basic Law, promulgated in 1949, plays a crucial role 
in the country’s security policy because it constrains options of both decision-makers and 
outlines the basic functions of the armed forces. The constitution explicitly prohibits the 
use of force for aggressive purposes by making the preparation of aggressive war 
unconstitutional and perpetrators punishable (Article 26a). This makes the military 
accountable for its actions on the basis of national and international law. The constituti  
allows the use of the German armed forces other than for defense only if explicitly 
stipulated by the Basic Law (Article 87a) and also establishes a citizen’s right to refuse 
military service for reasons of conscience (Article 66). In addition to supporting 
antimilitarism, the document creates the basis for German multilateralism in security 
policy by allowing for the country’s participation in collective security organizations as 
long as these institutions serve the maintenance of peace (Article 24). The unusual 
inclusion of this article is viewed as an indicator of a preference for the pursuit of 
multilateral security policy (Baumann 2001, 146; Berger 1998, 31).  Germany’s 
constitution strongly influences the organization and institutional culture of its armed 
forces. 
The organizational structure of the German military supports the multilatera  and 
antimilitant tendencies observed in other institutions. Completely integrated into NATO’s 
military structure, the Bundeswehr was established as alliance army (Baumann 2001, 
147) without a general staff (Paterson 2000, 27). The multilateral security orientation and 
the firm integration into NATO’s command structure was upheld after the Two-plus-Four 
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Treaty in 1990 restored full German sovereignty in military matters (Duffield 1999, 783). 
The Bundeswehr emains an alliance army that is ill-suited to unilateral and nationalist 
policy objectives.  The organizational culture of the Bundeswehr is defined by a unique 
philosophical concept referred to as inner guidance (Innere Führung).   
Inner guidance is the foundational element of German civil-military relations. It 
conceptualizes German soldiers as citizen in uniform (Bürger in Uniform) who serve the 
state in the capacity of a soldier but remain citizens throughout the time of service. This 
preserves the soldier’s full rights and establishes individual responsibilities on the basis 
of the values and norms enumerated in the German constitution.  A soldier’s primary 
obligation rests with constitutional principles guaranteeing inviolable and inalienable 
human rights rather than the military command.  Institutionalized respect for 
constitutional principles and the maintenance of the soldiers’ connection with society are 
intended to strengthening liberal-democratic values in the armed forces (Hyde-Price 
2003, 186). The resulting military has been characterized by a critical orientation towards 
the use of force which mirrors the general antimilitant predisposition of society.  Civil-
military connections are also maintained by the institution of national military service 
which is viewed as preventing the emergence of a military controlled by a particular 
group or class (Kohl 1996; Hoffmann and Longhurst 1999, 35 and 43).  
The brief overview of German cultural and institutional characteristics indicates 
that considerable societal impediments to security policy reorientation existed during the 
1990s. But these factors also offered unique possibilities for policy transfomati n. The 
value of antimilitarism and its associated behavioral preference for non-military actions 
in global politics would not remain uncontested given the value of calculability which 
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established the need for compliance with multilateral policy decisions. Germany’s 
advanced levels of integration in multilateral security institutions created opportunities 
and settings for agents pursuing the objective of policy reorientation. The country’s 
reliance on external sources to validate its post-Cold War identity as calculable and 
reliable member of the Western alliance established foreign expectations of German 
contributions to international security as significant factors that would create both 
obligations and incentives for elites to engineer changes in the country’s central foreign 
policy principles.   
 
Foreign Policy Analysis: Internal and External Factors 
 
Security policy reorientations are durable transformations of the traditional 
security policy patterns of a state actor. Alternatively called policy restructuring, policy 
shift or policy redirection, reorientation involves the revision of a state’s traditional 
stance on important issues or challenges emanating from the environment. Reorientation 
differs from but usually affects specific policy decisions, general guidelines or strategic 
doctrines, observable behavior or verbal pronouncements.23 Within mature democracies, 
shifts from established parameters of foreign policy behavior may also be relat d to 
changes in public opinion, political institutions and a country’s collectively shared 
security values or strategic culture. Reorientation is a foreign policy phenomenon.  As 
such, the central questions in the field of foreign policy analysis also pertain to this class 
of events. Nothing is more central in the field than the debate about the relative influence 
of internal and external influences on state behavior. 
                                                
23 This definition is an adaptation of that of foreign policy used by Kaarbo, Lantis and Beasley (2002, 4). 
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The question of what drives national foreign policy - domestically generated 
interests or structural constraints - comes with the territory. States are bounded entities 
within the international environment. Leaders of states act as liaisons between the 
domestic and external sphere and deploy foreign policy “to mediate the impact of the 
external on the domestic and to find ways of projecting a particular set of concerns in a 
very intractable world” (Hill 2003, 31). The nature of foreign policy as gateway between 
two connected worlds suggests that it can be influenced from either direction. Many 
approaches have concentrated on illuminating one or the other side of the relationship.  
Domestic-level approaches have been very prevalent in foreign policy analysis 
(Fearon 1998).24 Some noteworthy studies of important domestic factors include the 
impact of decision-makers, their personalities and cognitive processes (George 1969; 
Volgy and Schwarz 1991; Hermann et al. 2001; Steinbruner 1974; Axelrod 1976; Rosati 
2000; Malici 2006; Hagan 2001), elites and elite turnover (Brunk and Minehart 1984), 
bureaucratic processes (Allison 1999, Halperin and Clapp 2007, Drezner 2000), regime 
changes (Bunce 1976; 1981), coalition behavior (Lantis 2002; Putnam 1988), party 
ideology (Rathburn 2004), state-society relations (Risse-Kappen 1991; Katzenstein 1977; 
1997), military doctrine (Kier 1997, Legro 1995), strategic culture (Gray 1981; Johnston 
1995; Hudson 1997; Berger 1998; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006), and public opinion (Burstein 
2003; 2006; Holsti 1992). Governments ultimately make foreign policy decisions. The 
strength of domestic level approaches lies in uncovering the actors, institutions, doctrines 
and cultural values impacting processes of foreign policy decision-making. Domestic 
                                                
24 Fearon (1998, 290) notes that between 1987 and 1996, slightly more than one-third of 193 abstracts from 
International Organization invoke domestic-political factors as independent or intervening variables. 
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level approaches have been criticized for being reductionist because they either n glect or 
downplay the importance of stimuli and constraints emanating from the international 
system (Waltz 1979). Environmental influences are captured in theories of international 
politics. Three international relations paradigms are routinely used to develop hypotheses 
on state foreign policy conduct.  
The neorealist paradigm views the international environment in Hobbesian 
fashion. Anarchy defines the international system which imposes the primacy of survival 
as state security objective. States are the preeminent actors which view gains in relative 
terms. This limits their ability to engage in cooperative and multilateral b havior.25  The 
distribution of power within the system, known as polarity, directly affects stae behavior 
because the differential state capabilities establish power-based categories of states. The 
foreign policy behavior of a great power is deemed to be characterized by a tendency to 
preserve its foreign policy autonomy while states with less capability w l tend to seek 
influence (Rittberger 2001; Baumann 2001). State conduct deviating from this standard is 
viewed as temporary occurrence because the international environment will have a 
tendency to ‘normalize’ state policy to reflect inherent actor capabilities.  
Neo-liberal institutionalist approaches to understanding foreign policy and foreign 
policy reorientation consider the impact of international institutions on state conduct. 
Representing this perspective, Keohane states that “the nature and strength of 
international institutions are also important determinants of expectations and therefore of 
                                                
25 Multilateral arrangements do not necessarily provide evidence for multilateralism. Even within the 
European Union, states have jealously guarded their national sovereignty by refusing to shift real power 
from the intergovernmental European Council to truly supranational institutions such as the Commission or 
the European Parliament (Hacke 1998). Consistent French support for European integration may well be 
understood as a means to control Germany or the desire to amplify its own influence (Loriaux 1999).    
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state behavior” (Hoffmann, Keohane, and Mearsheimer 1990, 193).  States are 
conceptualized as rational utility-maximizers that value cooperation over the costs 
imposed by conditions characterized by unregulated relations. States will adapt their 
foreign policy behavior to international rules in an effort to better pursue a range of 
utilitarian objectives. As rules evolve and connect actors in increasingly more complex 
networks of interdependence, multilateral policy conduct and the reliance on internat onal 
organizations to pursue collective, international goals become widespread (Keohane and 
Nye 1977). Neoliberal institutionalists contend that after bipolarity, interdependence 
remains the single most important structural feature of the international system (Peters 
2001). 
Social constructivists see the international environment as possessing a cultur l, 
interactive quality in which social relations create normative understandings between 
actors which lead to the coordination of values, expectations and behavior (Finnemore 
1996, 192). States adopt international norms, understandings or principles and redirect 
their foreign policy out of a desire to comply with standards of behavior that are 
generally considered socially acceptable or appropriate. Changes are pursu d by domestic 
norm entrepreneurs who have “strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 896).26 Initial compliance with externally generated norms 
may be the result of utilitarian considerations as leaders perceive benefits for ‘doing the 
right thing’. Over time, decision-makers may internalize what they now consider as 
appropriate behavior and it becomes associated with identity or role. In adva ced stages 
                                                
26 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 896) define norm entrepreneurs as “agents having strong notions about 
appropriate or desirable behavior in their community”. The authors see them as playing a crucial role in the 
norm building process.   
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of socialization, actors assume new identities and the transformed behavioral patterns 
become ‘second nature’. Deviation from the norm will become less likely as norms
reconstitute interests and reshaped domestic institutions lock in the changes.  
International relations paradigms suggest general preference patterns for states 
including tendencies towards maximizing power (neorealism), pursuing cooperati n 
(neo-liberal institutionalism) and valuing social compliance (constructivism). Theories of 
international politics do not explain differences in state foreign policy conduct resulting 
from internal factors. The suggested policy preferences for power (neo-realism), 
cooperation (neo-liberalism) and social compliance (constructivism) constitute broad 
guidelines of state action and rarely determine foreign policy directly.27  
A third path taken in foreign policy analysis involves attempts to reconcile the 
close relationship between the domestic and the international sphere by explaining 
foreign policy as the result of conjunctions of external and internal factors. Hanrieder 
suggested that foreign policy was a “continuous process bridging the analytical barriers 
between the international and the domestic political system” (1967, 977). Feasible 
foreign policy goals were those that were both compatible with the “strictures and 
opportunities of the international system” and enjoyed a sufficient degree of domestic 
consensus on the ends and means of foreign policies (Ibid.). Responding to Waltz’s 
criticism of state-level explanations of foreign policy, Gourevitch proposed his ‘second 
image reversed’ in which domestic outcomes are seen as shaped by international f ctors 
(1978). Other important contributions include the prolific research on two level gams in 
which rational decision-makers are viewed as negotiating international agreements that 
                                                
27 Waltz (1979, 121) wrote on the issue that “it is an error… to mistake a theory of international politics for 
a theory of foreign policy”.  
 50
enhance the power of supporting coalitions on the domestic side (Putnam 1988; Evans, 
Jacobsen, and Putnam 1993). More parsimonious models have also been constructed. 
Alons, for example, argues that factors understood as internal and external polarities 
determine a states’ foreign policy direction (2007). Frequently, crises or external shocks 
are seen as playing an important role, particularly in accounting for foreign policy 
reorientation. Hermann, for instance, views dramatic international events as accounting 
for the majority of foreign policy change (1990, 14). For Krasner, crises force the 
adaptation of policies that are “no longer feasible” (1976, 341). Lantis sees decision-
makers reacting to ‘strategic dilemmas’ which he defines as “regional or international 
crises that demand a response from great powers and may prompt realignment in foreign 
policy” (2002a, 5). Ikenberry considers the effect of particular historical moments that 
empower specific expert groups who redefine state conceptions of the national interest 
through new policy approaches and philosophies (1993, 59).  
More recent attempts to connect external with internal variables have evolved out 
the social constructivist research agenda which investigates the impact of international 
norms, understandings and principles on domestic politics. Notable investigations of 
successful or unsuccessful norm diffusion include studies of human rights norms (Risse, 
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), humanitarian intervention (Finnemore 1996), the taboo on 
weapons of mass destruction (Price and Tannenwald 1996), conceptions of state 
citizenship (Checkel 1999; 2001), liberal-democratic institutions (Flockhart 2005; 
Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfennig 2001), and policy towards ethnic minorities (Kelley 
2004). Increasingly, the constructivist research focus has moved to an examination of the 
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sociopolitical processes by which transnational and domestic actors utilize international 
norms and promote transformations in state laws, policies and principles.   
The proposed theory follows in the tradition of explaining foreign policy change 
as the result of a conjunction of external and internal factors. It contributes to he social 
constructivist tradition that views state policy changes as a result of the diffusion of 
international norms and understandings. I hypothesize that Germany was socialized by 
the international system, understood as international organizations and important allies, o 
assume the rank and to exhibit the behavior of a great power. Social expectations 
prompted German security policy reorientation, not changes in the distribution of power
as postulated by realist approaches. Germany was pressured to play the role of a 
responsible ally in the global system by contributing commensurate with capabilities 
which included the use of force. Changes in foreign policy behavior were the result of 
transformations of the conceptions held by political elites about Germany’s appropriate 
role within the international system.   
 
National Role Conceptions 
 
The focal point of the current constructivist research agenda is the study of social 
and cultural variables. A key variable deemed to affect the behavior of actors is hat of 
identity. Succinctly stated, identity may be understood as an actor’s concepti  of itself.28 
Identities emerge as the result of a combination of internal factors includi g inherent 
capabilities, unique development processes, formative experiences and exteral 
conditions such as material contexts and the social expectations of other actors embedded 
                                                
28 Wendt (1992, 397; 1999, 21) defines identity as relatively stable, role-specific understandings and 
expectations about self.  
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in the same culture. Many authors believe that states maintain identities ot unlike 
individuals (Rosenau 1987; Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot 1997, 174) and that these 
identities generate motivational and behavioral dispositions (Wendt 1992; 1999, 224). 
State identities are deemed to be the product of material factors, elements that Wendt 
refers to as “rump materialism” and social interaction with other actors in the 
international system (Wendt 1999).29 Communities of states create and maintain social 
expectations and behavioral prescriptions for members. These expectations establi h 
categories of proper or appropriate behavior which are maintained and reinforced through 
socialization processes between states. A different way of thinking about identi y and its 
associated behavior is to conceptualize it as a social role and role behavior, respectiv ly. 
Roles are the main means by which social collectives organize the behavior of 
their members.30 Roseau defines them as “attitudinal and behavioral expectations that 
those who relate to its occupant have of the occupant and the expectations that the 
occupant has of himself or herself in given situations” (1990, 220). The use of roles 
creates the possibility “of treating individuals not as concrete, identifiable persons, but as 
complexes of roles and statuses…that so fully account for the expectations to which they 
respond that nothing meaningful is left over as the quintessentially unique person” 
                                                
29 Material influences may include a state’s location or available resources while social influences refer to 
the prevailing culture of the external environment which establishes specific types of appropriate and 
inappropriate identities which, in turn, make certain state actions appear as either appropriate or 
inappropriate. For instance, within a security community, armed force is considered inappropriate conduct 
(Adler and Barnett 1998). Wendt (1999) distinguishes b tween Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures 
that each are characterized by different ‘logics of appropriateness’.  Thus, power-seeking and military 
conflict appear appropriate in a Hobbesian but not i  a Kantian culture in which multilateral consensus-
formation is considered more appropriate conduct.  
 
30 Holsti (1970, 239) writes that “the foundations of human behavior … are both the position and the norms 
and expectations the alter projects on the position”.   
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(Rosenau 1987, 45). Like individuals, states maintain relatively stable roles within 
international society which determine behavioral predispositions in specific contexts.31 
The theoretical concept used to describe this tendency is that of a national role 
conception.   
National role conceptions (NRCs) are social constructions of “the policy-makers’ 
own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable 
to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis 
in the international system or in subordinate systems” (Holsti 1970, 245-46). This 
includes perceptions of the nation’s position in international society and understaings 
“of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, and associated long-term intnational 
functions which are associated with these positions” (Wish 1987, 96). The NRCs of 
policy-makers constitute a type of cognitive “image of the appropriate orientations or 
functions of their state” (Ibid.) and “a set of norms expressing expected foreign policy 
behaviour and action orientation” (Aggestam 1999, 2).  
Role conception theorists claim that states are actors that exhibit behavioral 
orientations consistent with specific roles with which they identify (Chafetz, Abramson, 
and Grillot 1997, 174). National role conceptions specify what foreign policy goals 
should be pursued, what tasks must be accomplished, and what performances are required 
in a given regional or issue-specific context.  State roles are reproduced through the 
combination of subjective elite understandings of what behavior a role requires (role 
conceptions), external demands of international society (role expectations) and the 
                                                
31 The extrapolation of the role concept from individual to state actors can be justified because role 
understandings, as cultural constructs, can be shared by the decision-makers commanding the state.  
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particular context in which the role is acted out (role performance).32 In short, state role 
performance is a function of domestically generated role conceptions and externally 
formulated expectations. National role conceptions held by elites come under pressure 
and may experience adjustment when role performance is no longer validated by other 
states through intersubjectively grounded practices or shared meanings (Wendt1999).33 
National role conceptions are ideational variables. The perceptions, values and 
attitudes of the actor occupying a position become the crucial independent variables 
explaining the role performance of the national actor (Holsti 1970, 240-241). In 
developing their national role conceptions, policy-making elites consider a range of 
elements which can be broken down in internal and external as well as material and 
ideational elements. Figure 1 illustrates the elements believed to affect role onceptions 


















                                                
32 Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot 1997, 174. 
 
33 Social constructivists view the end of the Cold War as important example showcasing their argument for 
social variables and the importance of intersubjectiv  understandings in international relations. They argue 
that the Cold War ended when President Gorbachev fail d to affirm its existence. Thus, the most important 
transformation in international politics of the last 50 years is explained by ideational rather than mterial 
changes.  See Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994).  
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NRCs are primarily the product of a state’s history, memory, and socialization (Krotz 
2001, 3). Socially constructed elements at the domestic level include the values and 
historical memory of the state’s strategic culture, institutions, and patterns of public 
opinion.  Externally generated ideational elements consist of community norms and 
understandings as well obligations incurred as part of a state’s alliance or treaty 
commitments. Material elements include a range of national capabilities and the 
distribution of power within the international system.  
 The relationship between the various elements is complex. An attempt has been 
made to list the main influences on national role conceptions but the list is by no means 
exhaustive. Material factors influence the development and maintenance of role 
conceptions at a very basic level but they are mostly excluded from the focus of this 
study. National role conceptions may differ depending on changing regional and issue-
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specific contexts. The inclusion of the situational context is beyond the scope of the 
dissertation. Keeping in mind these important qualifications, what do we know about 
German national role conceptions understood as a function of both internal and external 
ideational variables? 
Germany’s national role conception has been described by the term of civilian 
power or trading state.34 The central values deemed to compose this role are 
responsibility, reliability, predictability, calculability and antimilitarism (Krotz 2001). 
This constellation of values makes Germany unique compared to other powers with 
comparable capabilities. The core values also represent a major departure from those of 
previous German regimes. They developed as a result of the two lost world wars which 
were themselves perceived as logical consequence of the unilateral ‘catastrophe’ of 
German history. 
The key value in the role conception of the Federal Republic is foreign policy 
stability. Alternatively understood as reliability (Zuverlässigkeit), predictability 
(Berechenbarkeit), calculability (Kalkulierbarkeit) and continuity (Kontinuität), these 
concepts denote the ‘obsession’ of German politicians with having their country perform 
a stabilizing or supportive rather than destabilizing role within the international 
environment. Germany wants to be seen as calculable and reliable partner who honors 
international commitments (Duffield 1999, 782). This value constraints the development 
of unilateral tendencies in foreign policy. Instead, multilateralism in foreign policy is 
                                                
34 Maull is credited with developing the concept of the civilian power (Maull 1990; 1995; 1999) which 
builds upon Rosecrance’s (1987) concept of the trading state. Both roles are viewed as the product of a 
globalizing environment in which new types of power, especially economic power become more useful and 
prevalent. However, Maull emphasizes the importance of historical factors in Germany and Japan in 




preferred to cast German interests and actions within the legitimacy of international rules 
and conventions. The emphasis on policy stability also explains the continual support for 
the increasingly more precise legal framing of international relations (Krotz 2001) and 
Germany’s “self-confident self-integration in larger political contexts” (Haftendorn 1993, 
41). Unlike the decision-makers of other great powers, German elites perceive the 
expansion in scope and application of international law and norms not as restraints but 
opportunity for the legitimization of foreign policy. Thus, Germany allows international 
institutions to play their classic function of placing restraints on action in return for the 
self-confidence achieved as consequence of the adherence to appropriate rather than 
instrumental action. The prospect of social rewards trumps material advantges in 
Germany’s utility function. 
 The statements of German foreign ministers from different legislative periods and 
parties indicate a desire for stability, reliability and continuity. Genscher, for instance, 
was well-known for his commitment to maintain Germany’s foreign policy traditions, 
values and calculability (Genscher 1995, 62). His successor Kinkel reiterated this 
position after reunification and promised that “Germany’s policy will remain consistent 
and calculable” (Kinkel 1994, 7). Fischer added in 1998, that “continuity is the main 
focus of our policy” (Fischer 1998) and went on to deny claims that Germany’s military 
participation in airstrikes over Kosovo signaled any fundamental change in policy
(Hertkorn 2001, 62). Germany’s emphasis on policy stability is closely intertwin d with 
the value of responsibility. 
Responsibility (Verantwortungsbewußtsein), frequently referred to as ‘politics of 
responsibility’ (Verantwortungspolitik) in official discourse, is understood as the need to 
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honor Germany’s commitments to the NATO alliance and the Western value community. 
The Western orientation (Westbinding) of the Federal Republic since 1945 is considered 
permanent. It differentiates present-day German policy from the unilateralis , self-
centered stance (Schaukelpolitik) of past regimes. Membership in the Western value 
community entails a domestic commitment to democracy (Demokratische 
Grundordnung) and the rule of law. In addition, official phrases frequently invoke terms 
of Germany’s ‘co-responsibility for peace’ (Hacke 1996, 6) indicating that the 
international dimension of German responsibility requires the support of multilateral 
peacekeeping efforts. The emphasis on efforts to contribute to international peace and 
stability is also closely associated with the country’s historical burden. The militarism of 
the past is viewed as establishing special responsibilities for strengthening international 
human rights regimes. Until the 1990, both the efforts directed at maintaining peace and 
preserving human rights were strictly understood in nonmilitary fashion. Military force 
was categorically rejected in favor of efforts directed at improving global governance.    
Germany’s predisposition towards peaceful means of conflict resolution and 
aversion to the use of force is an important characteristic of elite role conc ptions since 
World War II (Berger 1996; 1998; Maull 1990; Markovits and Reich 1997).35 The 
general public shares the profound skepticism about both appropriateness and usefulness 
of military force (Berger 1996; 1998; Hyde-Price 2003, 187). Antimilitarism developed 
as result of a collective learning process following the devastation of the world wars and 
the deliberate actions of policy elites since 1945 (Berger 1996, 1998). Political 
                                                
35 In his investigation of German chancellors and foreign ministers since reunification, Malici (2006) finds 
that the operational codes of German leaders tend to differ from a mean score of world leaders in terms of 
their tendency to prefer diplomacy, cooperation and peaceful means to conflict resolution. 
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institutions placing restrictions on the use of force help maintain the cultural aversion to 
militarism and military force (Duffield 1998; Hoffmann and Longhurst 1999). German 
role behavior emphasizes ‘soft power’ - the reliance on economic, trade-related and 
normative tools to pursue national objectives. The allocation of significant proportions of 
GDP towards defense is viewed negatively by both policy makers and the general public 
(Berger 1996; Maull 1990; Harnisch and Maull 2001). The country continues to 
disappoint expectations of important allies to increase its national defense expenditures. 
International organizations and mediation efforts are strongly supported while the use of 
military power is regarded as unacceptable option.36 Germany’s tendency to avoid 
leadership roles in international affairs (Hyde-Price 2003, 187) is indirectly linked to its 
antimilitarist stance because global leadership functions still require the ability to deploy 
force as a final resort in deterrence and diplomacy. German values of stability, 
responsibility and soft power fit the role of a mediator state in international p litics.   
Mediator or integrator roles in world politics are based on decision-makers’ desire 
to reconcile differences between other nations (Walker 1987, 273-275). Policy elites of 
mediator states prefer to play a go-between role as an honest broker. They engage in 
international conflict resolution and support peacekeeping efforts through multilateral 
efforts. The concern with the welfare of other nations ranks high and tends to be viewed
as a function of one’s own welfare. Economic concerns outrank military ones. The 
mediator role also involves a non-assertive foreign policy with a low diplomatic profile 
characterized by multilateral policy conduct and the fostering of mutual understandings 
                                                
36 Maull disagrees somewhat when he writes that civilian powers are not pacifist in the strict sense because 
the role does not exclude the military implementation of international norms and decisions, particularly 
when conducted within a multilateral setting (Maull 1990; 1999; 2004).  
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(Ibid.). Most distinctive is a mediator’s concern with its reputation which causes political 
elites to try to stand behind their policy commitments. Mediator roles are frequently 
performed by states with relatively weak national capabilities. The assumption of such 
roles by weaker parties may be understood as an attempt to address deficienci s in power 
relative to other states.  
Germany’s traditional tendency to support global governance and act through 
multilateral organizations, to maintain a low diplomatic profile in internatio l relations, 
to value economic over military concerns and to reject the use of force as a way to 
resolve conflict in world politics establish its civilian power orientation as a type of the 
mediator role. Germany’s out-of-area debates revealed that the mediator role was by 
preferred by many members of the political elite and the general public. Germans viewed 
countries like Sweden as more appropriate role models than assertive powers including 
the United States, the United Kingdom and France even though the country’s national 
capabilities would identify it as member of the aforementioned group. In short, in 
maintaining a mediator role conception in spite of its national ability to assume a 
leadership role, Germany maintains an unusual foreign policy predisposition that varies 
substantially from that of other great powers (Duffield 1998).    
 
Parliamentary Elites  
 
The degree of elite decision-making autonomy in foreign policy questions 
continues to be one of the important questions discussed in foreign policy analysis. No 
definitive answer on the issue has emerged. I assume that political elites possess 
sufficient policy autonomy from both public opinion and institutions to merit being 
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viewed as the initiators of German foreign policy reorientation. The research focus on 
political elites is motivated by a number of important considerations.   
Political elites are routinely viewed as carriers and modifiers of natio l role 
conceptions.37 Through their interaction with leading officials of other governments and 
international organizations, policymakers become aware of role expectations emanating 
from the international environment (Holsti 1970, 335). Policymaking elites also po sess 
the ability to influence state role performance through their command over institut ons 
and their knowledge of political issues and processes. Because of their higher awareness 
and knowledge of political issues, elites tend to frame these issues and dominate debates 
about them. As such, they control the political agenda (Checkel 1999, 88; Bachrach and 
Baratz 1963) and their actions and opinions are likely to shape those of the public 
(Brettschneider 2001, 245-6; Holst 2001, 260).38 The focus on elite conceptions is 
particularly relevant for issues pertaining to foreign policy and national security. Public 
influence on foreign policy decision-making is minor unless an issue achieves a high 
degree of salience (Burstein 2003; 2006). Elites perform liaison functions between 
domestic and international politics. They are the product of their domestic environments 
yet they respond to international challenges and opportunities on behalf of their societ e , 
striving “to minimize costs and maximize opportunities” (Rosenau 1981, 50). Even in 
consolidated democracies, the degree of elite policy-making autonomy expands on topics 
                                                
37 The research on NRCs has concentrated on “responsible, legitimated decision-makers” acting as 
representatives of the state (Gaup 1983, 15), political elites (Wish 1987, 99-102) or the highest-leve policy 
makers (Holsti 1970, 256).  
 
38 Higley and Burton (2006, 27) see non-elites establishing parameters for elite action but that these are 




new to the national agenda and during conditions characterized by rapid change (Putnam 
1976, 140).39 Elites may elaborate and propagate new political concepts under these 
conditions (Ibid., 139). They may be particularly influential during situations marked by 
crises (Dogan and Higley 1998), external challenges or strategic dilemmas (Lanti  
2002a), during which elites change policy traditions, reinterpret doctrines or r design 
political institutions. Observed changes in the role conceptions of political elites, 
therefore, are significant for understanding fundamental changes in foreign pol cy.  
Critical junctures in the history of the Federal Republic are characterized by elite 
leadership: The rearmament of Germany after World War II, the subsequent integration 
of the country’s armed forces into the NATO alliance as well as the long-term policy of 
Western integration; the decision to deploy mid-range nuclear weapons; the swift 
German reunification in 1989, the introduction of the Euro and persistent support for 
European integration all represent policy situations in which political elites forged ahead 
of the consensus of the general public. The current reorientation of foreign policy may be 
seen as part of a similar pattern in which political elites, in an ongoing, top-down prcess, 
pass their opinions down to the general public (Lantis 2002a; Lutz 2003, 31; 
Brettschneider 1998, 245-246). The argument for the elite-focused analysis of foreign 
policy reorientation is further supported by a number of factors specific to German 
politics including the existence of a high level of elite consensus on questions of national 
interests and policy objectives.  
                                                
39 The degree of elite autonomy varies between countries. See, for instance, Risse-Kappen (1991) on the 
relationship between public opinion, domestic structure and foreign policy. 
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German political elites exhibit ideological tendencies towards the moderate cen er 
and general civility in their way of social interaction. Parties with extreme positions 
regularly partake in the formation of governments in Italy. In France, powerful fringe-
parties influence debates and issues at the center. In contrast, German ruling elites since 
World War II have come from just four main parties: The CDU/CSU, the SPD, the FDP 
and, since 1998, the Alliance 90/Green Party. Relations between political elites in 
Germany’s multiparty system are predominantly characterized by a consensual and 
cooperative deliberation and policy-making style. The comparatively high proportion f 
unanimously passed bills indicates that opposition parties seek “to exercise control
through cooperation in legislation rather than confrontation in debate” (Katzenstein 1987, 
43).  
Cooperation and consensus on important issues are possible because political 
elites in Germany hold a “distinctive, widely shared, and rather elaborate set of beliefs 
and values” in regards to foreign policy (Duffield 1999, 779; also, Hoffmann and 
Longhurst 1999, 38). As a result, “there are few disagreements in concrete foreign policy 
issues in this discourse among social scientists, political advisors, foreign pol cy decision 
makers, and opposition politicians” (Hellmann 1997, 25-27). The elite consensus on 
central foreign policy dimensions stems from cultural cohesion which, in turn, is 
primarily a function of collective memories of national defeat and destruction (Markovits 
and Reich 1997).40 The strength of the elite value consensus becomes evident in 
processes by which dissenting individuals perceived as deviating from the accepted 
                                                
40 Examples of major elite division include the struggle and eventual adoption of Ostpolitik as well as the 
out-of-area controversy over of the use of the military which is the subject of this dissertation. See
Hoffmann and Longhurst (1999, 37-38). 
 
 64
cultural consensus are shamed or ostracized.41 In short, a focus on the national role 
conceptions of policy-making elites in Germany is justified given the elite’s g nerally 
greater awareness of political issues, the relatively high degree of decision-making 
autonomy in foreign policy as well as the crucial function of elites during times of crisis 
and policy innovation, all of which have been observed in past German foreign policy 
behavior. However, the focus on elites as modifiers of German foreign policy also 
presents a number of scholarly challenges. They emanate from the nature and application 
of the elite concept itself which remains as yet slippery and under-define.   
The use of the elite concept in political science has been plagued by definitional, 
empirical and methodological problems (Zuckerman 1977). There is no shortage of 
definitions. In his classic study, Mosca saw elites as comprising a ruling class that 
“performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that 
power brings” (1939, 50). Pareto considered as ‘governing elite’ all “those who directly 
or indirectly play a significant part in government and political life” (1966, 248). Dahl 
advanced a more limited notion of “a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly 
prevails in cases of differences in preference on key political issues” (1958, 269) while 
Putnam defined political elites as “those who in any society rank toward the top of the 
presumably closely related dimensions of interest, involvement, and influence in politics” 
(1971, 651). More recently, Bill and Hardgrave have defined elites as minority group
possessing most political power and making the most important political decisions within 
society (1981, 144) with Higley and Burton considering elites as “persons who are able, 
                                                
41 Among the shared elite value consensus also is the condemnation of anti-Semitism.  In 2003, the 
publication of a leaflet critical of Israeli actions that was deemed anti-Semitic ended the successful career 
of FDP politician Jürgen Möllemann. He subsequently committed suicide. 
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by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect 
political outcomes regularly and substantially” (2006, 7). The definitional variations of 
the term have in common the concern with “the behavior of a relatively small number of 
decision-makers, rather than the formal and institutional apparatus of government” (Bill 
and Hardgrave 1981, 143). The problem of conceptual vagueness can be reduced through 
greater specificity on the individuals to who ought to be included in elite analysis. For the 
purposes of role conception analysis, a conceptually and empirically useful way of
defining important individuals is to focus on the specific subset of German parliamentary 
elites. 
Parliamentary elites are defined as key decision-makers within the German 
political system whose actions regularly influence foreign policy. This includes 
individuals occupying positions in government. This group is considered as cabinet elites. 
Cabinet elites within Germany’s parliamentary system include the chancellor, the 
ministers and the heads of their respective bureaucracies as well as important advisors. 
Additional individuals considered as carriers and potential modifiers of national role 
conceptions include the President of the Federal Republic. German presidents exert 
general influence on role conceptions by establishing moral imperatives and guidelines. 
These help define German identity and conceptions of appropriate role behavior. Leaders 
and important policy advisors of opposition parties are also considered key decision-
makers because of the nature of the German political system. The Federal Republic has a 
multi-party system with two major and three minor parties. It is a strong federal system 
with a bicameral parliamentary structure. These structural characteristi s allow 
opposition leaders to influence the process of foreign policy formulation, particully in 
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times of ‘co-governance’ during which the opposition controls the upper house 
(Bundesrat).    
The German chancellor plays the key role in foreign policy making. Article 65 of 
the constitution (Grundgesetz) grants him/her the right to set general policy parameters.42 
The chancellor’s power to direct and redirect policy is supported by the institution of the 
chancellery which functions as a kind of super-ministry generating information 
independent from that of the other ministries. Advice produced by this institution allows 
the chancellor to challenge the policy suggestions made by ministers in the cabinet. 
Finally, unlike conventional prime ministers, the German chancellor is protected by the 
institution of the constructive vote of no-confidence which allows for his/her removal 
only in the case of the existence of a fully functioning opposition government. The 
formation of such a counter-coalition has proven to be difficult in the multi-party system 
of the Federal Republic. For these reasons, as well as the traditional tendency for 
chancellors to remain autonomous in the foreign policy field (Korte 2000), this position i  
a key to understanding foreign policy redirection within the context of Germany’s role 
conception. Notable decisions made by past chancellors, frequently against popular 
opinion, include Germany’s rearmament and joining of NATO, the deployment of 
intermediate range nuclear missiles and the adoption of a swift reunification plan after the 
collapse of the East German regime. 
 Cabinet members play important roles in policy formulation. The ‘departmental 
principle’ establishes a minister’s authority and responsibility for independently 
conducting the affairs within the respective ministry with the chancellor r solving 
                                                
42 In German: Richtlinienkompetenz 
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interdepartmental differences. The institutional structure suggests that he cabinet 
members directing foreign policy and defense are the key players in security policy 
formulation. The importance of the position the foreign minister is underscored by the 
fact that in the past, chancellors performed this function themselves or made the foreign 
minister the vice chancellor.43 Foreign ministers including Genscher, Kinkel and Fischer 
have played leading roles in directing the external policy orientations of the Federal 
Republic.44 Performing a bridge function between state and foreign interests through their 
frequent official contacts, foreign ministers tend to be very conscious of the expectations 
of other governments of German policy conduct. Defense Ministers also play a cruci l
role in security policy through their supervision of the Bundeswehr which does not 
possess a central command structure. In conjunction with the General Inspector 
(Generalinspekteur) of the army, defense ministers influence the capabilities of the armed 
forces through decisions regarding procurement, organization and defense doctrines as 
indicated in internal memos and the White Papers of the Bundeswehr. Due to Germany’s 
multilateral commitments, defense ministers also are closely tied into the European 
security organizations including NATO, the EU and the WEU as well as the OSCE. Here 
again, the minister plays a bridge function in constantly having to reconcile German 
national interests with those of foreign actors. Foreign minister Rühe, for instance, was 
both credited and criticized for his ‘Salami-tactics’ by which he incrementally committed 
                                                
43 During the first cabinets of the Weimar Republic, the positions of chancellor and foreign secretary were 
actually performed by Gustav Stresemann. 
 
44 For instance, Foreign Minister Genscher played a key role in the process leading to Germany’s unilateral 
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Evidence seems to suggest that Genscher redirected the anti-
recognition position of the entire ministry. In so d ing, he acted against the interests of the ministry which 
was engaged in multilevel European negotiation over th  upcoming Summit of Maastricht which would 
mark one of the most important points in the evoluti n of the European Union. 
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the Bundeswehr to increasingly more dangerous foreign mission types and helped change 
foreign policy parameters through a series of decisional faits accomplis. Foreign and 
defense ministers are important cabinet actors in German security policy. However, the 
network of important decision-makers extends beyond them. Frequent cabinet reshuffles, 
unanimous decision-making principles which require consensus-building, information 
procurement as well as party connections and even personal loyalties requires the 
inclusion of other individuals in the policy-network surrounding each security policy 
decision. The influence of these persons has to be ascertained on a case by case basis.    
  The President of the Federal Republic is among the group of individuals 
considered as carriers of the country’s role conception. Federal Presidents do not actively 
participate in day-to-day policy formulation but influence the contours of policy making 
by setting agendas, formulating national aspirations and articulating a consensus on 
national values. Speech acts of the German head of state are important indicators of the 
country’s role and desired role changes and are vital for any cultural understanding of 
foreign policy redirection. President von Weizsäcker’s 1985 speech commemorating the 
40th anniversary of the end of World War II cast Germany’s devastating defeat in terms 
of liberation from the inhumanity of the tyrannical Nazi regime. The President validated 
Germany’s transformed post-war identity and went on to articulate a special German 
responsibility for addressing inhumanity in current times. President Herzog’s 1995 
speech to the German Society on Foreign Affairs included the now famous line “the end 
of free riding has been reached” (1998, 27). The President used the role conception value 
of responsibility to argue for a more engaged German role in support of international 
peace and stability.  
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   The leadership cadre within opposition parties constitutes a final category of the 
parliamentary elites playing a role in foreign policy formulation. This includes the party 
leaders, faction heads, party whips, federal managers (Bundesgeschäftsführer) and 
foreign policy experts. Opposition party leaders are important for a number of reasns. 
Germany’s federal democracy is a party state (Parteienstaat) in which all major political 
decisions are shaped by political parties (Schmidt 2003, 6). Parties connect the various 
“tiers, arenas and corporate actors in the Federal Republic’s decentralized state…” 
(Saalfeld 2005, 46). The Christian Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party are 
catch-all parties with moderate programs that are accustomed to government by coalition 
and a style of policy-making which emphasizes cooperation through committee work and 
legislative specialization rather than adversarial confrontation (Katzens ein 1987, 39-43; 
Saalfeld 2005, 49-50; Schmidt 2002).45 The consensus-oriented policy style within 
Germany’s multiparty system also enhances the role of the smaller party he ds as so-
called ‘king-makers’.46 The increasing tendency of opposition parties to take control of 
Germany’s upper house, the Bundesrat, in a strong federal system frequently makes the 
opposition a co-governing power.47 Finally, there are cultural and institutional traditions 
                                                
45 The role of political parties is so pronounced that researchers have employed the term party-state 
(Parteienstaat) or the conjoining of state and party (Wagschal 2001) to describe a structural reality in 
which Germany’s main parties have interpenetrated th  branches of the government as well as the civil 
service. They receive substantial subsidies from the s ate and their role as linkage institutions betwe n 
public demands and policy-making is anchored in the constitution. They are relatively cohesive, and well-
organized institutions that remain at the very center of policy-making even though membership has been 
declining and the linkage between parties and social rg nizations has loosened somewhat during the last 
30 years (Saalfeld 2005, 67). 
 
46 This differs from a majoritarian policy style whic is based on the articulation of competing policy 
models by opposition parties and the tendency of ruling parties to pursue their policies in partisan fshion. 
 
47 With an average of four regional elections per year, Germany’s federal system frequently allows for 
opposition control of the upper house. Between 1990 and 1999, the Bundesrat was controlled by the 
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of inclusiveness, solidarity and corporatism that support the concept of co-governance. 
German politicians have a tendency to feel more comfortable with pursuing policies 
supported by the majority of participating actors - a tendency that has frequently been 
used to explain incrementalism in policy making. Tracing the process by which a new 
elite consensus developed after reunification will be crucially important to understanding 
foreign policy reorientation during the 1990s.  
The focus on the understandings that parliamentary elites hold of their country’s 
role in the world is a reasonable approach to assessing changes in national role 
conceptions. It also offers the possibility of tracing social interaction processes between 
leaders of countries and between German elites engaged in debates about their country’s 
foreign policy in the period immediately following reunification. Such a research focus 
offers the advantage of theoretical parsimony but involves a significant degree of 
oversimplification of political processes. The institutional literature on Germany’s semi-
sovereign political system suggests that society - including public opinion - ought t  have 
considerable influence on state processes and policy output. I view public opinion as 
having indirect rather than direct influence on elite policy preferences. That position is 
supported by the current state of research on the public’s influence on foreign policy 
decisions in advanced industrial societies which remains inconclusive.48 Some systems 
appear to be more responsive than others and domestic structure matters as intmedia e 
                                                                                                                                                 
opposition for 32 months (30 percent) of the time (Saalfeld 2005, 63). Since the Bundesrat addresses 
primarily regional concerns, the interests of regional parties may diverge from those of the federal parties.   
 
48 The question of whether foreign policy makers are responsive to the public continues to be debated in the 
field. One position is based on the assumption that affective components drive an otherwise uninformed 
public (Holsti 1992). An opposing school of thought views the public as both rational and stable offering 
the possibility of policy maker accountability (for instance, Page and Shapiro 1992). As yet, no study has 
conclusively linked public opinion to specific foreign policy outcomes (Burstein 2003; 2006).  
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variable (for instance, Risse-Kappen 1991). Survey studies have found repeated and 
consistent gaps between public sentiment and foreign policy actions of governments 
indicating that political elites enjoy significant degrees of policy autonomy. This justifies 
an elite-centric research focus coupled with the consideration of public opinion as part of 
the multidimensional and instrumental calculus of elites. Public opinion matters s part of 
the electoral concerns of elites but is not viewed as affecting foreign policy outcomes in 
the form of an independent variable. 
 
A Social Theory of Security Policy Reorientation: Role Pressure and Adaptation 
The Role Episode: Role Pressure and Adaptation 
 The general argument thus far conceptualizes German foreign policy reorientation 
leading to the incorporation of the use of force during the 1990s as a function of changes 
in the role conception of parliamentary elites. A logical extension of the focuson role 
conceptions held by policy-makers is the use of role theory to understand changes in such 
role conceptions and, in so doing, illuminate the process of security policy reorientation. 
Role theory assumes that elites share “a set of ingrained beliefs about the role, function, 
mission and obligations of their country in international affairs” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006, 
21). The German change in policy conduct can then be conceptualized as resulting from 
transformations in elite role conceptions. Roles are products of social environments. The 
adaptation of actor role behavior occurs in response to changes in the normative 
parameters of the environment. Actors adapt role behavior through social learning 
processes called role episodes.   
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 Role episodes are policy-making situations characterized by intense social 
message exchanges between actors. They occur within social environments in which 
actors attempt to affect each other’s role or behavior on the basis of shared perceptions 
about reality and understandings of appropriate conduct. Role episodes capture the logic
of appropriateness that accompanies policy contexts during which political elites convey 
social expectations. A role episode is a social process which gives rise to an actor’s 
behavioral response.  It consists of a complete cycle of role sending, the response by the 
focal actor, and the effects of that response on the role senders (Kahn et al. 1966, 277).  
Figure 2: General Model of the Role Episode (Adapted from Kahn et al. 1966, 277) 
 
  
Role senders maintain expectations about the way in which the focal role should be 
performed and the actual performance of the focal actor (Ibid., 277).  In the case of 
incongruence between expectations and behavior, social pressure is exerted to bring the 
two in line. 
 Social pressure on the focal actor is exerted through persuasion efforts by role
senders. Persuasion to change actor behavior in line with the expectations held by t  
collective may take the form of a range of interpersonal influences includig rhetorical 
processes or speech acts. Social rewards including the possibility of maintaining or 
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reinforce the desired behavioral change. Persuasion and status cooptation as a type of
socialization may instigate a process of value and identity change within the focal actor. 
Initially, social demands for role adaptation may lead to certain maladjustive responses 
(Kahn et al. 1966, 277).  
 It is plausible to expect socialization attempts to frequently engender maladjustive 
responses as the actor learns to play the as yet unfamiliar role and tends to be fraught 
with internal conflict and ambiguity over the definition of personal and appropriate 
interests. This is particularly likely in the case of a state which is not a uniform actor. 
States are constituted by individuals and institutions whose ‘micro-level’ int rests interact 
with social demands coming from the outside reference group. Internal ambiguity and 
maladjustive behavior may also be the result of muddled social messages. 
















Role Senders Focal Actor (Elites) 
 74
 Inconsistent messages coming from a social environment in transition may make 
the maintenance of uniform role expectations difficult. Such environments introduce 
wiggle room that allow for challenges or avoidance instead of compliance. Muddled 
messages may also be the result of a divergence between group standards of appropriate 
behavior as practiced multilaterally and the expectations of individual states pursuing 
their own agendas.  Under such circumstances, the micro-level interest of elites may 
make the difference in how the role is interpreted. This may lead to anomalous foreign
policy conduct. 
 The focal actor’s response completes the role episode. A response may involve a 
challenge of the role expectations. Acts of avoidance or compliance represent additional 
options for the actor. Any type of response carries with it the possibility of influencing 
the development of group norms. If the actor complies, the question emerges of whether 
such compliance is purely instrumental or occurs as a result of the internalization of 
normative standards. The element central to processes of socialization and subsequent 
German role adaptation after the end of the Cold War was the shared understanding of 
the post-Cold War security environment which generated new expectations of German 
role conduct. 
 
The International Security Environment  
 
The international security environment changed dramatically after the end of the 
Cold War. The bipolar distribution of power that had characterized the Cold War period
ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The countries of Eastern Europe 
gained their freedom from communist control and democratized. Soon, many of them 
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would join international and regional institutions.  The existential threat to humanity 
posed by the system of mutually assured destruction had ended. But the changes did not 
usher in a more peaceful global order. Instead, the emerging environment was 
characterized by a host of unexpected security challenges. Ethnic warfare in failing and 
failed states, uncontrolled refugee flows, economic threats emanating outside of tate 
borders, drug trafficking, environmental decay, terrorism and pandemics of untreatable 
and deadly diseases were just some of the threats characterizing the new security 
environment which quickly distinguished itself from the Cold War era through the fluid, 
unpredictable and interrelated nature of the challenges to state security. These challenges 
required new responses.  
Governments, militaries and international organizations responded to the changes 
in the security environment by revising their strategic doctrines. As early as 1991 and 
even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO’s new strategic concept 
recognized the new security threats as ‘multi-faceted’ and ‘multi-directional’ in nature, 
arising from “adverse consequences of instabilities”.49 This assessment was shared by the 
European Commission’s 1993 White Paper on Security which identified many of the 
diverse security problems that would emerge as focus in future years.50 In their 1992 
Petersberg Declaration, WEU member states agreed to develop national capabilities for 
European rapid-deployment forces that would engage in humanitarian assistance, 
                                                
49 NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, July 1991, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-
95/c911107a.htm#IV (accessed November 5, 2007). 
 
50 European Commission, “European Security Policy”. Draft Recommendation on European Security 
Policy, Submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur. 24th May, 1993, 
http://www.cec.lu/pub/history/military/a-weu/document (accessed April 22, 1996). 
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peacekeeping operations, crisis management and prevention as well as peace enforcement 
operations.51 Within the EU, the more earnest pursuit of a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and a European Security Identity within NATO were partly motivated by the 
desire to more adequately address the multi-faceted threats of the new security 
environment.    
German foreign policy elites shared the threat perceptions of the transformed 
security environment that were emerging in international circles. Commandeering the 
most powerful state in Europe, they became both architects and promoters of multilateral 
security arrangements to address the emerging threats. In part, German concern for global 
instability stemmed from the country’s role as one of the world’s leading trading states 
that had a strong interest in guaranteeing the security of both trade and resource 
acquisition. But more importantly, the enmeshment of German elites in the multilateral 
security institutions and German participation in the process of fashioning new threat 
responses dramatically increased the pressure on Germany to support multilateral 
peacekeeping capabilities that its own politicians had helped develop. As strategic 
doctrines and response mechanisms became more articulated, generating and increasing 
capabilities for rapid intervention and as it became increasingly clearer th t the new 
security environment did, indeed, require the use of these capabilities, German elites 
were caught in a normative trap of their own making. They had helped develop the new 
standards and were obligated to support institutional capabilities in the spirit of alliance 
                                                
51 WEU, “Petersberg Declaration”, June 19, 1992, http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf  
(accessed November 5, 2007). 
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solidarity.52 Not participating commensurate with the country’s capabilities which 
included the use of force would have entailed reputational losses, the loss of influence 
within the international organizations so important to Germany and worse, the risk of 
sociopolitical isolation. To avert that danger, parliamentary elites would adapt their 
country’s national role conception. 
 
Norm Diffusion and Elite Socialization 
 
The importance of external demands as potential explanation for German foreig  
policy reorientation has been suggested by a number of observers and authors (i.e. 
Hoffmann and Longhurst 1999, 38; Baumann 2001; Lutz 2003; Clement 2004; Hyde-
Price 2003; Noetzel and Schreer 2008). Expectations about a more engaged international 
role for Germany were voiced by President George Bush who called for West Germany 
and the United States to be ‘partners in leadership’53 and who personally requested that 
Chancellor Kohl consider the deployment of troops to join Operation Desert Storm in 
August 1990 (Lantis 2002b, 82). Similar expectations were conveyed by President 
Clinton54 in 1994 and by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali who urged “Germany to 
                                                
52 The Strategic Concept of the NATO alliance of Novemb r 7, 1991 states under Principles of Alliance 
Strategy: “The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity 
and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of he
Alliance's objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well 
as the benefits, of common defence” (NATO, “New Strategic Concept”, 1991). 
 
53 President Bush (2009, 52-3) expressed these expectations in his important speech in Mainz in May 1989 
in which he recognized Germany’s role as Europe’s preeminent economic and political power and saw the 
US and Germany as ‘partners in leadership’ in respon ibly grasping ‘the promise of the future’ created by 
Gorbachev’s initiatives.  
 
54 This position was reiterated by President Clinton in 1994 during his visit to Germany when he stated that
“I do hope that we will have the benefit of the full range of Germany’s capacities to lead…I do not see how 
Germany, the third biggest economic nation in the world, can escape a leadership role…[it] has no other 
choice but to assume a leadership role. Germany cannot withdraw from its responsibility” (SZ, July 4, 
1994, quoted in Haar 2001, 23). Clinton also said “nything that can be done to enable Germany to fulfill 
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be fully responsible and engaged in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacemaking” 
during a visit to Bonn in 1993.55 Equally important in their socializing effect on German 
policy elites was criticism conveyed when German behavior failed to live up to 
expectations. This occurred during and after the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 and 
during the unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 when Germany was 
widely criticized in international circles.56 The consistent foreign expectations of 
Germany to take on a role commensurate with its capabilities within the system constitute 
a type of social pressure that routinely characterizes processes of socialization.   
Political socialization is the process by which actors “learn to adopt prevailing 
norms, values, attitudes and behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system” 
(Sigel 1970, vii). Norms are cultural constructions that generate and maintain a 
collectively agreed upon standard of appropriate behavior (Finnemore 1996, 22; 
Schimmelfennig 2001, 6; Coleman 1990, 242; Checkel 1999, 83). As such, normative 
standards create behavioral expectations between members (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 
2002, 14).  
State socialization within international society occurs when norms are transfe red 
to the national level in the form of new understandings, values, attitudes or types of 
behavior.  States can be impacted by environmental socialization in either regulatory or 
constructive ways (Schimmelfennig 2001, 10). In the first instance, norms constrain actor 
                                                                                                                                                 
the leadership responsibility it is plainly capable of filling is a positive thing” (Tom Heneghan, Reuter 
News Service, Western Europe, July 11, 1994, quoted in Haar 2001, 23). 
 
55 FBIS-WEU 1993, “Wörner Urges FRG Role in Peacekeeping Missions”, January 11, 1993, 10, January 8 
1993, quoted in Lantis 2002a, 83. 
 
56 During the Persian Gulf War, for instance, Germany was stung by censure from its allies by acting like a 
“teutonic, double-headed European ostrich” (Sked 1991, 51-60). 
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behavior without affecting deeper interests or identity (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 
2002, 14; Johnston 2001, 495).57 In the second instance, norms can provide actors with 
new understandings of their role or identity (Checkel 1999, 84). At that point, norms have 
been internalized and the interests of actors have changed permanently.58 Regulation and 
sanctioning by an external institution is complemented or even superseded by internal
sanctioning (Coleman 1990, 293) which makes the violation “of an established norm 
psychologically painful” (Axelrod 1986, 1104). As part of identity, norms assume a 
‘taken-for-grantedness’ character and the gains from behavioral compliance are evaluated 
in abstract social rather than concrete and consequential form (Johnston 2001, 495; Risse 
1997, 16).59 Identification between actors supports norm internalization. By identifying 
with the socializing agent a focal actor takes the agent’s interest as his own (Coleman 
1990, 295). 
Identification processes create similarity of interests through the need of one actor 
to associate with another. The need for association or affiliation is the fundametal 
                                                
57 The utilitarian benefits of regulatory frameworks for rational state actors have been extensively discus ed 
in the literature under the heading of neoliberal institutionalism and regime theory. See, for example, 
Keohane (1988) and Krasner (1983). Socialization has also been addressed by realists. Waltz (1979, 128)
for instance, writes about socialization that “states will display characteristics common to competitors: 
namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialized to their system…The socialization of 
nonconformist states proceeds at a pace that is setby the extent of their involvement in the system”. This 
view of socialization is based on rationalist assumptions about the nature of a competitive environment in 
which state actors are compelled, like corporations, to emulate each other’s most effective strategies in 
order to survive. Strictly speaking, this is not socialization but natural selection (See Johnston 2001 for a 
detailed discussion). 
  
58 Klotz (1995) uses the now familiar phrase “norms reconstituting interests” to describe the process of 
internalization.  
 
59 Schimmelfennig (2002, 10) argues that the degree of internalization can be evaluated objectively by 
investigating the extent to which a norm has been tra slated into a state’s domestic political institutions and 
political culture as well as the degree of rhetorical challenge of the norm within society. In advanced stages 
of internalization, norms will generally result in “convergence between discourse, formal institutions, a d 
behavior” (Ibid., 12).  
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objective that creates and sustains all social collectives. Like individual actors in families, 
peer groups or societies, states identify with one another to organize their knowledge 
about reality and their place within it (Druckmann 1994). The psychological need to 
become or remain a member of the group will assure compliance with its principal norms 
(Axelrod 1986, 1105).60 Thus, membership within a social group provides a normative 
context for what constitutes proper behavior and attitudes (Flockhart 2005, 46). Social 
groups will control the behavior of their members through social pressure. 
Social pressure to achieve compliance may be exerted through a variety of means
with the most general types being persuasion and social influence. Persuasion involves 
the changing of minds, opinions and attitudes about causality and affect without the use 
of overt coercion (Johnston 2001, 496). Central to persuasion are language and 
argumentation which may cause actors to adjust views of reality or adopt new values 
(Majone 1989, 2). Arguments will have a more persuasive effect when they can be 
related to information coming from in-groups rather than out-groups (Johnston 2001, 
497).61   
Socialization may also occur through social influence based on the distribut on of 
social rewards or punishment (Ibid., 499). Rewards include psychological well-being 
derived from conforming to role expectations, status, honor or prestige and a sense of 
belonging. Punishments include shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning as well as 
cognitive dissonance resulting from actions inconsistent with role and identity (Ibid, 
                                                
60 Thus, democratic transitions in Eastern Europe were successful in part because of the desire of domestic 
policy-making actors to identify with the group of democratic states constituting the European Union (See, 
Schimmelfennig 2005; Flockhart 2005). 
 
61 For a more comprehensive discussion on the complex topic of persuasion see Johnston (2001, 496-499). 
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499).62 Shaming government decision-makers into compliance through the use of 
international norms is a common and powerful way of changing actor behavior (Risse, 
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 15). Shaming becomes more effective an instrument of 
socialization when states have publicly committed themselves to upholding a certain
norm. In this case, rhetorical action−the strategic use of norm-based arguments to evoke 
norm-compliant behavior−may effectively be used to draw on a state’s desire to remain 
consistent with past commitments to avoid hypocrisy.63 All types of social influence tend 
to become more effective in influencing state behavior as the need for a state to belong to 
a particular group increases.64 The elements pertaining to socialization presented above 
allow a number of preliminary conclusions about national role expectations.  
Role expectations of German contributions to international security after the Cold 
War were based on three central elements: Generally held threat perceptions of the 
environment, effective responses to those threats that developed into standards of 
                                                
62 In the United States, an amendment to the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act was passed in 1996. 
The objective of the burden-sharing amendment was to increase the financial support for foreign US 
military presence by 11.5 Billion over six years. The amendment was approved by the House in May 1996 
by a 353 to 62 margin. After the amendment passed, Barney Frank’s press release contented that “this 
year’s extraordinary support demonstrates the importance of requiring our wealthy allies to pay their fa
share of common defense costs and ending the defense sub idy that American taxpayers give to wealthy 
nations of Western Europe and the Pacific (Burdensharing Press Release, May 16, 1996, quoted in Haar 
2001, 3). 
 
63 Schimmelfennig (2001) demonstrates the salience of r putation in shaping national interests by showing 
how EU norms of inclusiveness persuaded member states who were initially opposed to Eastern 
enlargement to change their position without receiving tangible benefits.  
  
64 Schimmelfennig (2005) sees the desire of Eastern Eu opean states to belong to the EU as important 
reason for the strengthening of liberal-democratic institutions in those countries. Paradoxically, social 
influence as a means to control German behavior may have become more effective after Germany regained 
its full sovereignty. As long as Germany was fully integrated into NATO and semi-sovereign, the social 
bond between it and its allies was unbreakable and uncontested from either side within the context of the 
Cold War. With independent status, German elites had to worry about the maintenance of the social bond 
which protected their country. Full sovereignty within the context of a more uncertain security environment 
produced the potential for policy disagreements but also raised fears of abandonment which increased the 
effectiveness of external socialization. 
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appropriate behavior for states and a state actor’s specific function and status within 
international society. The scope of the allocated functions is based on perceptions of a 
state’s relative power or capabilities. More is expected of stronger actors than of weaker 
ones. The functionally differentiated nature of states is sustained through intersubjective 
validation processes.65 States that disregard their capabilities and do not act according to 
the role assigned to them by their reference group because of domestic inclinations 
towards certain types of behavior will become targets of socialization. Gr up pressure 
will be applied to make the behavior of the state conform to the role assigned to it by he 
collective. Regional instabilities emerging after the Cold supported the concretization of 
multilateral intervention standards. This generated new behavioral expectations nd 
social pressures on Germany to abandon its cultural aversion to the use of force. External 
demands of German military contributions proved effective in socializing the country 
because they created pressure on political elites to preserve the country’s reputation as 
dependable, calculable and reliable ally.  
 
Domestic Concerns and Elite Persuasion Processes  
 
 Socialization processes taking place between actors at the domestic level are 
similar to those that occur within the international realm. Again, persuasion nd social 
influence are the key elements to consider. To a considerable degree, the establishment of 
a consensus between elites on behavioral changes in foreign policy is a function of 
                                                
65 Neorealism assumes that states are not functionally differentiated but differ on the basis of capabilities 
(Waltz 1979). But states are functionally differentiated in that they play different roles in international 
politics which are maintained through external expectations. Functions are likely to be related to materi l 
conditions including the distribution of power whic determine an actor’s capabilities. However, the 
behavior of a state cannot be deduced from those capabilities alone. Rather, behavior as based on external 
influences is likely the result of social function as well as perceived capabilities which establish the level of 
expected contributions.   
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persuasion through effective argumentation pursued by individuals determined to affec  a 
change in role behavior. Interpersonal persuasion is “a two-way interchange, a method of 
mutual learning through discourse” (Majone 1989, 8). A persuasive argument is more 
than a logical demonstration involving a rational response to a policy problem. A vital 
function of public deliberation and of policy-making is defining the normative standards 
on the basis of which specific conditions become policy problems that require a response 
(Ibid, 24). Within the social environment of the Bundestag, parliamentary elites engage  
in argumentative processes during which they will attempt to connect their pref ence for 
policy behavior with a generally accepted normative standard. The values of the national 
role conception constitute a basis for what is considered appropriate conduct. A crucial 
function in the argumentation process leading to role adjustment is that perform d by role 
entrepreneurs.66 These individuals possess strong notions about appropriate national role 
conceptions and are willing to initiate a process of role adaptation. Role adaptation is 
essentially a process that establishes new shared conceptions of appropriate behavior and 
interests. Role entrepreneurs may use a variety of strategies to challenge existing 
standards of appropriate behavior. They will, for instance, construct new cognitive frames 
consisting of language designed to name, interpret or dramatize issues in an effort to 
create alternative conceptions of both appropriateness and interest (Ibid., 897). Role 
entrepreneurs may also clandestinely use the old standard of appropriateness to promote 
new behavior (Ibid.). Alternatively, they may challenge the existing standards through 
foreign policy actions or commitments considered ‘inappropriate’ that both prepare 
opposing groups for the changes and hollow out existing standards.  
                                                
66 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 896) use the concept of norm entrepreneurs to denote “agents who have 
strong notions about appropriate behavior within their community”. 
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I propose that in the social environment shared by Germany’s parliamentary 
elites, conservative elites acted as role entrepreneurs by employing the above strategies. 
On issues of international instability, they constructed a cognitive frame consisting of 
solidarity, reliability and calculability which they linked to their prefernce for role 
normalization, including the use of force. In addition, they used their control of 
government to incrementally commit the Federal Republic to extraterritorial missions in 
what was frequently labeled as ‘Salami tactics’. These high-profile behavioral 
commitments hollowed out the accepted anti-militant meaning of the civilian power role 
and further increased the effect of international socialization.67   
Figure 4: Elite Persuasion in the Domestic Environme t 
 
Human beings are not social automatons who blindly follow normative 
parameters of action. Within existing social environments, elites also pursue a range of 
interests and concerns that are not necessarily social in nature. These will include 
utilitarian concerns about resolving important domestic issues, electoral prospects and 
even personal career goals. Individual concerns are pursued against the canvass created 
by the ongoing domestic and international socialization processes. Domestic concerns of 
                                                
67 Addressing the effectiveness of persuasion, Cialdini (1984) argues that new, high-profile behavioral 
commitments increase the persuasiveness of a new set of attitudes.  
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elites must have affected the degree of compliance with international expectations during 
each role episode. Thus, Germany’s eventual compliance on the use of force may have 
been facilitated through some degree of convergence between external expectations and 
the domestic concerns of major players. Conversely, the lack of convergence should 
explain non-compliance. In short, the final piece of the investigated puzzle is the 
domestic context of policy-making and its influence on German policy responses to 
external expectations during each role episode. 
 
Evidence Collection and Data Sources 
 
Research Questions for Comparative Investigation 
 
The debate about German foreign policy normalization after reunification has not 
yet generated a strong theory that explains reorientation by relating the complexity of the 
post-Cold War period to domestic processes. This dissertation employs a comparative 
case study design to investigate whether German foreign policy was reorient d by its 
elites as a result of changing expectations and altered role conceptions after the Cold 
War. Qualitative case studies with small numbers of cases are particularly well suited for 
uncovering a potential causal path for which there is no pre-existing theory (George and 
Bennett 2005, 221). Such studies have the potential to identify variables and causal 
mechanisms culminating in the development of contingent generalizations. The main 
methodological approach used is process tracing which involves the search for a causal 
link between independent and dependent variables. Key to a successful application of the 
process tracing method is the specification of a set of questions that guides the collection 
of evidence. This allows for a focused and structured comparison.  
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 The central areas under investigation in this dissertation are 1) perceptions of the 
international security environment prevalent within important international org nizations 
charged with security functions 2) the evolution of norms within those organizations 
addressing the new security threats emerging after the Cold War 3) the behavioral or role 
expectations of member states, 4) the role pressure exerted on German elites, 5) the 
persuasion processes initiated by domestic role entrepreneurs, 6) the interests of domestic 
parliamentary elites, 7) the resistance or constraints, if any, established by strategic 
culture and institutions. These areas generate a set of ten questions for comparative 
research that will be utilized for each of the role episodes under investigation. 
 Threat perceptions are generally assumed to have changed after the Cold War. 
This process is investigated through a focus on the official output and internal debates of 
international organizations with particular focus on statements of NATO, UN, E , WEU 
and OSCE (Q1). It is assumed that a qualitative change occurs over the time period under 
investigation with perceptions of greater instability becoming universally hared by the 
elites commanding states and international security organizations. New threat 
assessments of the international security environment which frame perceptions of 
appropriate responses should be reflected in official statements, summit reports and 
agreements.  
  The evolution of responses to the newly defined security environment in the form 
of security norms is the focus of a second set of questions. Revised strategic doctrines 
and declarations established new standards of appropriate state contributions (Q2). These 
behavioral expectations are viewed as generating pressure to adapt Germany’s role 
commensurate with capabilities (Q3). Foreign leaders and heads of international 
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organizations conveyed new expectations of German role behavior through formal and 
informal requests for military contributions, public demands for greater involvement in 
peacekeeping operations and criticism in cases when Germany failed to comply (Q4). 
 The next area under investigation is the domestic context of argumentation and 
persuasion between elites. I start by assessing the initial role concepti s held by 
parliamentary elites (Q5). Then, I address the question of whether parliamentary elites 
shared the threat perceptions of the international environment as one characterized by 
greater instability (Q6). Also, did elites generally share the understanding that Germany 
had special responsibilities to the international community because of its position a  great 
power in terms of status and national capabilities (Q7)? 
 Next, I ask the question of how a particular subset of parliamentary elites 
instrumentally deployed both threat perceptions and externally generated role 
expectations to pursue the process of role adaptation by promoting the use of force in
support of multilateral peacekeeping missions (Q8). Role entrepreneurs needed to 
persuade non-compliant elites. This was accomplished through two central means: First, 
role entrepreneurs constructed an effective argument for role adaptation by lnking
external expectations to alliance solidarity and Germany’s responsibilities. Thus, 
concerns about reputational and status losses were combined with the threat of political
isolation after reunification.68 Second, role entrepreneurs used their control over existing 
                                                
68 The threat of political isolation carries special weight in German politics because of the elite consensus 
on maintaining a national identity that is intrinsically tied to Western values and membership in a Western 
value community. This makes isolation or ‘special pths’ politically unacceptable.  
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institutions to prepare other elites and the public for the use of force by incrementally 
committing the Bundeswehr to out-of-area mission with escalating risk levels.69  
 The last area considered is the domestic context of elite interests (Q9). How did 
parliamentary elites relate their electoral and party interests to external role pressure on 
one hand and the domestic antimilitarism of strategic culture on the other? This aspect is 
seen as crucial in explaining variation and timing of compliance during each role episode 
(Q10). Elite autonomy from external expectations declines as expectations of behavior 
become more consistent with the concretization of intervention standards. As such, 
external expectations are seen as reconstituting domestic elite interests by the mid-1990s. 












The question set outlined in Table 1 will be used for each of the three role episodes under 
investigation. The episodes are characterized by variance in compliance. Elites partially 
complied during the Persian Gulf War 1990-1991, failed to comply during the unilateral 
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia 1991-1992 and complied at the end of the Bosnian 
Civil War in 1995.  
                                                
69 Among the ways in which role entrepreneurs used existing institutions to promote the adoption of the us  
of force was the quest to seek an institutional amendment to allow participation in out-of-area peacekeeping 
missions, the creation of rapid intervention capabilities within the Bundeswehr which was promoted under 
the heading of force ‘modernization’, the development of new strategic concepts to facilitate deployment 
and the increase in cabinet autonomy for running military missions.    
 
Q1: What were the threat perceptions of leaders of international security organizations?   
Q2: What types of normative responses were generated wi hin these organizations?   
Q3: What behavioral obligations for Germany can be deduced from the norms?  
Q4: What type of role pressure was exerted on German elites? 
Q5: What were the role conceptions of parliamentary elites? 
Q6: What were the threat perceptions of parliamentary elites? 
Q7: Did elites share an understanding of German great power responsibilities?  
Q8: How did role entrepreneurs use external role pressure to pursue role changes? 
Q9: How did concerns or interests of parliamentary elites interact with role expectations? 





  The dissertation study will analyze the statements of international organizations 
and those of important national and international foreign policy elites. International 
organizations issue publications, proclamations, announcements and briefs. Elites 
exerting their influence at national and international levels of governance co v y their 
positions through formal and informal statements in proclamations, debates, media 
interviews and memoirs. Document analysis of the elite discourse during specific role 
episodes will be used to establish general threat perceptions, the external expectations of 
German role behavior, the role conceptions held by parliamentary elites and the ature of 
persuasion processes occurring between states and within them. Content analysisshould 
also reveal the electoral concerns of domestic-level elites. Four majorcategories of 
primary sources will be utilized. 
  Official charters, pronouncements, declarations, programs, strategies, doctrines 
and national white papers indicating shared perceptions of the international security 
environment after the Cold War constitute the first category of primary source 
documents. This includes the joint declarations following important NATO, EU, WEU 
and OSCE summits as well as important internal debates recorded in organizational 
journals including NATO Review. The statements of the heads of these organizations are 
considered significant as well, particularly in regards to developing an understanding of 
external expectations of German conduct. 
 A second important category of primary sources comprises elite position 
statements from the national level of foreign policy formulation. It includes the official 
records of parliamentary debates between 1990 and 1995. Parliamentary records 
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(Plenarprotokolle des Bundestags) provide comprehensive accounts of parliamentary 
proceedings, hearings, debates and resolutions. They document voting behavior by a 
parliamentarian’s name and party and provide sufficient detail to allow for an 
investigation of discursive practices, speech acts and rhetorical persuasion efforts 
between elites.70 Position changes of parliamentarians can be ascertained and associated 
with the effects of argumentation and persuasion. Parliamentary records are detail d 
enough to chronicle nonverbal actions by individuals and party factions.  
 Transcripts of official statements and speeches of parliamentary elites are also 
considered. Of particular importance for this time period were statements and speeches 
made by Presidents von Weizsäcker (CDU) and Herzog (CDU), Chancellor Kohl (CDU), 
foreign ministers Genscher (FDP) and Kinkel (FDP), defense minister Rühe (CDU) as 
well as opposition leaders including Vogel (SPD), Scharping (SPD) and Fischer (Alliance 
90/Greens). Elite interviews in newspapers or periodicals are also considered as primary 
sources. Other primary sources indicating role conceptions are the German Defense 
Ministry’s irregular series of Bundeswehr White Books (Weiβbuch der Bundeswehr), 
particularly the 1994 edition. Debates about role conceptions and appropriate German 
behavior after the Cold War were particularly important within the opposition parties.  
The information service of the Social Democratic Party (Informationsdienst der SPD) 
will be consulted to establish internal debates and concerns.  
                                                
70 The parliamentary logs record more than just the speeches or presented party positions. By indicating 
outbursts, commotion or general versus party-line support for speeches, the logs allow for the study of 
discourse practices and the relative support for particular arguments. The logs even take notice of unus al 
actions including individuals breaking with party lines by clapping when their party does not.  
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 Primary evidence indicating foreign and German elite positions will be 
complemented by information derived from biographical accounts. The autobiographies 
and memoirs of Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Genscher, U.S. Secretary of State 
Baker, US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Zimmermann, US Ambassador and Chief Bosnia
negotiator Holbrooke, to name just the important ones, will be consulted to reveal 
underlying motivations, interests and concerns. Additional episodic records will be 
included as they become available. Media interviews should also shed light on positions, 
motivations and understandings of lower-rank decision-makers of the German foreign 
policy establishment.  
 Final primary sources to be consulted are media reports. Articles, editorials and 
reports in newspapers and journals establish a true record of events. Journalistic accounts 
also tend to capture the general political and social climate of their time. As such, they 
should record the existence of social variables including threat assessments, int rnational 
expectations of German foreign policy conduct, role conceptions and strategic culture.    
Journalistic accounts will also indicate important policy debates and elite con roversies 
during the 1990s. The editorial statements of authoritative newspapers are consid red 






                                                
71 The main focus will be on the New York Times, the BBC, The Times, as well as any other newspaper 
carrying editorials that can be shown to have some impact on debates between German elites. The main 
German papers included in the research effort are De  Spiegel, Die Zeit, Die Welt, Der Focus and 






This chapter presented the historical, cultural and theoretical context as well as a 
theory of German security policy reorientation during the 1990s. The history of German 
foreign policy since the end of World War II shows the importance German elites hav  
attached to their country’s continued membership in a community of states characterized 
by liberal values. As such, parliamentary elites were prone to undertake changes in their 
country’s foreign policy behavior if such behavior conflicted with the expectations 
coming from that community. Antimilitarism in strategic culture and institutions would 
present obstacles to policy reorientation. The following cases will show that conservative 
elites, acting as role entrepreneurs, were able to persuade opposition parties and 
circumvent cultural antimilitarism to successfully adapt their country’s role performance 
on the basis of foreign expectations of German contributions to international peace and 




























THE PERSIAN GULF WAR EPISODE  
 
Introduction: A New Script 
 
On November 9, 1989, the East German regime under its recently appointed and 
what was to be its final authoritarian leader Egon Krenz, announced the forthcoming 
opening of additional border check points in Berlin. Under duress, the regime was 
acceding to the demands of its citizens for greater freedom of movement including travel 
to West Berlin. Tens of thousands of East Berliners forced their way past the existing 
border crossings later that memorable night. The Iron Curtain had divided Germany and 
Europe for 28 years. It would pass into history within weeks. The German Democratic 
Republic conducted its first and only democratic election in March 1990. Less than a ye r 
after the fall of the wall, the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic of Germany 
reunited in October 1990.  
Germany’s reunification process took place against the backdrop of international 
efforts directed at liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. The escalating Persian Gulf 
crisis and the demands it placed on the international society of states caught German 
parliamentary elites off guard. They were addressing the immense domestic policy 
agenda resulting from the objective to complete the merger of two dissimilar soci l,
economic and political systems. The speed of the unification process presented a 
challenge as did a concern with preserving some degree of socioeconomic equality 
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between citizens from the different parts of Germany. I  addition, foreign policy elites 
were engaged in the complicated process of negotiating the critical Two-plus-Four 
Treaty. The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany was intended to 
formally conclude the system established at Potsdam in 1945. Its successful oncl sion 
required a diplomatic consensus involving the United States, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom and France. A delicate diplomatic balancing act would commence. 
Parliamentary elites quickly joined in the chorus of international diplomatic 
statements condemning Iraqi aggression. German politicians were quicker and more 
decisive in their initial, official criticism of Iraqi actions than those of many other states. 
This was due to the fact that Germany had no strategic interests in the region. The 
country’s relations with Iraq had been kept to relatively minor level contacts.72 Soon, 
however, the country’s actions began to be out of step with the direction taken by the 
United States, France and the United Kingdom who chose to act swiftly and decisively by 
militarily countering Iraqi aggression. In comparison, German elites and their population 
appeared strangely out of touch with the crisis management requirements created by  
more complex security environment emerging with the end of the Cold War. Cultural 
resistance against the impending military solution to liberate Kuwait was widespread and 
frequently, the German public seemed more concerned with the plight of Iraqi civilians 
than with the victims of Iraqi aggression in Kuwait.73 Germany’s financial contributions 
                                                
72 Revelations about the extent to which German firms had contributed to Iraq’s war making capabilities 
would become a major embarrassment for the government later on during the crisis. 
 
73 Addressing parliament on the eve of the expiration of the UN ultimatum on January 14, 1991, Chancellor 
Kohl found it necessary to remind members of parliament that war would be the direct result of Iraqi 
actions from August 2 rather than the ultimatum issued by the United Nations (Asmus 1992, 10-11; PB 
12/2, January 14, 1991, 21) 
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to the coalition were offered belatedly and after much prodding by President Bush, 
Secretary of State Baker, President Mitterrand of France, Prime Minister Thatcher and 
others. German politicians declined the national and international requests for troops and 
categorically ruled out military participation from the start. Germany was considered a 
great power with the economic wherewithal of France and the United Kingdom put 
together. It had loyally served alliance objectives during the Cold War. Now, Germany 
rejected the duty call coming from its closest allies during the first major crisis of the 
post-Cold War era.     
The German policy response to the Persian Gulf War was more than a simple case 
of domestic concerns trumping foreign policy. The crisis in the Gulf was the first in a 
series of role episodes by which German foreign policy was reoriented in the early 1990s. 
The episode still found German elites adhering to their country’s traditional civilian role 
conception. Political elites viewed the use of force as counterproductive method to 
resolve international crises and generally considered foreign deployment of the military 
for purposes other than territorial defense as unacceptable. Strategic culture remained 
vehemently antimilitaristic and a powerful antiwar movement quickly developed to 
constrain elite actions in regards to a potential military involvement of the Fed ral 
Republic. Opposition politicians were able to effectively draw upon the public’s 
antimilitarism to forestall the desire of conservative elites to act as role entrepreneurs by 
adapting role behavior in line with external expectations. The case for role adaptation 
would strengthen as regional instabilities were beginning to establish the need for 
operations outside of alliance territory. The emergence of the new threats would change 
the Cold War emphasis on territorial defense and non-interference in internal affairs 
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which had stabilized relations between the superpowers during the Cold War. The Gulf 
War marked the beginning of this transformation. The old system norms were undergoing 
change but had not solidified into the comprehensive regime of strategies, doctrines and 
response capabilities that would characterize the later 1990s. German elites w re caught 
up in the euphorically optimistic times of the ‘winds of change’ blowing in Europe that 
had made possible the country’s reunification. The nature of the post-Cold War security 
environment appeared as yet undetermined. Foreign expectations of German military
contributions lacked persuasive power because they were not supported by strong 
intervention standards.  In this context, Germany’s traditional role conception conti ued 
to set the parameters of appropriate national conduct. Hence, elites were genuinely 
surprised and taken aback by the international criticism they received about their 
country’s inappropriate conduct during the Gulf War.  
In addition to the inertia produced by traditional role conceptions, elites also were 
preoccupied with completing the most important project in Germany’s post-war history 
which was the unification of their country and the restoration of full sovereignty. This 
clearly affected their decisions during the Gulf crisis because the international crisis had 
the potential to disrupt the constructive relations between the quadripartite powers upon 
which successful conclusion of the Two-plus-Four Agreement depended. Elites also 
sought to allay international fears about German national intentions after reunification by 
playing the traditional role of the civilian power.74 International apprehension about 
                                                
74 An (2005) argues that British foreign policy towards Germany during this time was not as obstructive as 
was generally perceived and the rhetoric of Prime Minister Thatcher and the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office has to be differentiated from the active and constructive role British diplomats played in devising 
workable solutions to the process by which Four Power rights over Germany were terminated. However, 
 97
reawaked German power and ambitions on one side and the demands to contribute 
militarily on the other produced contradictory role expectations. This led to role conflict 
which elites resolved by having foreign policy conduct during the Persian Gulf War be 
consistent with the normative expectations generated by the Cold War environment. 
Playing the old role in a new play produced problems because the elements of reliability, 
calculability and solidarity that crucially defined the country’s role conception were 
beginning to take on a new meaning within the environment of the Post-Cold War world. 
Role adaptation was required to meet expectations and elites struggled with coming t  
terms with the new expectations.  
In short, the combination of contradictory expectations and as yet underdeveloped 
intervention norms produced confusing messages about expected role behavior for 
political elites engaged in domestic and international projects of the highest national 
order of importance. Elites maintained the foreign policy orientation associted with the 
traditional role conception to pursue all of these objectives. Germany incurred s bstantial 
international criticism for non-compliance with the expectation to contribute militarily to 
extraterritorial security threats. The elite decision to not contribute commensurate with 
capabilities caused Germany to be perceived as ‘free rider’ in the new security 
environment. This produced social pressure on German elites to adapt their country’s 
policy orientation to international expectations.75 Cabinet elites reacted by 
acknowledging and confirming the validity of external demands even though they 
                                                                                                                                                 
the majority of German elites must have been under the impression that their country’s reunification was 
met with a high degree of apprehension in many parts of he world.  
 
75 Wendt (1999, 421) refers to the process by which an actor is ‘reminded’ by others of its desired role as 
‘altercasting’ which is an “attempt to induce alter o take on a new identity…by treating alter as if it already 
had that identity”.    
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initially did not share the threat perceptions of the security environment. They decide  to 
pay for a considerable part of the war costs incurred by the Gulf alliance. Conservative 
elites also promised to adapt institutional conditions to allow for future military 
contributions. German ‘checkbook diplomacy’ was not a rejection of external demands 
but represented a compromise between foreign expectations, traditional role conceptions 
and strategic culture.  
The Persian Gulf War marked the beginning of the process of German foreign 
policy reorientation. Political elites would eventually come to accept the necessity of 
using force outside of German territory. The crisis substantiated a less optimistic 
perception of international security in which it was both possible and necessary to 
address regional instabilities through multilateral interventions. Elite recognition of new 
systemic requirements and the international expectations to contribute militarily 
generated role pressure to adapt foreign policy conduct in regards to the use of forc.  
 
The Invasion of Kuwait and the International Response  
 
The devastating, eight-year long war between Iran and Iraq ended in 1988. Iraq 
and Kuwait had been close allies during the war. Kuwait had served as Iraq’s main port 
after fighting had shut down the harbor of Basra. Kuwait had also provided Iraq with 
about $14 billion in loans (Hayes, NYT, September 3, 1990). The war left Iraq 
impoverished and its economy in ruins. Iraqi financial problems would become crucial
issues in the escalating conflict between the former allies. 
 Claiming that Iraq had protected the Arab world from aggression by the Shiite 
theocracy in Iran, Saddam Hussein announced that he expected Kuwait to forgive Iraqi 
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debt incurred during the war. The Kuwaiti government rejected this demand. A number 
of meetings held in 1989 were ultimately unsuccessful in resolving the differences 
between the two countries. On a separate track, Iraq attempted to address its economic 
problems through diplomatic efforts aimed at increasing its oil production quota within
OPEC. Iraqi oil industry had suffered greatly during the war and the country’s oil 
production had been reduced substantially. The vast Rumaila oil field, located between 
Iraq and Kuwait, had been mined to protect it from a potential seizure by Iran.76 The 
reduced production capacity had been taken over by Kuwait which had also been able to 
expand its exploration efforts in the field. By 1989, Kuwait was exceeding its OPEC 
quota by 700,000 barrels a day (Ibid.).77 Hussein’s diplomatic efforts to achieve an 
increase in Iraq’s OPEC quota were unsuccessful. He also failed to coerce Kuwait into 
compensating Iraq for allegedly undermining world oil prices through violations of the
country’s OPEC production quota. An emergency session of the Arab League in May 
1990 ended on Hussein’s ominous statement that “we cannot tolerate this type of 
economic warfare'' and ''we have reached a state of affairs where we cannot take the 
pressure'' (Ibid). Iraq’s final warning was issued in a letter to the Arab Le gue on July 16 
in which Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of 
direct aggression. A day later, Hussein warned that something effective must be done in a 
speech commemorating the twenty-second anniversary of the Ba’ath Party’s revolution 
(Baker 1995, 271).  
                                                
76 In 1986, 225 out of a total of 615 wells in Iraq were located in the Rumaila field (Hayes, citing figures 
from the oil industry consulting firm John S. Herold Inc, NYT, September 3, 1990). 
 
77 Adding to the complexity of the issue was the factthat the border between Iraq and Kuwait had never 
been officially demarcated.  
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On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The armed hostilities ended within two 
days and resulted in the complete occupation of the Kuwaiti state. Hussein went on to 
exploit unresolved territorial and political issues surrounding the emergence of both 
territories from colonial rule. Iraq had long questioned Kuwaiti sovereignty by 
considering the country a former part of the Ottoman province of Basra. On August 8, 
1990, Hussein declared portions of Kuwait to be part of the Iraqi province of Basra and 
designated the rest of the occupied territory as Iraq’s 19th province.  
Within hours of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security Council passed 
resolution number 660. It condemned the aggression, called for the withdrawal of Iraqi
troops and instructed the two parties to resolve their differences peacefully.78 NATO and 
the European Economic Community followed suit as did individual countries including 
France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany (NYT, August 3, 1990). On August 4, 
the European Community imposed sanctions on Iraq which included a ban on oil imports 
and the export of weapons, the suspension of all types of cooperation and the confiscation 
of Iraqi assets (Genscher 1998, 472). UN Resolution 661 was adopted on August 6, 1990 
in which Iraq was charged with “usurping the authority of the legitimate government of 
Kuwait” and economic sanctions were imposed to force Iraq to comply with resolution 
660.79 The UN would continue to uphold the principle of state sovereignty in no fewer 
than twelve resolutions passed during the next months.  
                                                
78 Information about Security Council resolutions is taken from the website of the United Nations Security 
Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm (accessed October 20, 2008).  
 
79 http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm (accessed October 20, 2008). 
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Following President Bush’s memorable words “this will not stand, this aggression 
against Kuwait”, uttered on the White House lawn, the United States quickly showed the 
resolve to meet Iraqi aggression and restore Kuwaiti sovereignty (Baker 1995, 276). The 
Bush Administration decided on a multilateral course of action and began to assemble an 
international coalition designed to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait.80 Invoking the Carter 
Doctrine81, the US also moved to protect Saudi Arabia from a potential Iraqi attack by 
deploying troops as part of operation Desert Shield starting on August 7, 1990. Against 
the backdrop of a number of diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and the continuing 
military buildup that would eventually culminate in the deployment of over 500,000 
soldiers in Saudi Arabia, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678 on November 
29. The resolution established a final deadline of January 15, 1991 for Iraq to comply 
with Resolution 660 and to withdraw from Kuwaiti territory. The resolution also 
authorized member states to use all necessary means to enforce Iraqi compliance (Lantis 
2002a, 28). By this time, the United States had been able to assemble an international 
coalition that included thirty-four countries including the United Kingdom and France. 
Both European powers chose to act resolutely. Together they would dispatch close to 
50,000 troops.   
  On September 9, Bush and Gorbachev met in Helsinki and issued a joint 
declaration calling for the unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. A number of 
                                                
80 This decision followed a discussion between President Bush and Prime Minister Thatcher who happened 
to be in Washington at the time. The Prime Minister has argued for prompt action involving only a few 
very committed states on the basis of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter which allowed self-defense to protect 
national interests (Baker 1995, 279). 
 
81 The Carter Doctrine justified the use of force in the Persian Gulf to defend U.S. national interests. The 
doctrine had been articulated by President Carter in 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanist .  
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diplomatic initiatives by the UN, the Arab League as well as the European Community 
did not resolve the crisis. A six hour meeting between Secretary of State Baker and Iraqi 
Foreign Minister Aziz in Geneva on January 9 also ended in failure.  
Following a final congressional authorization on January 12, 1991, the United 
States and its allies commenced an air campaign on January 17 named Operation Desert 
Storm. Iraq escalated the conflict by targeting Israeli cities with Scud missiles. The full-
fledged invasion of Kuwait and Iraq during the end of February followed the destruction 
of Iraqi air defenses and command centers. The ground assault lasted just 100 hours and 
on February, 27, 1991 the United States declared a cease-fire and the liberation of Kuwait 
as complete.  
 
The German Response to the Gulf Crisis 
 
German elites and the general public strongly opposed the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait and on August 3, 1990, the Kohl government condemned the invasion of Kuwait 
as act of unwarranted aggression that violated international law and human rights.82 The 
Federal Republic also supported the various mediation efforts aimed at persuading Iraq to 
withdraw from Kuwait including the twelve resolutions issued by the UN Security 
Council. Lastly, Germany participated in the economic sanctions imposed under UN 
Resolution No. 661. In his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 26, 1990, 
Foreign Minister Genscher indicated concerns about safeguarding principles of state 
sovereignty and human rights. He condemned the annexation of Kuwait as illegal and 
offered Germany’s unqualified support in demanding the complete and unconditional 
                                                
82 NYT, August 3, 1990. 
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withdrawal from Kuwait, reinstitution of the country’s full sovereignty, and immediate 
release of all hostages (Genscher 1998, 477).83  
The Federal Republic addressed the Gulf Crisis diplomatically as indicated by its 
condemnation of Iraqi aggression and the call for the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty.  
Yet Germany did not join in the growing international consensus on a military solution to 
the crisis and showed little concern about the possibility of further Iraqi aggression in the 
region. In contrast, leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and France quickly 
decided on the use of force and proceeded to deploy troops in Saudi Arabia to deter Iraq 
from further aggressive moves. German policymakers also showed no inclination to force 
Saddam Hussein to relinquish control over Kuwait. Neither parliamentary elites nor the 
general public seemed to perceive Iraq as grave threat to international security (Berger 
1998, 171). Public debates were characterized by the absence of discussions about 
German interests in the region and how these interests should guide policy (Asmus 1992, 
vi). The concern for domestic issues including reunification clearly preoccupied elites, 
public and the media.84 The failure to partake and support a military solution pursued by 
NATO allies and the United Nations would soon leave Germany diplomatically isolated 
and susceptible to international criticism.   
                                                
83 Chancellor Kohl would later explain the government’s reasoning in a Bundestag speech on January 14, 
1991 where he stated that “once the international community allows the forceful extinction of one of its
members as a state, it will have unforeseeable consequences in other parts of the world” (Kohl 2007, 299; 
PB 12/2, January 14, 1991, 22). The session of parliament ended with an all-party resolution calling on 
Saddam Hussein to prevent war by withdrawing from Kuwait (Genscher 1998, 479; PB 12/2, January 14, 
1991). 
 
84 Extraordinary parliamentary sessions convened during the summer break on August 8 and 9 addressed 
domestic issues including reunification and upcoming elections but made no mention of the crisis in the 
Persian Gulf.  
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Germany’s parliamentary elites were divided on the appropriate course of action
to address the escalating Gulf crisis. Cabinet elites were aware of th  growing 
international expectations of German military contributions. Members of the cabinet 
including Chancellor Kohl and Defense Minister Stoltenberg were sympathetic to the 
requests for military assistance issued by the United States and the United Nat ons and 
initially recommended the deployment of logistical support troops to demonstrate 
German solidarity with its allies (Berger 1998, 174; Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 
68). They supported their argument with article 24, paragraph 2 of the constitution 
according to which German membership in a collective security system could be 
interpreted as establishing the special responsibility to support the coalition forces being 
assembled in the Gulf (Stoltenberg 1991).85 This interpretation of the constitution 
produced significant disagreements among parliamentary elites. Members of the 
opposition parties dismissed the argument outright and even the coalition partners from 
the FDP were unprepared to commit troops without judicial clarification. A political 
controversy developed which indicated that the room for a consensus on the German 
policy response was narrow and pre-determined by the role conceptions of the past.  
Foreign Minister Genscher of the junior coalition partner FDP opposed changes in 
German role behavior. He argued that the deployment of German troops in the Gulf 
required a constitutional amendment (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 69). Addressing 
the general question of military contributions to actions outside of NATO territory, the 
                                                
85 “Normale Rolle”, Der Spiegel, March 11, 1991, 22. 
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minister emphasized the requirement of an international mandate.86 Politicians from the 
Social Democratic Party went even further in opposing Kohl’s initial position on 
deploying logistical support troops in the Gulf region. Party members criticized American 
actions as attempt aimed at preserving hegemony in the region and maintained th t the 
party was unwilling to support superpower interests at the cost of overturning Germany’s 
pacifist traditions (Berger 1998, 173). These concerns were shared by the politicians from 
the Alliance 90/Green Party who criticized past US policy in the region and contended 
that it had contributed to the crisis. Green Party politicians also categorically opposed any 
use of military force.  
In the end, parliamentary elites settled their differences at a meeting on August 20 
in which the leaders of the CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD agreed to a compromise in which 
military contributions of any sort were ruled out in return for an agreement on addressing 
the issue through a constitutional amendment at a later date (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 
1994, 69). Foreign Minister Genscher and Defense Minister Stoltenberg conveyed the 
Federal Republic’s position at a meeting of the WEU the next day and three days later, on 
August 23, Genscher informed the Bundestag of the cabinet’s decision to deny militar 
assistance on the basis of limitations on the use of military force contained within the 
federal constitution.87  
                                                
86 In October, Genscher stated that the only option on the table was participation in peacekeeping 
operations under UN auspices (Der Spiegel, October 1, 1991). 
 
87 Genscher stated that “Our basic law does not permit us to send troops into territory beyond the borders of 
our alliance…It is our objective to enable the German forces to participate in military actions that have 
been voting in by the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 
The Federal Republic of Germany thus expresses its preparedness…to assume its responsibility for 
securing world peace within the framework of the United Nations and on the basis of its charter” (Genscher 
1998, 474; PB 11/221, August 23, 1990, 17469).  
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In the ensuing parliamentary debate, opposition politicians remained true to the 
informal agreement forged at the inter-factional meeting three days prior. They also 
reaffirmed their support for a constitutional amendment that would allow the Bundeswehr 
to participate in UN peacekeeping missions. Backed by the elite consensus, Chancellor 
Kohl turned down a personal appeal for military assistance made by President Bush 
during the end of August by claiming that the constitution prohibited the of out-of-area 
deployment of Bundeswehr troops (Hyde-Price 2003, 188; Lantis 2002, 82). On 
September 13, the Chancellor declared that Germany would aid the coalition within 
limitations and that he would introduce a constitutional amendment after the November 
elections allowing for the use of the Bundeswehr in crisis spots within a multilateral 
framework provided by the United Nations (Genscher 1998, 476).  
Unwilling to render military assistance while being subject to increasing 
international pressure to aid the coalition, Germany began to concentrate on financial and 
diplomatic means to address the crisis. Kohl pledged about $2.1 billion in economic aid 
to the coalition during a meeting with US Secretary of State Baker on September 15 
(Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 66; Baker 1995, 299). Half of that amount was to go 
to the United States with the other half to be divided between Egypt, Jordan and Turkey 
(Ibid.). Baker, who personally believed “that Germany’s response to the crisis up to then 
had been disappointing”, emphasized the importance of Germany living up to its 
responsibilities (Baker 1995, 298-299).88 Germany made a second pledge in January 
                                                
88 Baker (1995, 299) wrote in his memoirs: “You’re not g ing to contribute any forces because your 
constitution prohibits it, and then if it looks like you’re being skimpy on the money, you’re getting all the 
benefits of this and you’re not contributing. And even if I don’t believe it, that’s the way it’s perceived. 
You have to put me in the position where I can argue when I appear before Congress that Germany is doing 
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1991 with the country promising an additional $5.5 billion to the United States and $550 
million to the United Kingdom, followed by another pledge to support French efforts in 
February 1991 (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994, 66; Kohl 2007, 308). In total, 
German financial contributions would amount to $10.6 Billion (Berger 1998, 173). 
Nonfinancial contributions were not insignificant. Germany sent seven support ships to 
the Mediterranean in August to replace American vessels that had been reassigned to the 
Gulf. It would later dispatch five minesweepers to the Gulf. Germany also agreed to the 
use of its airspace, paid for the transportation of the bulk of US troops from Germany via 
rail and river barges and dispatched eighteen Alpha jets to Turkey to protect it against a 
potential Iraqi attack in response to a government request. Germany mobilized about 
3100 troops in support of allied efforts.89 The air force deployment as part of the Allied 
Mobile Force was largely a symbolic act of alliance solidarity. Public op nion remained 
strongly opposed to military actions (Der Spiegel, March 11, 1991). Antimilitarism in 
society and the armed forces turned the deployment decision into a minor governmental 
crisis. The number of conscientious objectors surged with fifty alone among the troops 
sent to Turkey.90  
Germany continued to emphasize the need for non-violent means of resolving the 
conflict although hopes for a negotiated end to the crisis quickly faded with Hussein’s 
steadfast refusal to withdraw from Kuwait. Iraq’s position became increasingly more 
isolated through September 1990, when Hussein began to detain foreign citizens as 
                                                                                                                                                 
its fair share. I know how important the U.S.-German relationship is to you, and you know how important it 
is to me. But you can’t leave me hanging out there”.  
 
89 Der Spiegel, February 4, 1991. 
 
90 Der Spiegel, February 4 and 11, 1991. 
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hostages and also ignored the appeals of the Soviet Union. At the United Nations, 
Germany repeatedly underscored its support for principles of international law which 
clearly defined Iraq’s actions as aggressive and illegal. Germany also helped facilitate the 
Soviet Union’s continued political cooperation with the West which contributed to the 
maintenance of cohesion among Gulf coalition members and indirectly supported alliance 
objectives.91   
A noticeable shift in the domestic debate about adequate responses to the crisis 
occurred after the Scud missile attacks on Israel on January 17, 1991. German elites 
agreed that the country had a special responsibility for Israeli security arising from the 
historical burden of the Holocaust. The indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilians made 
German military reticence appear morally unacceptable and increased international 
pressure to boost support for the multilateral coalition. The diplomatic damage wors ned 
when German firms began to be implicated in the design and construction of Iraq’s 
chemical and biological laboratories (Lantis 2002a, 30). Germany, which had been 
quicker to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait than some other states because it had 
not engaged in major arms trading with Saddam Hussein’s government, now was 
subjected to intense international criticism for having aided Iraqi capabilities (Ibid.).  
Criticism, guilt and the missile attacks on Israeli civilians “triggered a complex 
psychological and political reaction that helped produce a major shift in policy”… “[it] 
created a political imperative for Germany to act” (Asmus 1994, 63). As such, the attacks 
                                                
91 Later, Genscher (1998, 483) would write about this frequently overlooked role that “Germany’s 
willingness to support the Soviet Union’s economy facilitated its withdrawal from Europe … [which] … 
improved the Alliance’s strategic position in regard to security”. 
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on Israel led to a noticeable shift in both the elite and the public’s perception on the use 
of force as a more effective means to address Iraqi aggression.92   
The attacks on Israel and guilt over having aided Iraq shifted situational 
parameters for German elites. The question of German responsibility elevated the Gulf 
crisis to a high level of national importance. Parliamentary elites stepped up their support 
for the coalition by increasing financial and material contributions significa tly. In his 
speech to the Bundestag on January 30, 1991, Chancellor Kohl justified an additional 
$5.5 billion in aid by referring to the sacrifices other allies had made as well as US 
contributions to the maintenance of German unity and freedom. He also argued that a 
united Germany had greater responsibility that came with its increased freedom of action 
(PB 12/05, January 30, 1991, 69). 
Germany’s significant financial and logistical contributions did little to shake the 
international perception that it had not contributed commensurate with capabilities.  
International criticism of German policy conduct and military reticence heated up during 
the peak of the coalition’s air attack in February. German policy elites responded with 
baffled indignation. For instance, Foreign Minister Genscher stated that “nobody should 
complain when Germans are thoughtful and not rash in questions of war and peace”.93 
Voicing a civilian power conception of the German role in the world, President Richard 
von Weizsäcker commented on international criticism of German inaction “that the world 
would not want to rediscover how well German soldiers can fight”.94 The President saw 
                                                
92 A number of prominent left-leaning intellectuals ao began to support the use of force as necessary evil.  
 
93 Der Spiegel, February 4, 1991, quoted in Asmus (1992, 11). 
 
94 Die Zeit, February 8, 1991, quoted in Asmus (1991, 11). 
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Germany’s future role on the forefront of addressing the ‘real security problems’ of the 
world which he considered to be overpopulation, hunger, social inequality and 
environmental destruction.95   
The country’s refusal to deploy troops on the grounds that the country’s 
constitution ruled out the deployment of Bundeswehr troops in ‘out-of-area’ operations 
can be contrasted with that of other middle powers such as the United Kingdom and 
France which chose to act resolutely and between them, dispatched close to 50,000 troops 
to the region. Both countries were cognizant of their leadership responsibilities in the 
maintenance of the international order arising from their great power rles. French 
military support against an Arab country, in particular, was strongly motivated by the 
country’s desire to demonstrate great power status in the post-Cold War world (Wood 
1992, 45-49). But emulating the role of the United Kingdom or France did not appeal to 
most German politicians even though Germany was more dependent on oil from the Gulf 
than France and many of the countries who militarily supported the coalition. Therefore, 
preserving continued access to the region’s oil supply and preventing a dictator from 
controlling them should have constituted a vital national interest. On the basis of the 
principle of state sovereignty, as well, Germany should have militarily supported the 
restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty which had been so blatantly violated by Iraq. There
also was the issue of the Iraqi human rights violations in Kuwait which should have been 
a prime concern for a civilian power that had supported the strengthening of international 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
95 In a clear misunderstanding of the altered nature of the international security environment after the Cold 
War, the President also saw the controversy about German military involvement as superfluous and the 
Gulf War as the last of its kind (“Normale Rolle”, Der Spiegel, March 11, 1991, 22). 
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human rights regimes for many years.96 The relatively swift reaction to the Scud missile 
attacks on Israel did little to dispel the international image of German policy as being 
callous and unconcerned.  The debate over whether NATO ally Turkey should be 
defended from a potential Iraqi attack was awkward and diplomatically damaging.  
Perhaps most perplexing was the fact that the ongoing negotiations over the vital Two-
Plus-Four Treaty required the goodwill of the allied powers which should have made 
diplomatic and political concessions in response to Allied requests more likely.97 How 
can the fact that Germany failed to exhibit the role behavior of a responsible and 
calculable ally that it had shown throughout the Cold War be explained through the 
interplay between role expectations and role conceptions? 
 
Role Expectations and Role Perceptions  
 
The diplomatic fallout over the German response to the Persian Gulf War was 
dramatic. Foreign media and government officials criticized the Federal R public for 
failing to provide combat troops and for dragging its heels on offering financial 
assistance. In the United States, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee singl d 
Germany out for special criticism (Baker 1995, 298-99). Along with Japan, Germany was 
accused of being an ‘ostrich power’ that was strangely out of touch with international 
                                                
96 The extent of human rights violations appears to have been deliberately exaggerated at the time by 
sources acting on behalf of the Kuwaiti government. 
 
97 Secretary of State Baker (1995, 299) was perplexed about the lack of German reciprocity. As he pointed 
out during his meeting with Chancellor Kohl: “We have worked very closely in the last year to meet your 
needs.  I think that we have done a good job, and it wasn’t always easy. We worked closely together, and 




realities. Even more stinging criticism came in the form of accusations of cowardice98 
and callously having traded lives of soldiers for checkbook diplomacy.99 The failure to 
act decisively to protect Turkey exasperated many NATO officials and even raised 
doubts about German reliability within the alliance (Stephen Kinzer, NYT January 26, 
1991, A8). Defense Minister Stoltenberg was forced to acknowledge that the Federal 
Republic had been subjected to some very critical reactions (Ibid.). Chancellor Kohl and 
Foreign Minister Genscher would spend months attempting to repair the diplomatic 
damaged caused by the war. Clearly, Germany had not lived up to role expectations from 
important allies. These expectations were based on the desire for Germany to act 
responsibly by assuming a leadership role in international affairs after the nd of the Cold 
War.100 The intensity of the demands for a new German role during this period needs to 
be viewed within the context of the evolution in NATO’s strategic doctrines and the 
organization’s general purpose and self-perception which influenced the behavioral 
expectations of important member states. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established by the North Atlantic 
Treaty, signed in Washington in 1949. As a collective defense system, Article 5 of the 
treaty treated peace as indivisible by considering an attack on one of the member states as 
                                                
98 Stephen Kinzer, “War in the Gulf: Germany; Germans to give $5.5 Billion More”, NYT, January 30, 
1991, A11. 
 
99 Among the more stinging critiques of German actions were those by Michael Lind, “Surrealpolitik”, 
NYT, March 28, 1991 and Sked (1991). Other commentaries conveying expectations of German military 
responsibilities were those by Hobart Rowen, “The Fr e Lunch Countries”, WP, November 3, 1990 and 
Amy Schwartz, “Germany’s Special Way”, WP, February 13, 1991. 
 
100 President Bush expressed these expectations in hisimportant speech in Mainz in May 1989 in which he 
recognized Germany’s role as Europe’s preeminent economic and political power and saw the US and 
Germany as ‘partners in leadership’ in responsibly grasping ‘the promise of the future’ created by 
Gorbachev’s initiatives (Bush 2009, 52-3).  
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an attack on all. Article 5 was also referenced to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
which supports states’ rights to individual and collective self-defense (NATO, Art. 5). 
Charged with defensive functions for European and North American territory, NATO 
was not set up to conduct operations outside of its territory. So-called out-of-area or non-
article 5 operations which were not directly related to the defense of alliance territory but 
undertaken in the interest of maintaining international stability had always been the 
source of disagreements between the member states (Baumann 2001, 160). However, the 
rigid balance of power system of the Cold War generated few opportunities for out of 
area mission and hence caused few issues of contention. This would change with the 
emergence of a new security environment after the Cold War ended.  
NATO’s Summit in Brussels in May 1989 acknowledged the far-reaching 
changes that were beginning to envelop Europe as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy 
revolution in the Soviet Union. The summit also began to address what would soon be 
perceived as radical change in the international security environment. For instance, 
articles 31-32 of the Brussels Declaration established the need to deal with regional 
conflicts as well as comprehensive security problems including environmental 
depredation, resource conflicts and economic disparities.101  However, the defensive 
strategy of the alliance remained essentially unchanged with Article 12 stating that 
defense depends on “a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate
and effective nuclear and conventional forces” (Ibid.). Subsequent role expectations were 
conveyed in Article 13 which required that  
                                                
101 NATO, Declaration of the Heads of State and Governme t, May 30, 1989. 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c890530a.htm (accessed June 24, 2009). 
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the Allies fulfil [sic] their essential commitments in support of the common 
 defence. Each of our countries will accordingly assume its fair share of th risks, 
 rôles and responsibilities of the Atlantic partnership (Ibid.).  
 
Threat perceptions and strategies began to change in earnest at the London 
Summit in July 1990 during which governmental leaders attempted to come to terms with 
the fundamental transformations taking place in Europe. The creation of multinational 
rapid reaction forces was a major issue at the summit (Berger 1998, 169).102 Article 14 of 
the London Declaration addressed the need for crisis management through “smaller and 
restructured active forces...which...will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied
leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis”.103 With the 
increasing tendency of the UN to engage in peacekeeping missions in accordance with 
Chapter VII of its charter, NATO would move even further towards the creation of crisis 
reaction forces through the development of a new strategic concept in 1991.  
In sum, NATO revised its strategic doctrines during the early 1990s in response to 
changes in the international environment and the possibilities generated by the end of the 
Cold War. The new doctrines effectively transformed normative parameters for state 
action and participation in non-article 5 operations. Alliance responsibility was no longer 
understood as state contributions to territorial defense. Instead, member states were 
expected to develop the capability and willingness to address global stabilities through 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. During the period of the Persian Gulf 
Crisis between August 1990 and February 1991, the new norms were not fully articulated 
                                                
102 Among the important concerns addressed by the London Summit was the need to contain soon-to-be 
reunified and sovereign Germany through the maintenance of a dense institutional network (Berger 1998, 
169). 
 
103 NATO, London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlan ic Alliance, art. 14, par.1. 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm (accessed June 24, 2009). 
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and national force structures had not even been reorganized to allow for the capability for 
rapid reaction missions. Changes in the physical environment were occurring faster th n 
institutions could respond to them. Given the uncertain and fluctuating nature of the 
situation, the social impact of the developing intervention norms was muted which 
increased the policy autonomy of German elites whose role conceptions still reflected 
those of the Cold War.   
The international criticism came as a surprise to elites whose civilian power 
conceptions had largely survived the fundamental transitions that accompanied the end of 
the Cold War. In fact, Germany’s response to the Gulf War suggested that the country
had not emerged from reunification as stronger actor, secure in its role as Europe’s 
leading power, but a country “that really wanted to be a Greater Liechtenstein” 
(Schoenbaum and Pond 1996, 67). Nevertheless, conservative elites quickly seized the 
opportunity to attempt to change role behavior concurrent with international expectations. 
Their interest lay in having Germany become a ‘normal’ state that would exhibit foreign 
policy behavior similar to that of other great powers. The interest in normalization was 
argumentatively presented as part of a concern with the country’s reputation as 
dependable ally. 
CDU party leaders quickly began to view Germany’s anti-military traditions and 
institutions as obstacle to be overcome rather than as valuable post-war identity asset to 
be preserved. Chancellor Kohl, his advisor Horst Teltschik, Defense Minister Stoltenberg 
and Secretary General of the CDU, Volker Rühe, argued that the future reputation of the 
Federal Republic would depend substantially on its willingness contribute militarily to 
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the resolution of international crises.104 Karl-Heinz Hornhues, the foreign policy 
spokesperson for the CDU/CSU coalition, maintained that the “unified Germany is  
normal state and should accept its responsibility in the international community” (quoted 
in Lantis 2002a, 32). The desired role changes were also motivated by a desire for full 
equality in social status as revealed by statements by Volker Rühe who voiced his 
concern that “the quality and size of Germany’s contribution influences its polical 
capability and thus determines the weight that can be thrown behind its interests” (quo ed 
in Duffield 1998, 183). In line with their quest for behavioral normalization, Kohl and 
Stoltenberg emphasized the need for the revision of the constitutional limitation on 
deployment of troops outside of NATO area (Bach 1999, 122).   
The role adaptation sought by the ruling party was pursued under the heading of 
responsibility which had been the hallmark of elite role conceptions for many yers. 
Responsibility was the argumentative centerpiece of Chancellor Kohl’s inaugur l policy 
speech from January 30, 1991 in which he stressed that Germans could not exclude 
themselves from world developments and that the country had a responsibility to 
participate in the maintenance of international peace and stability. In that speech, the 
chancellor also argued out that Germany’s allies expected such a role shift and that 
Germany’s membership in the ‘community of free nations’ obligated it to contribute with 
“all rights and with all the responsibilities”.105 Kohl also promoted the normalization of 
                                                
104 “Normale Rolle”, Der Spiegel, March 11, 1991, 22. 
 
105 Kohl conveyed the desired changes in role behavior in the following words: “There can be no safe little 
corner in world politics for us Germans," and "we have to face up to our responsibility, whether we lik it 
or not. Until now, we have worked actively and successfully for the world's economic stability. This will no 
longer be enough… The attainment of full sovereignty does not just increase behavioral latitude but also
comes with increased responsibilities. That is how our partners view this. They expect from the united 
Germany that it becomes true to its new role. This is not a question of unilateral policy or ambitions of 
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German policy and identity including Germany’s need “of finding its inner balance, its 
center…which included what was considered normal in other countries, …[a] living 
patriotism”.106  
The statements of conservative politicians reveal that they desired a change in the 
role behavior of the Federal Republic after the end of the Cold War. They promoted 
policy normalization by cleverly linking allied expectations to values of responsibility 
and reliability that had been central to the country’s traditional role conception since 
World War II. Role entrepreneurs were unsuccessful in persuading other parliamentary 
elites. Politicians from the coalition partner FDP and the opposition SPD advanced their 
own positions of maintaining policy continuity on the use of force by invoking 
Germany’s traditional civilian power role conception.  
Politicians from the Free Democratic Party were concerned with preserving the 
country’s traditional role conception including the institutionally anchored military 
reticence. This foreign policy orientation was considered as a prudent state policy that 
had proven itself in the past.107 For FDP politicians, the future reputation of the Federal 
Republic was a function of maintaining the traditional role as an antimilitarist power that 
                                                                                                                                                 
power because for us there is only one place in the world and that is among the community of free nations” 
(PB 12/5, January 30, 1991, 69). 
 
106 Chancellor Kohl concluded his speech with the statement that Germany was in need of finding its inner 
balance, its center…which included what was considered normal in other countries, …[a]living patriotism 
and…that the unified Germany takes its role in the circle of nations – with all rights and with all the 
responsibilities. This is rightfully expected of us and we must meet this expectation…a vision of a new 
order for Europe and the world which is based on natio l self-determination, the inviolability of human 
dignity and the respect for human rights (Kohl, PB 12/5, January 30, 1991, 90). 
 
107 FDP parliamentarian Feldmann conveyed this role conception in parliament by stating that “the Federal 
Republic of Germany has achieved a good reputation nd trust as a result of a forty-year record of a 
commitment to a political and consistently nonmilitary foreign policy. Now, this condition of trust has to be 
strengthened and transferred to the united Germany” (PB 11/221, August 23, 1990, 17478). 
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addressed global security through holistic and institutionalized approaches.108 The 
differences between CDU/CSU and FDP politicians over Germany’s future role took the 
form of a disagreement over the nature of the mandate allowing for the participation of 
German troops abroad. Emphasizing antimilitarism as part of the country’s role in world 
politics and relying on Genscher’s holistic and institutionalized conception of global 
security, party members preferred a UN over a NATO or European mandate. Thus, Otto 
Graf Lambsdorff openly questioned the grounds on which the government could decide 
to deploy German troops to the Persian Gulf.109 Genscher and others argued for the 
resolution of the issue of the mandate through judicial clarification by Germany’s 
Constitutional court.110 
Politicians of the Free Democratic Party also worried about the precise natur of 
the decision-making procedure leading to the deployment of troops. To prevent potential 
abuse by the executive, they insisted on Bu destag majorities to allow out-of-area 
deployments (Duffield 1998, 185). By linking out-of-area participation to Bundestag 
majorities and hence, popular support and by emphasizing the importance of international 
peacekeeping through the UN, the position of the FDP did not deviate substantially from 
that of the traditional civilian power role. The disagreement between the coalition 
                                                
108 This benign, civilized vision of global politics relied on the premise that resolution of violence and
misunderstandings within international politics could be achieved through the support of institutions a d
international law. Genscher was well-known for this vision (even referred to as Genscherism). The 
underlying assumption behind this view of international politics was that international society could be 
turned into something resembling domestic society – a concept German politicians referred to as world-
domestic politics (Weltinnenpolitik). See Longhurst (2004, 62). 
 
109 “Warum Sollen Wir nicht Dabei sein?”, Der Spiegel, February 11, 1991, 27-30. 
 
110 Germany’s Constitutional Court would not decisively rule on this issue until July 12, 1994 when it 
allowed German participation in out-of-area mission  the basis of the country’s responsibilities as 
member of a defensive alliance. 
 
 119
partners undermined the ability of conservative politicians to promote a new role 
conception of the Federal Republic as normal power. Politicians from the opposition 
parties were even more vehemently opposed to a course change. 
Politicians from the Social Democratic Party were among the strongest supporters 
of Germany’s traditional role conception. SPD party chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel 
opposed the cabinet’s original idea of deploying troops for logistical support missions 
and criticized the economic support provided for the Gulf coalition. Party leader Oscar 
Lafontaine went even further by questioning the use of military force to remove Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait on the basis of principle.111 Instead of military force, party members 
viewed sanctions as the only appropriate way of pressuring Iraq into restoring Kuwaiti 
sovereignty. Humanitarian assistance operations were seen as the only acceptable form of 
German participation.  
The left-of-center rejection of the use of force and the view of war as 
counterproductive and unacceptable means of diplomatic conduct closely corresponded 
to the civilian power role conception. Opposition leaders fought hard to preserve that role 
conception. They conjured up the specter of the potential militarization of German 
foreign policy and the dangers inherent in abandoning the primacy of the established 
policy tendency to seek political rather than military solutions to conflicts.112 They 
recommended, instead, that the government pursue all opportunities leading to a speedy 
                                                
111 “Den Ernstfall nicht gewagt”, Der Spiegel, February 11, 1991, 25-27. 
 
112 Vogel cited concerns of US conflict expert Paul Nitze about the potential side effects of the of Gulf war 
including the global rise of fundamentalism and environmental destruction. He went on to argue that the 
logic of war needed to be disrupted at every possible moment so that the political process may be given th  
chance to pursue justice by non-violent means (PB 12/6, January 31, 1991, 96). 
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resumption of the political process.113 Left-of-center politicians also emphasized the 
misuse of military force in the past and suggested, fully in line with the expectations 
arising from the role conception of a civilian power, that the Federal Republic had a 
special moral obligation arising from its history to disavow the use of military force to 
resolve international disputes. Referring to the participation of German soldier  in the 
Gulf as unacceptable, Vogel stated categorically: “We don’t want it ad he constitution 
does not allow it”.114  
Responding to the idea of role normalization and explicitly rejecting its great 
power ramifications, members of the SPD argued against such a national role if that 
meant emulating France, the United Kingdom or Italy. Many party members had been 
calling for the reduction of national force levels to under 250,000 troops. This figure was 
significantly under the 370,000 troops agreed upon in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty 
(Longhurst 2004, 55 and 62). Germany was to perform an international role comparable 
to the one played by Sweden. The country’s foreign policy was to be characterized by th  
central values of antimilitarism and humanitarianism (Kamp 1993, 167). SPD politicians 
also rejected Kohl’s argument that Germany had an obligation to demonstrate solidarity 
with the alliance.   
Members of the more radical left wing within the Social Democratic Party also 
were distrustful of American intentions in the region. US actions were viewed as 
primarily hegemonic and self-serving in nature. The Gulf Crisis was perceiv d as a 
                                                
113 In German: “…jede Möglichkeit genutzt werden, damit erneut die Politik eine Chance erhält, das Recht 
mit gewaltlosen Mitteln wiederherzustellen” (Ibid.). 
 
114 PB 12/6, January 31, 1991, 96. SPD parliamentarian Wischnewski had used similar words during the 
debate from August 23, 1990: “We welcome that clarity has been achieved about the fact that there will be 
no Bundeswehr in the Gulf. “Our constitution does not allow it” (PB 11/221, August 23, 1990, 17471). 
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peripheral event given the party’s traditional policy focus on European events. 
Europeanists had been advocating for the dismantlement of NATO in favor of an 
expanded and strengthened European security policy after the end of the Cold War 
(Berger 1998, 181).115 The questioning of US motives is revealed in the discourse on 
Turkey’s request for military assistance under the auspices of NATO’s Allied Mobile 
Force.  
The Turkish president had publicly criticized Germany for its delayed response in 
providing military aid against a potential attack from Iraq. SPD Party chairman Vogel 
rejected the criticism and accused Turkey of trying to use the incide t to boost the 
country’s regional power in an effort to become a regional hegemon.116 Clearly rejecting 
external role expectations that required Germany to act responsibly by rendering 
assistance to an ally in need, Vogel maintained that “the Federal Republic gets to d cide 
if she wants to participate in military operations on the basis of UN decisions and not the
Turkish president or the NATO General Secretary”.117 He later reaffirmed his disapproval 
of German military assistance to Turkey because he perceived the risk of having troops 
be used in violation of constitutional parameters.  
The positions of SPD leaders emphasized values of Germany’s traditional role 
conception over those of foreign role expectations. Responsibility was understood as 
adherence to the civilian power values of the past. Antimilitarism and humanitarianism 
                                                
115 The party decided to abandon this position during the December elections of 1990. 
 
116 The term used here was Ordnungsmacht which roughly translates into hegemon. The relevant se tence 
in Vogel’s statement in German was: “Das Wort von der Ordnungsmacht in der Region läβt da aufhorchen” 
(PB 12/6, January 31, 1991, 97). 
 




were viewed as guiding principles of German policy orientation in the post-Cold War era. 
This stance would be affirmed through a series of party congresses during the early 
1990s. The vast majority of party delegates would continue to reject German 
participation in peacekeeping mission that carried the risk of weapons being used for 
purposes other than self-defense. SPD leaders had initially agreed to compromise on the 
necessity of a constitutional amendment on the use of military force. But support for that 
position during the August 1990 meeting had been lukewarm and possibly guided by the 
conviction that the necessary two-thirds majority for an amendment in the Bundestag was 
out of reach.118   
Members of Germany’s Alliance 90/Green Party maintained the most restrictive 
position on the use of military force. Claiming that “military intervention by the United 
States exacerbates the conflict and contributes to the escalation”, party member Beer 
criticized the actions of the United States as “gunboat diplomacy”.119 Green Party 
politicians emphasized the importance of political rather than military means of resolving 
the conflict by voicing their support for continued UN sanctions and Iraq. They also 
criticized the desire of the government to meet foreign expectations through military 
involvement and “demanded strict military abstention” in this and all future conflicts 
(Ibid.,17477). The categorical rejection of the use of force was based on a role conception 
of Germany as an immature state.  
                                                
118 Some dissent did exist within the party. For instace, Hans-Ulrich Klose, Karsten Voigt and Rudolf 
Scharping who would later take the position of Defense Minister in the first Schröder cabinet, supported a 
more active stance for Bundeswehr participation in UN peacekeeping missions even if combat was 
involved (Longhurst 2004, 63; Lantis 2002a, 32).  
 
119 Beer stated that “the US disregarded the UN resolution and that is proof of the fact that the old thinking 




According to the view of the radical left, Germany was a state not yet ready to 
take on international responsibility. The country’s imperial past and its militant-
expansionistic foreign policy orientation established the obligation for the Federal 
Republic to rule out military involvement outside of state territory. Continued state 
immaturity and irresponsibility in international affairs were confirmed by German actions 
in the Gulf region. Germany was seen as guilty for having contributed to theregion’s 
militarization and insecurity through a defective arms export policy.120 In their 
categorical rejection of the use of military force and their opposition to German 
involvement abroad, Green Party elites strongly supported the traditional role conc ption 
of the Federal Republic.121  
The elite debate during and immediately following the Persian Gulf War shows 
that conservative elites attempted to meet foreign expectations and wanted to combine 
that goal with their desire for the normalization of German role behavior. As first major 
crisis of the Post-Cold War order, the Gulf War initiated a debate on the normalization of 
national identity and German foreign policy. The war helped define the discursive terrain 
along with what would become the rhetorical positions and argumentative dividing lines 
between elites for the next years.122 The battle would rage over what type of role behavior 
                                                
120 In German: “... daβ die BRD und die DDR erheblich zur Mitaufrüstung und Militarisierung dieses 
Konfliktes im Nahen Osten beigetragen haben zeigt, daβ das vereinigte Deutschland erst noch unter Beweis 
zu stellen hat, daβ es nicht zu Eskalationen von Konflikten auf der Welt oder gerade in der Dritten Welt 
beitragen wird” (Beer, PB 11/221, August 23, 1990, 17477).  
 
121 In a striking turnabout, Fischer and the Green Party would later support and oversee the country’s first
military engagement since World War II during the Kosovo Crisis.  
 
122 The debate was not always strictly divided along ideological lines. Former Chancellor Willy Brandt 
(SPD) and left-of-center opinion leader Magnus Enzensb rger supported the use of force to liberate Kuwait 
to the need to oppose aggression by authoritarian regimes in reference to Germany’s own past.  
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most closely matched the central tenet of responsibility that had defined German role 
conceptions since World War II.123 Conservative elites would argue for a change in role 
behavior that included the pursuit of ‘normal’ national interests and the use of force. 
They were joining forces with a small but influential group of scholars who argued 
strongly for the acceptance of the country’s ‘natural’ great power role in Europe.124 The 
opposing position was that of role continuity which entailed the preservation of the 
civilian power role including its defining principle of the rejection of the use of force. 
The decision to not comply with new international expectations of German behavior 











                                                
123 Even Social Democrats who vehemently opposed the participation of Bundeswehr troops in Gulf 
operations accepted the need for greater responsibility. In the first major rhetorical exchange in parli ment, 
Wischnewski (1990, August 23, 1991, 17471) stated that Germany needs to be prepared to contribute to 
international peace outside of NATO area. In German: “…weil wir bereit sein müssen, in aller 
Behutsamkeit und in aller Bescheidenheit unseren Beitrag zu leisten, um den Frieden auch auβerhalb des 
Bereichs unseres Bündnisses zu erhalten oder wiederh rzustellen”. 
 
124 Examples of the arguments promoting normalization are found in the contributions by Stürmer, 
Schöllgen and Gillessen.  Schöllgen wrote that “half a century after World War II, Germany is again 
united, again a nation-state and thus on the evolutionary path to again becoming a European Great Power” 
(1993, 27).  Stürmer argued that Germany, as “defined by the four Gs: Weight and size, history and 
geography (Gewicht und Gröβe, Geschichte und Geographie)… is by its nature a Gre t Power. Germany is 
thus both becoming normal and returning to normalcy” (Stürmer 1992 quoted in Schöllgen 1993, 140). 
Finally and perhaps most telling, Gillessen wrote that “Germany will have to become a normal nation 
among other nations…Identifiable interests are the basis of continuity, credibility and trust…a nation which 
is not able to talk about its national interests openly and clearly will appear to pursue a hidden and perhaps 
suspect agenda…A country that cannot define its interes s properly and set its policies accordingly will be 
regarded by others as unpredictable and if, in addition, that country is powerful, as dangerous (Gillessen 
1994, 30-31). We see here the clear linguistic appro riation of concepts associated with the traditional role 
conception including predictability and calculability (trust) to forge a new role conception and foreign 
policy conduct.   
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Domestic Concerns of Parliamentary Elites during the Gulf War Crisis 
 
The crisis in the Gulf could not have developed at a more momentous time in 
Germany’s post-war history. The government of Helmut Kohl was preoccupied with the 
range of political, socioeconomic and fiscal ramifications of reunification and the 
preparations for the first all-German elections since World War II. The December 
elections were widely perceived to create some type of watershed in German politics that 
would influence politics for years to come. On the foreign policy side, the negotiation of 
the crucially important Two-plus-Four Treaty trumped other issues. 
Germany’s domestic agenda in the fall of 1990 was dominated by the need to 
address the extraordinary range of political, economic and social issues pertaining to 
reunification. These issues revolved around nothing short of the conjoining of two states 
1990           
 
August 2   Iraq invades Kuwait  
August 6   UN imposes trade sanctions 
 Request for German military support 
August 20 Inter-Factional meeting between all major parties leads to agreement on 
rejecting military involvement   
August 23 Genscher informs Bundestag that Basic Law does not permit out-of-area 
deployment of Bundeswehr 
End of August   President Bush requests military assistance 
   UN requests military assistance 
September 12  Two-Plus-Four Treaty signed in Moscow  
September 15  Kohl pledges $2.1 Billion after meeting with Secretary Baker 
September 26  Genscher condemns annexation of Kuwait in speech to UN Assembly 
November 29  UN Security Council passes resolution 678 giving Iraq until January 15, 
   1991 to withdraw from Kuwait 
1991           
 
January 10  CDU/CSU looses election in Hessen 
January 17  Operation Desert Storm begins 
January 19  First SCUD missile attacks on Israel 
January 28  President Bush requests additional financ al support for the coalition 
January 30  Kohl’s inaugural speech lays out new role for Germany as normal  
   power with international responsibility 
February 27  Kuwait is declared liberated 
March 15   Supreme Soviet ratifies Two-Plus-Four Treaty 
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that, after five decades of leading a separate existence in opposing systems, had little in 
common safe language and the will of the citizens to unite sooner rather than later. 
Adding to the complexity of the domestic situation was the mind-boggling speed of the 
reunification process which frequently rendered plans obsolete even as they were being 
drawn up. In the face of these fast-moving events, the options available to policy-makers 
changed continuously. Plans for a federation of the two German states and a currency 
union were quickly superseded by the necessity of full national reunification. This, in 
essence, took the shape of an annexation as most East German economic and political 
models were deemed unacceptable to a majority of Germans. Parliamentary d b tes in 
1990 were dominated by the extraordinary range of issues that needed to be addressed to 
both facilitate reunification and address issues of social and economic integration.125  
In early October, 1990, the Democratic Republic of Germany formally ceased to 
exist when its parliament, the Volkskammer, voted for unification with the Federal 
Republic. The country began to prepare for the first all-German elections since the last 
Reichstag elections of 1933. Kohl and the CDU/CSU won the first post-unification 
election of December 2, 1990 by a landslide. He had advocated a swift reunification 
course, maintaining that Article 23 of the German constitution allowed for the exension 
of West German institutions to the five Länder of East Germany. The euphoria 
surrounding reunification in both East and West undoubtedly contributed to the party’s 
election success. Meanwhile, the opposition parties incurred major losses. The SPD ad 
                                                
125 In the end, Kohl’s government chose the easiest path to reunification. Invoking Article 23 of the German 
constitution which allowed for the extension of theinstitutions to the new provinces, the 5 Eastern 
provinces were simply incorporated in the existing erritory of the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, major 
problems were in need of resolution: These included in particular the rather complex laws governing 
German federalism – meaning the relationship between th  Länder and the federal government as well as 
between the Länder themselves.  
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to surrender about 3.5 percent of its seats in parliament. The Green Party suffered a major 
defeat. It lost 4.5 percent of its votes and failed to preserve the right to parliamentary 
representation.126 Both parties had advocated a more cautious and incremental 
reunification process based on stages. Party leaders had warned of the high costs for the 
West German population as well as inflated expectations in the East. Aware of the 
euphoria surrounding reunification, Social Democratic politicians had relied on what they 
believed was their party’s powerful reputation among East Germans.127 CDU/CSU 
politicians since Chancellor Adenauer had pursued an unequivocally Western orientation 
which should have negatively impacted their electoral prospects in East and West. SPD 
politicians including Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr had built a strong and lasting 
reputation for conciliatory politics towards East Germany. The party’s popular Ostpolitik 
had linked populations in East and West Germany during the 1970s and had enabled the 
two states to maintain cordial relations even during times of renewed tensions in the 
1980s.  
Germany’s Green Party was relatively unknown in the East. To overcome their 
party’s name recognition deficit, party leaders had pursued an alliance with leading 
intellectuals from the East who had been instrumental in bringing about the democratic 
changes in the former GDR. These individuals, turned politicians, had banded together in 
                                                
126 Support for the Green Party dropped from 8.7 percent in 1987 to 4.8 in 1990. The party did not clear the 
five percent hurdle and, subsequently, failed to win the right to parliamentary representation (Finkel and 
Schrott 1995, 360). 
 
127 The reputation was build on the Ostpolitik policies pursued under the Brandt cabinet which had replaced 
the confrontational course of previous cabinets with a series of conciliatory policies culminating in the 
semi-official recognition of East Germany in return for increased contact between the two populations. 
SPD politicians viewed increased contacts and communication as major factors in bringing about the 
peaceful revolution in the German Democratic Republic and the desire of the population for reunification.   
 
 128
the Alliance 90 Party. Neither Green nor Alliance 90 parties were able to produce a 
strong showing during the election because the reunification issue trumped everything 
else by a wide margin. 
Eager to regain some of the public confidence lost during the election, politicians 
from SPD and Alliance 90/Greens had an interest in continuing to embrace the country’s 
civilian power role by opposing German contributions to the Gulf War alliance. The 
nonconformist roots of the Greens as pacifist party opposing German NATO membership 
made that stance credible and corresponded effectively to the public’s antimilitant 
attitudes at the time. The antiwar position paid off during the election campaign in the 
state of Hessen on January 20, 1991 during which the SPD and Green Party successfully 
used the Gulf War to mobilize their respective bases (Kohl 2007, 307). The election took 
place just three days after the start of the air campaign in the Gulf. The incumbent 
CDU/FDP government lost power and was replaced by a Red-Green coalition.128  
SPD politicians, in particular party chairman Vogel, would continue to pursue the 
theme of antimilitarism as the ruling elites came under international pressure to increase 
German contributions to the alliance. Chancellor Kohl was forced to commit 6 Billion to 
the United States after a phone conversation with President Bush on January 28, 800 
million to the United Kingdom after a meeting with British Foreign Minister Hu d in 
early February and yet another 300 million to France after a phone call with President 
Mitterrand on February 12, 1991 (Kohl 2007, 308). In his memoirs, Kohl complained 
bitterly about the criticism coming from SPD politicians who had effectively b en able to 
                                                
128 The state of Hessen was traditionally left-leaning a d the Green Party had scored some of its first 
successes in government here. Thus, the success of the SPD and the Greens may not solely have been due 
to their anti-war campaign strategies.  
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publicly label Germany’s financial contributions to the coalition as a ‘war tax’ 
(Kriegsschuld). This allowed SPD politicians to deny political responsibility for the 
action and the party to distance itself from any potential tax increases (Ibid., 316).  
A central campaign promise given during the federal elections had been 
Chancellor Kohl’s insistence that reunification would not result in tax increases for West 
Germans. But throughout 1990, reunification costs spiraled out of control. Payments to 
the USSR, a currency swap that converted the significant savings held by East Germans 
for a multiple of their true value, the rapid adjustment of East German wages to th ir 
West German counterparts irrespective of comparatively low productivity as well as 
massive public infrastructure spending in the East made Kohl’s campaign promise 
unsustainable. The financial pledges to the Gulf War coalition provided a convenie t 
excuse that taxes would eventually have to be raised.129   
In his January 30 speech to the Bundestag, Kohl justified the financial 
contributions to the Gulf War coalition on the basis of German responsibilities. The 
Chancellor invoked the sacrifices made by other allies and US contributions to the 
maintenance of German unity and freedom. He expressed his view that a united Germany 
had more responsibility as well as more freedom of action (Kohl, PB 12/05, January 30, 
1991, 69). Kohl’s concern with responsibility after reunification is conveyed strongly in 
his memoirs in which he viewed checkbook diplomacy during the crisis as a way of 
‘buying off’ (freikaufen) responsibility and admitted that such a strategy would prove 
                                                
129 Protzman argues in similar fashion: Unification costs vastly exceeded expectations and probably would 
have forced the government to raise taxes regardless of the unforeseen contributions to the coalition. The 
Gulf War contributions may have served as excuse to justify breaking untenable campaign promises 
(Ferdinand Protzman, “Kohl Says Gulf War May Bring Tax Rise”, NYT, January 24, 1991). 
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untenable in the long run. Germany had to be prepared to participate in peace keeping 
and peacemaking missions (Kohl 2007, 564). These statements clearly reflected th  
influence of external role expectations on the mindset of Germany’s political elites. But 
the invocation of external demands also conveniently dovetailed the moral argument of 
responsibility towards allies and citizens in the East that would sustain unavoidable and 
unpopular tax increases. An additional concern of policy elites during reunification was 
the external diplomatic game being played to make reunification possible in the frs  
place.  
 The Treaty on the Final Settlement in Regards to Germany, more commonly 
known as the Two-plus-Four Treaty, was one of the most significant treaties in German 
history. The treaty finalized the agreement between the Allied Powers that had been 
formulated at Potsdam in 1945. It restored German sovereignty by terminating all special 
privileges and responsibilities of the Allies. Thus, it was designed to resolve all 
remaining issues pertaining to end of World War II which had been precluded by the
division of Germany and Europe during the Cold War. In return for its full sovereignty, 
the united Germany would accept the borders established by World War II and seek to 
conclude a separate peace treaty with Poland.130 In addition, the country was expected to 
reduce the size of its armed forces, agree to not station foreign troops in East Germany 
and to renounce the possession of all types of weapons of mass destruction. Meetings 
between the two Germanys and the quadripartite powers started in May 1990 and would 
not be concluded until the signing ceremony in Moscow on September 12, 1990. When 
                                                
130 A German-Polish Border Treaty was concluded on November 14, 1990 in which Germany formally 
recognized the Oder-Neisse border as final and renounced all further territorial claims. 
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the Gulf Crisis erupted, parliamentary elites were concerned about the possibility that it 
could lead to a falling out between the superpowers. Foreign minister Genscher’s later 
commented that “my first thought after the Iraqi invasion was whether this event would 
have any effect on relations between the West and the Soviet Union, which were vital for 
the German agreement” (1998, 473). German elites clearly viewed the invasion of 
Kuwait as an illegal act of unwarranted aggression and supported UN resolution against 
Iraq. But politicians were also anxious to smooth over potential points of contention 
between the US and the Soviet Union.131 They perceived two different sets of social 
expectations.  
 Politicians perceived important NATO allies and the United Nations as expecting 
more active German leadership and contributions to address international instability. Yet 
too forceful a contribution including military force was seen as potentially h rming the 
relationship with the Soviet Union. Genscher wrote about this time that he “…opposed 
the use of Bundeswehr troops in the Gulf for reasons of constitutionality but also of 
foreign policy” (1998, 479). Even after the signing of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty in 
September 1990, the German government remained concerned over the treaty’s possible 
rejection by the Soviet Parliament which would have had “catastrophic consequences for 
Germany and Europe” (Ibid., 478). Political elites wanted to act appropriately but 
appropriate action was motivated by the national interest of ensuring reunification. This 
required meeting perceived expectations from NATO alliance partners a d the Soviet 
Union without which the normalization of Germany’s status could not have been 
                                                
131 Major differences between the superpowers remained as Secretary of State Baker chronicles in his 
account of Gulf War diplomacy (Baker 1995, 281-283 and 285-287). 
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achieved. The continually changing situation within the disintegrating Soviet Un on 
complicated matters further.  
President Gorbachev had ended the Cold War by initiating a series of profound 
policy reforms within the Soviet Union and by changing the fundamental tenets of the 
country’s foreign security policy. Domestically, Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika 
reform initiatives represented fundamental efforts at modernizing and revitalizing the 
Soviet system. In the area of foreign policy, Gorbachev ended the war in Afghanistan, 
negotiated fundamental arms control agreements with the United States that effectively 
reduced Soviet military power and perhaps, most importantly, substantially increased the 
political leeway of forces seeking reforms within the Warsaw Pact societies in Eastern 
Europe. Domestic reform measures and the Soviet Union’s new tendency towards 
noninterference in the internal affairs of other Warsaw Pact states were politically 
contentious. Gorbachev was making enemies among the party rank and file which 
increasingly opposed his reform policies because they undermined Sovietp w r. At the 
historic bilateral summit in July 1990, Chancellor Kohl had been able to extract 
Gorbachev’s concession of a united Germany’s NATO membership. Repeated policy 
changes and diplomatic concessions increased the frictions within Gorbachev’s 
government and the Communist Party. Soviet foreign minister and Genscher’s main 
negotiating partner Shevardnadze resigned on December 20, 1990, citing concerns about 
an ‘impending dictatorship’ by forces intend on undermining political and economic 
reform efforts. The prospect that the end of Perestroika would also jeopardize the 
ratification of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty greatly concerned Genscher and Kohl. Only on 
March 15, 1991, when the German Foreign Office received the ratification document by 
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the Supreme Soviet, did Germany regain its full sovereignty (Genscher 1998, 479). On 
the other side of the Atlantic, the Two-Plus-Four agreement was still awaiting ra ification 
by the US Congress. In sum, Germany’s response to the crisis in the Gulf is imposs ble to 
understand without considering the impact of the ongoing Two-Plus-Four negotiations 
with particular emphasis on relations between Germany and the Soviet Union (Lantis
2002a, 26). German politicians viewed the most effective foreign policy role for the 
pursuit of the country’s vital interests as one based on the predictable and calculable 
nature of the past. The concern with predictability was considered prudent policy even in 
relations with Germany’s alliance partners.  
 The prospect of German reunification presented a dilemma for allies of the
Federal Republic. For many years, the governments of the United Kingdom and France
had supported West Germany in its quest for the exclusive mandate and had maintained 
an official commitment to the need of national reunification. Faced with reunification in 
1990, however, some allied governments quickly became concerned with the 
reemergence of the ‘German problem’ and a potential return to the power-oriented 
policies of the past. The fear that Germany “might break loose from its Cold War 
moorings in NATO and the European Economic Community and adopt a more 
independent, unilateral and nationalistic approach to foreign policy” had Prime Minister 
Thatcher and President Mitterrand attempting to slow down the reunification process and 
even exhibiting some inclination to stop it altogether (Berger 1998, 168). Traditional 
balancing against Germany as way to contain a stronger German state was considered 
and the reorganization of international organizations including NATO was conducted in 
part with the goal of containing German power through institutional integration (Ibid.) 
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German politicians were aware of the reemerging concerns about German power 
in European capitals and addressed any potential impediments to reunification through 
confidence building measures. They renewed the country’s commitment to 
multilateralism in security issues by promoting the functions of the WEU and the OSCE. 
Elites accelerated the process of European integration by supporting preparations for the 
milestone summit in Maastricht and made crucial economic concessions that allowed for 
progress on Economic and Monetary Union. Playing the traditional role of a civilian 
power role enabled Germany to maintain European support for reunification. Adherence 
to the behavioral parameters of the calculable and predictable role Germany had played 
throughout the post-World War II era was also seen as supporting President Gorbachev 
against the forces that opposed his domestic and foreign policy agenda from within the 
Communist Party.132 Domestically, the country maintained its commitment to traditional 
institutions including the commitment to the unique type of civil-military relations based 
on ‘inner guidance’ and national service even though the latter was being considered an 
outdated and inefficient institutional form of recruitment even at the time.  
Given the primacy of the objective to achieve German reunification through the 
successful negotiation of the Four-Plus-Two Treaty, the decision to exhibit foreign policy 
behavior consistent with the normative expectations generated by the Cold War 
environment appears as prudent course of action. But the decision to conform to 
‘outdated’ rather than contemporary behavioral expectations came at a cost. The 
appropriate behavior associated with values of predictability, calculability and 
                                                
132 These forces particularly opposed the withdrawal of the Red Army from East Germany for reasons of 
national pride, distrust and economic concerns about the living standards of the soldiers who generally 
fared much better in East Germany than they would within the Soviet Union. 
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responsibility was beginning to change. Exhibiting the old behavior without adapting it to 
conditions of the post-Cold War environment increasingly carried the risk of it being
perceived as inappropriate policy conduct. Without the willingness to militarily 
participate in peacekeeping operations when such actions were beginning to consti ute 
the norm rather than the exception, adherence to the role conception value of 
responsibility was being compromised. As a consequence, Germany appeared as 
unreliable and irresponsible ally. It was perceived as free rider who failed to contribute 
commensurate with capabilities. Domestic elite interests were not the only factor 
explaining noncompliance during the Persian Gulf War. The value of antimilitarism in 
Germany’s strategic culture also inhibited security policy reorientatio  during this role 
episode.   
 
Strategic Culture: Antimilitarism as Constraint on Elite Action 
 
Strategic culture with its dominant value of antimilitarism acted as major 
constraint in delimiting the space for elite responses to the Persian Gulf War. Public 
opinion polls indicated that Germans generally supported allied actions to evict Iraq  
troops from Kuwait but only a twenty percent minority supported the deployment of the
Bundeswehr.133  A majority of Germans explicitly rejected the use of force and preferred 
a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Public opinion also supported the UN sanctions against 
Iraq with a majority indicating the desire to allow more time for the sanctions o persuade 
the Iraqi regime to comply with the international demands to withdraw from Kuwait.  
Public opposition to German military involvement in the Persian Gulf grew steadily 
                                                
133 Der Spiegel, January 28 and March 11, 1991; Lantis 2002a, 26. 
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between November 1990 and January 1991 as a military solution became more likely. 
The number of public protests against the war increased as did dissent within the ra ks of 
the armed forces (Lantis 2002a, 34). The German public sympathized with Iraqi civilians 
as victims of a potential bombing campaign with references being made to the 1945 
firebombing of the city of Dresden (Berger 1998, 172). An opinion poll from January 18 
found that 79 percent of Germans viewed the use of force against Iraq as wrong with 
support for NATO declining to a historic low (Asmus 1994, 60-61). The respected, 
influential weekly journal Der Spiegel ran a series of articles criticizing the use of 
military force.134 The centrist and equally influential newspaper Die Zeit took issue with 
any potentially emerging nationalism after reunification and criticized th  small group of 
conservative writers who had argued for the normalization of foreign policy.135 In 
addition, a relatively small yet vocal and well-publicized anti-war movement organized 
demonstrations in many cities under the heading of ‘no war over oil’.136  The subsequent 
outbreak of war on January 17, 1991 was greeted by the German public with general 
surprise, dismay and calls for sympathy for the victims of the conflict (Asmus 1992, 10). 
SPD and Green Parties effectively exploited the public sentiment against the war during 
the regional elections in Hessen on January 10 and forced the CDU into opposition (Kohl 
2007, 307). However, public opinion was not as staunchly antiwar as it appeared from 
media coverage of the vocal minority of protesters and the general value structure of the 
                                                
134 Some examples of this include Peter Glotz, “Der Ungerechte Krieg“, Der Spiegel, February 25, 1991. 
Rudolf Augstein, “Sterben für Kuwait?”, Der Spiegel, November 12, 1990. 
 
135 “Wider den Feuilleton-Nationalismus”, Die Zeit, April 26, 1991.  
 
136 The largest anti-war demonstrations took place in Bo n on January 26, 1991 with about 200,000 people 
attending.  For a detailed account, see Der Spiegel, January 28, 1991. 
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antimilitant strategic culture. This was revealed by the missile attacks on Israel which 
caused significant changes in public sentiment.  
The missile attacks on Israel and the media images of gasmask-wearing civil ans 
huddling in bleak shelters influenced public opinion. Surveys taken at the end of January 
and the beginning of February began to show the majority of German citizens now 
supporting military actions against Iraq, financial support to the multilateral coalition and 
military assistance to Turkey.137 Polls also indicated the beginning of a trend of a mildly 
supportive public acceptance that Germany needed to take on greater responsibility with 
59 percent of those asked indicating that “Germany should pursue a more active role n 
world affairs” (Asmus 1994, 61).138 The list of prominent intellectuals from the left that 
began to publicly support the use of force as necessary evil to assist Israel and liberate 
Kuwait grew. It would eventually include Jürgen Habermas, Hans Magnus Enzensberger 
and songwriter Wolf Biermann as well as leaders from the Green Party ‘realist’ (Realo) 
Wing including Petra Kelly, Joschka Fischer and Micha Brumlik.139 Nevertheless, 
antimilitarism continued to be a powerful value among the population with Bundeswehr 
actions generally being rejected. Antimilitarism was shared by Germany’s political elite. 
                                                
137 Two polls are used here: The ZDF Politbarometer for February and March 1991, Forschungsgruppe 
Wahlen, Mannheim and a survey from the Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 29, 1991, 10. Both polls are cited 
by Lantis 2002a, 35.  
 
138 However, this development should not be overemphasized because a long-term RAND study of German 
foreign policy goals between 1991 and 1993 found that strengthening the UN and defending the security of 
allies consistently ranked last among the leading te  foreign policy goals which included goals such as 
preventing proliferation, the global environment, arms control (Asmus 1994, 65). The RAND polls also 
revealed that Eastern Europe was considered a key national interest which may or may not have had 
anything to do with the German hesitancy in regards to the Persian Gulf Crisis.  
 
139 “Wir haben die Faust geballt”, Der Spiegel 36, 1990, 176-180. Wolf Biermann, “Damit wir uns 
missverstehen: Ich bin für diesen Krieg am Golf”, Die Zeit, February 1, 1991, 6. 
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Political elites occupied a Janus-headed position between external and internal 
demands. On one hand, they were exposed to foreign expectations which, as indicated 
above, consisted of confusing and contradictory social messages about the future role of 
Germany. On the other hand, elites were attached to the main tenets of strategic culture 
and carriers of principle state values. Genscher refused to support an amendment to the 
constitution because of his concern with public opinion.140 The foreign minister 
concluded early on in the crisis that “the government was in an accordingly weak position 
both internally and externally given that the war fit neither the political needs nor the 
mood of the people” (Lantis 2002a, 26). Key to understanding the elite debate about the 
adequate response to the crisis was the controversy about the proper interpretation of 
constitutional provisions on the use of the armed forces in areas outside of NATO 
territory.  
The debate about the proper role of the Bundeswehr in situations that went 
beyond territorial defense had ignited on previous occasions during the Cold War. 
German governments had reacted to foreign requests for military assistance by declining 
participation in reference to limitations on the use of military force stipulated by the 
Basic Law of 1949. The key sections of the Basic Law related to the question of the 
potential deployment of troops for missions outside of Germany were article 24, 
paragraph 2 and article 87. In article 24, paragraph 2, the Federal Republic agreed to 
limitations on its sovereign decision-making prerogatives due to the country’s 
membership in a collective security system.141 Article 87 declared that the role of the 
                                                
140 “Standing Up”, The Economist, August 18, 1990. 
141 The precise wording of Article 24, paragraph 2 is: “For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may 
enter a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its rights of 
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armed forces be of an exclusively defensive and rule-based nature.142 By stating that 
“apart from defense, the armed forces may only be used to the extent explicitly ermitted 
by this Basic Law”, the constitution substantially reduced the decision-making uthority 
of the chancellor democracy. The pursuit of national interests through the deploym nt of 
the use of force constituted an important element in the foreign policy of other great 
powers. In Germany, this governmental option was largely precluded. The institutional 
limitation on the exercise of military force was an important aspect of the civilian power 
role. However, the relevant paragraphs of the constitution could reasonably have been 
interpreted to allow for German participation in peacekeeping missions outside of NATO 
territory (non-article 5 operations) as long as these missions were undertaken to “secure a 
peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world” (art. 24, par. 
2).143 This was, in fact, the position of leading government officials including Kohl and 
Stoltenberg who favored the deployment of German troops to demonstrate the country’s 
solidarity with its allies (Berger 1998, 174). In mid-August, Kohl had suggested that 
Germany could partake in coalition actions in the Gulf under the auspices of the WEU 
(Lantis 2002a, 23). The use of force could also have been presented as necessary when 
Turkey invoked Article V of the NATO Treaty, in which all parties agreed that “an armed 
                                                                                                                                                 
sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of 
the world”. 
 
142 Article 87 of the constitution reads: “The Federation shall build up Armed Forces for defense purposes. 
Their numerical strength and general organizational structure shall be shown in the budget … Apart from 
defense, the Armed Forces may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law”. 
 
143 This is, in fact, what the Constitutional Court would decide in 1994. 
 
 140
attack against one or more of them…shall be considered “an attack against them all”.144 
In spite of the interpretative possibilities allowed by the constitution and the NATO 
treaty, the Basic Law had always been used to stave off Bundeswehr participation in 
foreign missions. After a brief debate, Chancellor Kohl’s coalition cabinet would 
continue in this tradition and present this position to Germany’s allies. As such, this 
interpretation of the constitution could be said to constitute a key aspect in the elite 
consensus on the issue of military deployment which was, in turn, deeply related to th  
key value of antimilitarism so important in Germany’s post-World War II strategic 
culture. Evidence for both presence and dominance of antimilitarism abounds. For 
instance, prior to President Bush’s visit in November 1990, Kohl stated that “some 
believe that the problem can be solved by military means…[but that] I strongly advise 
trying everything possible to bring about a solution through negotiations”.145 Genscher, 
as well, pleaded for a peaceful resolution of the crisis hinting that such resolution may 
have positive consequences for other regional conflicts.146 SPD party members adamantly 
rejected military measures to evict Iraq from Kuwait. Their concern with civilian 
casualties and the potentially adverse effects of military actions indicate  a deeply-held 
belief in the counterproductive nature of the use of military force.   
The prominence of antimilitarism among both the general public and 
parliamentary elites explains in part the inability of the government to accede to the 
                                                
144 The North Atlantic Treaty, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm 
(accessed September 20, 2009). 
 
145 Kohl, Interview by Guenter Muechler, Cologne Deutschlandfunk Broadcast from November 18, 1990, 
in FBIS-WEU, November 19, 1990, 13-14. 
 
146 Hamburg DPA Broadcast, 5 January 1991, in FBIS-WEU, January 7, 1991, 14. 
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requests of the allies to actively participate in military operations t liberate Kuwait. 
Conservative politicians were inclined to meet foreign expectations. Their lack of resolve 
in pursuing their position indicated a lack of resolve in changing the cultural agreements 
upon which Germany’s postwar institutions had been constructed. Doubts about the 
efficacy of force prevented a stronger push for the use of force against a parliamentary 
opposition that was able to use the elements of the traditional civilian role concepti to 
construct a more convincing argument and public opinion that remained overwhelmingly 
antimilitaristic. A cultural and institutional web of constraint prevented the effective 
reorientation of German foreign policy. Falling back on the understanding of the German 
role of a civilian power, the country chose to engage in ‘checkbook diplomacy’ by 
contributing financial and material assistance to the coalition effort. The antimilitant 
dimension of strategic culture is, however, not sufficient in explaining policy behavior 
during the Persian Gulf Crisis. The foreign policy objective of securing full sovereignty 
weighted heavily on the minds of political elites. Playing the traditional civilian role 
made it easier to secure the agreement of France, Britain and the Soviet Union. 
In referring to the impact of socialization processes, Johnston saw the desire to 
maximize status, honor and prestige within a group as outweighing concerns of material 
rewards (2001, 499). German actions during the Gulf War corroborate that assertion 
because the country’s financial and material contributions began to increase as 
international criticism increased. Germany’s failure to conform to social expectations 
regarding the use of force in the post-Cold War security environment led to public 
consequences. It led, for instance, to criticism from other coalition countries that 
Germany did not contribute its fair share to the effort which had a shaming effect and 
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acted as effective means of persuasion. In the US congress, both Germany and Japan 
were criticized for not living up to the responsibilities of reliable allies.147 Perhaps most 
importantly, it led to a condition of cognitive dissonance from actions inconsistent with 
role and identity (Johnston 2001, 499).   
German identity reproduction requirements since World War II have relied to a 
considerable degree on complying with allied expectations as member of a social 
reference group of liberal states joined in a security community. The liberal d ntity of 
the Federal Republic distinguishes this state from its previous incarnations, Imperial and 
Nazi Germany. Previous German states are viewed as bad because they sought aut nomy 
through the maximizing of power. This course of action left them isolated and these 
policies are viewed as having caused the national catastrophe of two world wars as well 
as the rise of right and left-wing totalitarianism. In short, German history has created a 
compelling reason to never again be isolated or to pursue a special path (Sonderweg) and 
this is part of the generally accepted understanding shared by elites as well a th  public. 
The Federal Republic’s unique social identity reproduction requirements made its 
elites particularly susceptible to influence of international expectations and hence, 
socialization. Foreign expectations from important allies empowered those internal actors 
or groups who were most likely to prevent a condition of diplomatic isolation. Thus, the 
Persian Gulf War empowered cabinet elites as these individuals argued for compliance 
with external expectations and the use of force regardless of longstanding cultural values 
                                                
147 In early January, members of Congress had criticized Germany for shirking its alliance burdens (Baker 
1995, 298-91; Walter Mossberg, Urban Lehner, and Fre rick Kempe, ”Some in US ask why Germany, 




of anti-militarism, the reliance on diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts and the tendency 
to use economic means to pursue national interests. In the words of Chancellor Kohl, “It 
is now time that the unified Germany takes its role in the circle of nations with all rights 
and obligations (Kohl 2007, 316). This is rightfully expected of us – and we must meet 
that expectation. There is no niche for us Germans in world politics, and there can be no 
flight from responsibility for Germany. We want to make our contribution towards a 
world of peace, freedom and justice” (Ibid., 316).  
In opposing reorientation and supporting foreign policy actions in line with the 
traditional role of a civilian power, SPD leaders had won a Pyrrhus victory and its own 
political orientation could not be maintained in the face of the growing awareness of the 
international security environment. Among some SPD leaders, and through the 
international rejection of this role during the Persian Gulf War, the consensus was already 
shifting towards supporting military participation in out-of-area missions even as the 
rigid opposition to these actions remained popular among the party base (Duffield 1998, 
185). The world was changing and with it, most of the assumptions about threats, 
stability and peacekeeping were changing as well as the evolution of NATO’s strategic 
doctrines during the next years would demonstrate. A succession of humanitarian crises 
was about to make this clear to Germany’s foreign policy elite and it would pursue the 
fundamental reorientation of foreign policy regardless of party ideology. Of these, the 
unfolding crisis in Yugoslavia would be the one that had the greatest impact on the 





Conclusion: Explaining Partial Compliance 
 
 The Gulf Crisis finds Germany performing its traditional civilian power role as 
had been expected and affirmed by the external environment for the duration of the post-
War period. German elites continued to believe that the country’s constitution ruled out 
the army’s deployment abroad and that the antimilitary tendency of public opinion would
make the military engagement of the country outside NATO territory impossible. In 
interpreting existing institutions in a way that categorically ruled out the use of force, 
elite behavior suggested the continuity of existing strategic culture. In part, this was due 
to cultural and institutional path-dependence. The perceptions of elites were still 
anchored in the Cold War understandings of security threats and viewed their country’s 
obligations towards the alliance in terms of territorial defense. They could not reorient 
themselves that quickly, particularly, since they were used to a consensual policy-making 
style. They had their country perform the civilian power role out of habit and because it 
become the quintessential German identity after World War II. Thus, they showed 
genuine surprise at the pronounced international criticism of German military inaction 
and obstinacy during the liberation of Kuwait. Statements by President von Weizsäck r 
and other politicians that indicate surprise at the fact that anyone would want Germans to 
fight again are revealing this respect.148 They indicate both a desire to comply with 
international expectations and confusion about the nature of those expectations. Thus, 
                                                
148 President von Weizsäcker conveys the confusion political elites experienced as a result of contradictory 
foreign expectations:  “All our alliance partners alw ys proceeded from the assumption that because of our 
historical burden no new German military potential could ever again arise. In the year 1990 there were
many fears about what a Germany, strengthened in power by unification, would one day do with it 
militarily–and now, at the beginning of the year 199 , Germans are faced with the accusation that they do 
not want to participate in war” (von Weizsäcker, Die Zeit, February 1991, quoted in Ackermann and 
McArdle Kelleher 1993, 418). 
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elites blamed their failure to act in concert on the country’s antimilitant strategic culture 
and institutions which they claimed placed political constraints on further action and did 
not allow for more commitments beyond the traditional checkbook diplomacy. The 
international criticism had the effect of forcing a reinterpretation of antimilitant views 
and institutions in a process that would continue for years to come.149 Clearly, value 
conflicts within strategic culture and role ambiguity caused by a changing security 
environment were important determinants of the unique mix of German foreign policy 
responses during the episode. However, to fully understand German behavior, the 
interests of particular policy-making elites have to be considered who were abl  to 
effectively utilize the condition of role ambiguity to their advantage.  
An overriding foreign policy interest of parliamentary elites during the Persian 
Gulf War episode was the achievement of national reunification. The diplomatic process 
of negotiating the Two-plus-Four Agreement that ended quadripartite powers in Germany 
entailed the negotiation of a series of delicate bilateral agreements with allies that could 
potentially be at odds with each other. Regional conflicts during the Cold War had 
always carried the danger of superpower confrontation and subsequent proxy wars. 
Considerable distrust and divergence of interests continued to characterize US-Soviet 
relations during the Gulf War. In addition, fears about German power and the future 
German role after reunification remained high in the United Kingdom, France and the 
Soviet Union. Superpower differences and widespread fears about German intentions 
                                                
149 Longhurst (2004, 58-59) views the Gulf War as important watershed event in German foreign policy.  
He writes: “Discord emerged between external demands  conditions within Germany. Policy-thinking 
was caught between expectations and fears at home and abroad, and sought to do justice to both … what 
transpired in the course of the conflict was a tension, even a dialectic, among certain foundational elem nts 
of German strategic culture; namely, how a parochial stance of restraint was to be maintained if other core 
values, such as solidarity with the alliance or responsibility towards Israel, could not be served this way”.  
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could have derailed the immensely important reunification project. To facilitate a smooth 
diplomatic process that ensured continued external support for reunification, German 
elites had an interest in avoiding military actions because this made the country appear 
more calculable and predictable.   
The inclusion of elite interests in the ongoing process of socialization through 
external role expectations helps explain the timing of the foreign policy changes. It is 
only after reunification is achieved, that German elites allowed the changes leading to 
Bundeswehr participation in military missions to take place. After the Gulf War, 
conservative elites would promote a new type of role behavior through the use of the 
concept of responsibility as understood within the framework of a new understanding of 
international security after the Cold War. The consistent use of the values of 
responsibility and alliance solidarity allowed them to tie the desired behavioral changes 
to the country’s principal values established by its strategic culture. In addition, they 
would be able to cast opponents to the changes in role behavior as unreasonable or even 
immoral.  
The desire to combine the need to comply with international demands to avoid 
diplomatic isolation with the domestic interest of role normalization is reveal d in 
Chancellor Kohl 3rd inaugural address delivered on January 30, 1991. Here, the 
chancellor argued that the “escape from the responsibility for maintaining peace and 
freedom through global crisis management is not an option for Germany” (Kohl 2007, 
315).  Falling short of articulating a military role, the Chancellor neverthelss sought to 
establish a more independent, active and authentic role for Germany after reunification. 
The new role presented a middle ground between the extreme of antimilitarism on one 
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hand and the feared militarism potentially associated with traditional roles on the other. 
This role could be linked to the behavioral expectations generated by the new security 
environment after the Cold War. It would establish full equality in status with other
alliance members while enabling Germany to remain unique in that the use of force 
would be acceptable only for morally higher reasons rather than used for the pursuit of 
national interests. Increasingly, conservative politicians would also present the new role 
as the natural endpoint in a process of maturation since World War II.  
The Persian Gulf War episode suggests that international socialization processes 
via expectations from social reference groups of states can affect domestic policy debates 
with the potential of leading to changes in state foreign policy behavior. The afterm th of 
the Persian Gulf War saw conservative elites with traditionally strong ties to NATO and 
Western allies initiate the process by which the deeper meaning of tradition l elements of 
Germany’s role conception–concepts like reliability, alliance solidarity, continuity, 
stability and predictability–would be redefined. Social Democrats and Greens first argued 
against the reinterpretation of the traditional civilian power role.  Over the next decade, 
these elites would reexamine their reservations about the efficacy of force to engage their 
country in a kind of ‘moralistic Realpolitik’. As such, the Persian Gulf War marked th  
beginning of the process of reorientation that would eventually culminate in the 
















UNILATERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA 
 
Introduction: An Awkward Performance 
 The role episode produced by the Persian Gulf War was associated with a 
firestorm of international criticism for Germany’s parliamentary elites.150 The decision to 
play the civilian power role by hiding behind the country’s constitutional limitations on 
the use of force outside of NATO territory tarnished Germany’s international image as 
reliable ally. The hurtful and near universal foreign criticism constituted a clear social 
message that German policy responses had been inappropriate given the existing 
expectations based on the country’s global role and capabilities. The criticism threw 
Germany into “a crisis of confidence and direction” (Stephen Kinzer, NYT February 17, 
1991). A major debate about Germany’s responsibilities ensued with conservative and 
centrist newspapers alike questioning the cabinet’s decision to risk the country’s 
reputation by not contributing commensurate with capabilities.151 Several newspapers 
                                                
150 Stephen Kinzer reported for the New York Times that “in Washington, London, Paris and other allied 
capitals, there has been much grumbling in recent weks over Germany's perceived reluctance to help th 
anti-Iraq coalition. German leaders have been assailed s self-absorbed, niggardly, and ungrateful for fou  
decades of Western support”. The writer also quoted an unnamed diplomatic source in Bonn as saying that 
“whatever you get out of them, you really have to squeeze it out” (Stephen Kinzer, NYT, February 17, 
1991).  
 
151 The influential conservative newspaper Bild editorialized that “while the Americans, British, Canadians, 
French and Italians are in the desert doing freedom's grueling work, the German Army sits aloof on the 
sidelines”, and “In 10 days, the Bonn Government has ruined the reputation that took us three decades to 
build“, Hans-Hermann Tiedje, Bild Zeitung, February 17, 1991, quoted by Stephen Kinzer, NYT, February 
17, 1991. The Süddeutsche Zeitung added that the cabinet had been lucky because if coalition forces would 
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also carried an appeal from the Atlantik-Brücke, an organization promoting German-
American ties, which urged Germans to show solidarity with coalition forces.152  
 The Persian Gulf role episode had created an untenable situation of diplomatic 
isolation from Germany’s social reference group of Western states. For the first time in 
many years, Germany was not in compliance with the expectations from those state . A 
powerful social message had been generated that Germany would risk further isolation 
unless its elites took steps to adjust the country’s role in global politics. The episod  had 
also revealed the country’s continuing institutional and cultural limitations on meeting 
external expectations.153 Role expectations would lead to the internal adjustment process 
by which a central tenet of the civilian role conception of parliamentary elites–the use of 
force–would be challenged and eventually overturned. Yet an additional, crucial element 
in the process of reorientation would be elite perceptions that the security environment 
had inexorably changed and that new military responses to address internal instabilit e  
would be required. With the Gulf War barely over, another international crisis was 
quickly developing in Yugoslavia during the summer of 1991. This crisis brought post-
Cold War instability to Germany’s backyard and its unimaginable cruelty and disregard 
for human rights standards would quickly challenge everything policy makers had come 
to believe in.     
                                                                                                                                                 
have sustained high casualties “the Germans would be in trouble in the United States for a long time” (As 
quoted by Stephen Kinzer, “Genscher at Eye of Policy Debate”, NYT, March 22, 1991) 
 
152 The appeal was signed by many prominent Germans includi g former chancellor Willy Brandt, a social 
democrat. 
 
153 In his memoirs, Kohl 2007 criticized the public’s antimilitant response and intransigence of the 
opposition in failing to recognize the German responsibility to international peace through the participation 
in peace keeping after the Cold War.   
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The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia underscored policy makers’ perception 
that the world had changed after the end of the Cold War. Old demons including ethnic 
strife and genocide were reemerging as new threats to peace and security even in Europe.   
Yugoslavia’s proximity to Germany and the growing refugee problems established an 
urgent need for political action. The high levels of violence and the systematic violations 
of human rights directly clashed with the central values of Germany’s antimilitarist 
culture. UN and NATO involvement in the region intensified to manage the escalating 
crisis. As the efficacy of international security institutions was repeatedly challenged by 
determined regional adversaries, Germany was confronted with requests to play a larger 
role in supporting the missions of these organizations. Eventually, the country would get 
involved militarily for the first time since World War II. Thus, Yugoslavia’s descent into 
unimaginable violence can be considered as the “catalyst for the development of a new 
German security policy” (Hyde-Price 2003, 189). 
More than any other foreign policy area or challenge, the recurring violence in 
Yugoslavia would profoundly test the traditional role conception of a civilian power 
developed during the post-war period which had allowed Germany to become readmitted 
to the ranks of civilized states after World War II. Playing this role had en bl d the 
country to navigate the often unruly and unpredictable waters of international relations 
through the deployment of its considerable economic and normative influence. 
Specifically, violence in Yugoslavia would challenge the claim to moral superiority that 
non-violent means of conflict resolution had enjoyed as part of German strategic culture
after World War II. Parliamentary elites would begin to view the widespread pacifism 
among the general public as problematic and the country’s position on the use of force as 
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unsustainable when correlated with international expectations and security perceptions of 
the post-Cold War environment. In a series of role episodes, elites would move to enlarge
the foreign policy role of the Federal Republic by taking on greater responsibility. The 
fact that the role adaptation process would not always be smooth was made evident by 
the first major attempt at assertively engaging the crisis in Yugoslavia.  
Like the Persian Gulf crisis, external and internal processes leading to the 
unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia may be viewed as constituting another 
example of Germany’s maladaptive response to the international pressure to develop a 
role proportionate to the country’s economic, military and political significace. During 
this role episode, the international environment was characterized by a high level of 
normative ambiguity. Long-honored norms of state sovereignty clashed with those of 
group self-determination as Eastern European states disintegrated quickly and the post-
World War II political map literally changed before policy makers’ eyes. The confusing 
normative context allowed German elites to ignore role expectations and pursue 
unilateral policy options which were based to a significant degree on domestic concerns 
of maintaining levels of electoral support.  Multilateralism was pursued to a point but 
abandoned when the prospects for electoral gains generated by an assertive and unilateral
stance became apparent. Parliamentary elites would choose to instrumentally appropriate 
external demands when it suited them and to reject or avoid them when these demands 
conflicted with their political interests. The result was an awkward performance.  






The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the International Response 
 
The breakup of Yugoslavia began after Marshall Tito’s death in 1980. The 
socialist dictator had managed the country’s ethnic and religious differences through the 
de-emphasis of regional identities, the centralization of power and his personal appe l s 
hero of the guerilla war against the Nazi occupation. The power of the Serb majority in 
particular had been reduced through an administrative trick by which the regions of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina had been turned into independent provinces whose votes within 
the state council were used to balance those of the Serb faction. The fairly rapid 
estrangement between the national groups inhabiting the Yugoslav federation after Tito’s 
death indicated that animosity and distrust between groups had not sufficiently been 
reduced through socialization and propaganda efforts aimed at promoting socialist un ty. 
The death of Tito also coincided with mounting economic difficulties. These economic 
stresses contributed to the process by which groups of people frequently tend to idetify 
with their own kind in times of trouble.    
Modernization efforts and oil imports had led to the need for foreign loans which 
Western governments had been eager to provide given the country’s non-aligned position 
and the role it played as balancer of Soviet power in the region. The dual oil crises of 
1973 and 1979 had drastically exacerbated the problem of exchange imbalances. By the 
1980s, Yugoslavia was deeply in debt.154 In 1987, the IMF initiated structural adjustment 
measures which had the effect of corroding “the social fabric and the rights and securities 
                                                
154 Yugoslavia’s foreign debt increased from $2 Billion in 1970 to $6 billion in 1975. By 1980, foreign debt 
amounted to $20 billion with debt servicing taking up some 20 percent of export revenue (Nick Beams, 
“IMF Shock Therapy and the Recolonization of the Balkans”, World Socialist Web Site, April 17, 1999, 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/apr1999/imf-a17.shtml (accessed October 22, 2008). Germany had 
underwritten a substantial part of Yugoslavian debt (Maull 1995, 101). 
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that individuals and families had come to rely on” (Woodward 1995, 15). Real incomes 
fell dramatically between 1987 and 1991.155 In addition to straining social cohesion 
amongst citizens, the economic crisis also created stresses between the thnic provinces. 
Wealthier regions such as Slovenia and Croatia began to question their membership in 
the Yugoslav federation due to what they perceived to be the one-sided transfer of 
resources to poorer regions. Comparatively poorer areas and groups, in turn, sought to 
preserve the federation through the control and deployment of state power. The ongoing 
process of democratization became another nail in Yugoslavia’s coffin.   
The arrival of democratic institutions including legalized party pluralism in 
Yugoslavia brought to power nationalist parties and their leaders (Cohen 1995, 104).156 
After 40 years of multiethnic policy-making, the sobering reality revealed  divided 
citizenry with a multinational Yugoslav identity being the property of all but a minority 
of citizens.157 By appealing to primary ethnic identities within an economic environment 
marked by intensifying resource competition, Tudjman, Kučan, Milošević and other 
nationalist leaders fanned the flames of ethnic animosity and prepared the ground for 
                                                
155 Real wages in Yugoslavia fell by 41 percent during the first six months of 1990. That year, inflation was 
above 70 percent but quickly accelerated to 140 percent in 1991. It soared to 937 percent and 1134 percent 
respectively in 1992 and 1993 (Chossudovsky 2005, 246-247, quoted in Nick Beams, “IMF Shock Therapy 
and the Recolonization of the Balkans”, World Socialist Web Site, April 17, 1999, 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/apr1999/imf-a17.shtml (accessed October 22, 2008). 
 
156 In examining newly registered parties, Cohen finds that the number of parties devoted to preserving 
national unity and the attainment of liberal-democrati  goals is relatively low (1995, 104-107). 
Contemporary opinion polls also indicated that a Yugoslav identity remained relatively poorly developed 
and that Yugoslavs were more likely to identify themselves along regional lines. This condition was fairly 
well understood in academic and reconnaissance circl s as indicated by a CIA report from November 1990 
according to which the ‘Yugoslav experiment’ had failed and the country was predicted to violently fall
apart within eighteen months (NYT, November 28, 1990, 7). 
 
157 Democratization as transitional phase has been considered as characterized by greater instability. During 
democratization, countries have been viewed as moreaggressive and war-prone. The likelihood of violence 
is higher in multiethnic societies. See, for instance, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) and Cederman et al.
(2008).   
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separatist aspirations. A final element in the escalating crisis was the systematic 
appropriation of state power by Yugoslavia’s Serb faction led by Slobodan Milošević.  
In an act of manipulation as brilliant as it was ominous, Milošević and his 
nationalist supporters had subverted the federal institutions designed by Marshall Tito to 
ensure unity through the balance between national groups. By stripping the provinces f 
Kosovo and Vojvodina of their political autonomy and installing a pro-Serb leadership in 
Montenegro, Milošević created a voting bloc that allowed him to seize control of the 
Federal Presidency and with it, the ability to deploy the state’s armed forces (Maull 1995, 
100).158  The raison d’être of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) as the guardian of the
territorial integrity of the (multiethnic) Yugoslav state would cleverly and effectively be 
subverted to pursue the nationalist objectives of the Serb majority.159 National groups in 
other provinces were left with little choice but to accept membership within a 
Yugoslavian federation dominated by the Serbs under Milošević or to leave this 
federation altogether.160  Eventually, all major groups would opt to leave. 
On June 25, 1991, the year-long process of Croatian and Slovenian emancipation 
culminated in their unilateral declarations of independence. Under the control of 
nationalist parties, the new states quickly passed constitutions denying minority rights as 
                                                
158 In July 1991, the Dutch Ambassador to France, Henry Wynaendts, was sent to Yugoslavia on a fact-
finding mission for the European Community.  He noted hat the Federal Presidency resisted peacekeeping 
efforts by the EEC which he attributed to Serb control of half of the eight votes in the Federal Presid ncy. 
The voting power of the Serb block was a direct result of the removal of autonomy of the provinces of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina and the usurpation of their votes (Libal 1997, 26). With the vote of Montenegro, the
Serb faction was able to control the presidency and deploy the JNA against seceding provinces.  
159 True to the JNA’s declared mission of preserving Yugoslav integrity, US ambassador Zimmermann 
found Ministry of Defense officials and generals of the JNA to be hostile towards Croatia’s intention t  
secede (Zimmermann 1996, 100-102).  However, by 1989, most of the army’s generals were Serb 
(Stoessinger 2005, 122). Thus, the guardians of the Yugoslav state would allow themselves to become the 
tool of Serb nationalism.   
 
160 The idea of a confederation was considered but did not find much traction among either side. 
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defined by the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).161 Clashes 
between the Yugoslav People’s Army and Croatian and Slovenian National Guard 
elements had occurred before that–now they escalated. Armed hostilities peaked in 
Slovenia but quickly ceased, ending hostilities in that part of the country when JNA 
forces withdrew by July 19, 1991 (Cohen 1995, 227). The situation was more 
complicated in Croatia because a significant number of Serbs lived in the Krajina region 
located between the capital Zagreb and Bosnia. The new state’s nationalist const tuti  
had not adequately protected their cultural rights.162 Open warfare commenced between 
the JNA which, through desertions, had become an almost entirely Serb-Montenegro 
force, and the Croatian National Guard and volunteers.163 Conflict between the parties 
intensified throughout the spring and summer of 1991. The first human rights violations 
were committed and full-fledged civil war conditions had developed by October and 
November, when JNA forces destroyed the Croat city of Vukovar and lay siege to 
Dubrovnik. By December 1991, the conflict in Yugoslavia had cost over 10,000 lives and 
over half a million people had been made homeless (Duffield 1998, 190). Europe was 
witnessing its worst violence since World War II. Even so, few people would anticipate 
                                                
161 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became the permanent Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995.  
 
162 About 12 percent of Croatian citizens were Serb (Zimmermann 1996, ix). That amounted to a number of 
about 670,000 Serbs living in Croatia (Ibid., 94). 
 
163 The military action against Croatia, ordered by the government of Yugoslavia, violated Article 316 of 
the Yugoslav constitution which stipulated that the us  of the armed forces during peace time could only be 
authorized by the Federal Presidency. However, the Presidency could be considered to have become 
illegitimate due to the blocking of the routine rotation in its chairmanship by the Serb-led faction in the 
government. Libal views this action as the first “act in an attempt to solve the Yugoslav crisis by means of 
a joint JNA-Serbian dictatorship” (See Libal 1997, 13 and Genscher 1998, 496). 
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that the series of civil wars fought in the Balkans would last four more yearsand 
eventually reach a death toll of over 250,000 people.  
The initial response by governments and international organizations to the 
escalating crisis was characterized by the objective to maintain Yugoslav unity and 
sovereignty.164 The emphasis of the principle of state sovereignty over that of national 
self-determination was based on a number of normative reasons as well as national
interests. The UN charter protects the integrity of sovereign states in article 2 which 
establishes that states, as principle actors in international relations are entitled to respect 
for their territorial and political sovereignty and have the power to regulate internal 
affairs without foreign dictation (Alexander 2000, 403 and 408). Directly derived from 
sovereignty is the principle of non-intervention which requires that states refrain from 
intervening in the domestic affairs of another (Ruggiero 2003, 7). The general acceptan e 
of this principle in customary law and international treaties actually predates the UN 
charter (Alexander 2000, 408). The Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe of 1975 also enumerated several points protecting the integrity of 
states (notably, principles III, IV and VI). This agreement on the inviolability of World 
War II borders had always been crucial for the maintenance of cordial relations on a 
continent divided along ideological lines. The reliance on principles of international law 
at this time may also have been influenced by policy-makers’ increasing concern with 
regional stability. After all, central political parameters in Europe were changing quickly 
and both EU and NATO had already published important security analyses arguing for 
                                                
164 In a display of unity and out of the desire to build an independent foreign and security policy, membrs 
of the EC came to an agreement that the status quo hould be preserved (Crawford 1996, 492-3).  
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the revision of long-standing perceptions and responses to a newly emerging security
environment.   
In addition to the normative context, many states chose to support maintaining the 
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia as leading political objective dueto the existence of 
unresolved ethnic and national questions in Europe. Policy-makers in Spain, Belgium and 
the United Kingdom had long been concerned with reemerging regional autonomy issues 
within their own states and did not want to set a precedent by recognizing break-away 
provinces of Yugoslavia which would have indicated the support of the principle of 
national self-determination. The issue was also relevant given the national aspir tions of 
national groups within the convulsing Soviet Union. Policy makers were reluctant to 
encourage secessionist tendencies by supporting claims to Croatian and Slovenian self-
determination (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 50).165     
The United States, as well, had historically supported Yugoslav unity and was 
particularly concerned about negative repercussions on the cohesion of the Soviet Union 
(Cohen 1995, 218). US Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger was dispatched in 
February 1990 to convey the position of support of Prime Minister’s Marković’s reform 
policies. In the face of the escalating crisis, US Secretary of State Baker himself visited 
Belgrade on June 21, 1991 to convey the US position in support of national unity and in 
opposition to recognition (Cohen 1995, 218; Baker 1991, 478-483).166 At the prior CSCE 
                                                
165 For instance, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh considered the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia to 
be “one of the essential preconditions for the stabili y of Europe” (Politika: The International Weekly 56, 
April 13 – April 19, 1991, 2, cited in Cohen 1995, 218). 
 
166 Secretary of State Baker (1995, 481) would later recall his own words as “we regard your policies as the 
main cause of Yugoslavia’s present crisis…you are propelling your people, your republic, and Yugoslavia 
toward civil war and disintegration”.  
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meeting in Berlin, a Croatian attempt to achieve support for a peaceful session was 
defeated by the United States with the support of all major powers who had committed 
themselves to a policy of supporting the federal Yugoslav government (Cohen 1995, 
220). French and British positions tended to be especially supportive of Serb-controlled 
Yugoslavia (Ramet and Coffin 1995). Given the normative consensus of the international 
environment and the national interests of powerful actors such as the United States, the 
Soviet Union France, the United Kingdom and France, multilateral institutions like the 
EC and the UN initiated a number of mediation efforts designed to support the territorial 
integrity of the Yugoslav state and to discourage the use of violence between the parties.  
On May 30 and 31, 1991, Jacques Santer, Chairman of the European Council of 
Ministers and Jacques Delors, the Chairman of the European Commission visited 
Belgrade to meet with federal and republican leaders. The envoys offered a subst ntial 
economic support package to convince Yugoslavs that they resolve their constitutional 
differences peacefully and maintain the cohesion of the state.167 Under the impression of 
the escalating violence throughout the later summer and fall of 1991, perceived Serb 
intransigence and, no doubt, in part due to German diplomacy, the EEC would 
increasingly move towards identifying the Serb-controlled Federal government as the 
main aggressor in the conflict and target it with sanctions.168  
                                                
167 The policy makers offered financial support between $4 and $5 Billion, the immediate commencement 
of association talks for Yugoslavia and the intercession with international financial institutions like the IMF 
to help strengthen foreign currency reserves, the convertibility of the dinar and increasing foreign direct 
investment levels (See Cohen 1995, 219). 
 
168 Trade sanctions against Yugoslavia were announced i  November and the Peace Conference was 
suspended. More important as indicator of the growing conviction that Serbia was to be blamed for the 
conflict was the decision in December to drop sanctio s against the republics except for Serbia and 
Montenegro (Libal 1997, 187). 
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International mediation efforts continued through the Berlin meeting of the CSCE 
in June, the meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE in Prague in J ly 
and a peace conference convened in The Hague in September after open conflict had 
broken out. Chaired by Lord Carrington, this peace conference would broker no fewer 
than 14 ineffective ceasefires between Serb and Croat forces.169 The United Nations also 
attempted to mediate in October with its efforts being led by Cyrus Vance but the 
rationale for denying recognition was increasingly being undermined by the quick and 
almost automatic recognition of the break-away republics of the USSR after the 
attempted August coup in the Soviet Union and the JNA’s persistent refusal to withdraw 
from Croatian territory. The Yugoslav government’s decision to exclude all the other 
republics from the Federal Presidency undermined the credibility of its argument that the 
Serb-controlled rump state constituted the legitimate successor to Yugoslavia and on 
December 16, the EEC agreed to recognize all Yugoslav republics seeking independence 
provided they met constitutional conditions protecting the rights of ethnic minorities 
(Ramet and Coffin 2001, 51/Table 1). An arbitration commission led by Robert Badinter 









                                                
169 The 15th ceasefire held when the Serb-controlled federal government dropped its opposition to UN 
peacekeepers on January 1, 1992 and hostilities in Croatia began to cease after President Milosevic 
pronounced the war to be over. Whether the German decision to internationalize the conflict through the 
unilateral recognition contributed to the success of the final ceasefire continues to be debated. 
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The German Response to the Breakup of Yugoslavia 
 
 Germany’s foreign policy during this crisis was characterized by a number of 
multilateral as well as unilateral foreign policy moves with the overall impression left by 
the latter. In the beginning of the crisis, Germany clearly followed its multilateral policy-
orientation characterized by the use of consensus-seeking processes within internatio al 
organizations and based on a normative structure provided by international law. To that 
effect, Germany supported a joint declaration of the foreign ministers of the European 
Community in favor of the political integrity of Yugoslavia coupled with a pledge to not 
accept unilateral declarations of independence by Yugoslav republics wishing to secede 
1991                         
 
January 30 Chancellor Kohl argues for greater international responsibility 
February Alliance 90/Green Party proposes recognition 
June 19 All-party resolution supporting Yugoslav unity in the Bundestag 
June 25  Croatia and Slovenia proclaim independence 
June 27 Hostilities erupt in Slovenia 
June 27 CDU leaders call for recognition 
July 1 Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee leads to agreement on recognition 
July 4 Germany suggests recognition by the EU 
September 25 UNSC Resolution 713 imposes arms embargo on Yugoslavia 
October 1 Siege of Dubrovnik begins 
December 10 UN Secretary General de Cuellar urges German compliance 
December 13 UK and France introduce Security Council Resolution to forestall German   
 unilateral recognition  
December 15 Kohl announces recognition at CDU party Congress in Dresden 
December 16  EC yields to German pressure on recognition after a 10 hour meeting 
 Compromise based on commission findings with date se  for January 15, 1992 
December 17 Genscher announces German recognition of Croatia 
December 20 Baker urges German compliance at NATO Summit in Rome 
December 23 Germany recognizes Croatia and Slovenia, del ys exchange of ambassadors  
 
1992                                                                                                                                                     
 
January 14 Badinter commission recommends recognitin of Slovenia but not Croatia 




(Axt 1993, 359; Crawford 1996, 483).170 Germany’s commitment to Yugoslav unity grew 
out of the special relationship that the two countries had maintained for many years and 
which Genscher himself had been instrumental in cultivating. Referring to international 
norms upholding state sovereignty, Foreign Minister Genscher called for the susp nsion 
of the declarations of disassociation of the two republics (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49). 
Throughout July, Genscher would promote the internationalization of the conflict by 
involving European organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU) which Germany was chairing 
at the time. Flexing its economic muscles, Germany also threatened the feeral
government of Yugoslavia with the suspension of economic aid.171  
An important debate in Bundestag on June 19, 1991 ended with an all-party 
declaration supporting Yugoslav unity (Ramet and Coffin, 49; Crawford, 493). 
Representing the government’s position, Minister of State Schäfer stated succinctly that 
Germany, along with its allies supported the peaceful maintenance of Yugoslavia on the 
basis of democracy and human rights.172 The debate revealed that the position of the 
government was more pro-unity, in line with the international diplomatic consensus at the 
time, than that of the parliament. Even though the Bundestag eventually chose to support 
goal of preserving the unity of Yugoslavia, members of parliament had mostly been 
concerned with issues of democratic and peaceful processes of conflict resolu ion within 
                                                
170 Agence Europe, June 24/25, 1991, 4.  
 
171 In 1990, German economic aid to Yugoslavia amounted to $550 million (Ramet 1993, 327). 
 
172 In German: “Gemeinsam mit den Partnern treten wir für den friedlichen Erhalt gesamtjugoslawischer 




the country and they appealed to all parties in the conflict to refrain from the use of force 
in the settlement of the relationship between provinces and central government (PB 
12/33, June 19, 1991, 2558-2566).173 As such, parliamentary factions appeared more 
concerned with the issue of national self-determination and the potential for violent 
suppression by the central government.174  Members of parliament perceived the role of 
Germany to be one of a careful mediator, cognizant of the country’s past role in the 
region and intend on not repeating it.175 The concern with the principle of self-
determination indicated by the chamber would soon have consequences for German 
diplomacy. 
In July 1991, the German position on recognition began to divert sharply from 
that of its European and NATO allies–a fact that would generate considerable p essure on 
the country’s ability to conform to traditional role expectations which emphasized 
predictability and calculability. On July 1, Chancellor Kohl first publicly spoke ut in 
favor of the norm of self-determination for Croats and Slovenes (Maull 1995, 102).176 
Volker Rühe, Secretary General of the CDU, supported him, arguing that Germany had 
been reunited due to the principle of self-determination and that extending it to Croatia 
and Slovenia was imperative to not loose moral and political credibility (Maull 1995, 
                                                
173 The key principles discussed were renunciation of force (Gewaltverzicht), Democracy (Demokratie) and 
human rights (Menschenrechte). 
 
174 In closing his speech, Minister of State (Staatsminister) Schäfer points out that “the Bundestag appears 
to have focused more on the issue of national self-determination” (PB 12/33, June 19, 1991, 2565).    
 
175 In the words of one of the members, “Germany is nether the protective nor preeminent power of 
Eastern Europe or Southeast Europe”. In German: “Deutschland ist weder die Schutzmacht noch die 
Vormacht Osteuropas oder Südosteuropas“ (Glotz, PB 12/33, June 19, 1991, 2560). 
 
176 Chancellor Kohl made a general statement regarding recognition. According to Axt (1993, 359, 
footnotes) newspaper sources disagree on whether he specifically stated his intentions to diplomatically 
pursue the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. 
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117; Libal 1997, 19). Other important party members within both CDU and SPD were 
beginning to support recognition at about the same time.177 Among others, Karl-Heinz 
Hornhues, the Deputy Chairperson of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, explicitly 
criticized Foreign Minister Genscher’s hesitancy and called for immediate recognition.178 
It appears that Genscher and his Free Democratic Party were the last group within the 
policy establishment to embrace recognition; even at the cost alienating important allies 
of the Federal Republic (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49). 
Officially, Germany advocated EC recognition of the break-away republics a few 
days later at the EC Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in The Hague–a move that was 
vetoed by France (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49; Maull 1995, 103). France and the United 
Kingdom would continue to obstruct German recognition efforts until the end of the year, 
particularly within the UN Security Council.179 The position on recognition began to 
crystallize throughout the summer with Genscher expressing the government’s 
willingness to recognize unilateral declarations of independence if negotiations were to 
fail on September 4 (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 50). The government’s increasing 
divergence from the international consensus on recognition has to be considered against 
the backdrop of a number of important domestic and international developments at this 
time.  
                                                
177 This included Karl Lamers, the CDU foreign policy spokesperson and Volker Rühe, the Party Secretary-
General although Lamers would later reverse his position and become one of the few CDU politicians to 
question the recognition course (“Brennend nach Aktion”, Der Spiegel 26/1995, 38-41).  Important party-
members of the SPD had moved towards recognition as early as May (Maull 1995, 102).    
 
178 SZ, July 6/7, 1991, 7, quoted in Ramet 1993, 327. 
 
179 NYT, December 16, 1991.  
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Domestically, a public groundswell was developing in support of more resolute 
diplomacy towards the crisis in Yugoslavia. The German media presented the escalating 
violence in Croatia in rather concrete and vivid imagery (Libal 1997, 15; Woodward 
1995, 184). Croatia had been a popular travel destination for German tourists.180 Erb, 
comparing domestic debates about the situation in Yugoslavia in Germany and the United 
States, reports that while the debate appeared detached in the United States, concerned 
with abstract political issues such as setting precedents for recognition or he inviolability 
of territorial boundaries, media reports in Germany were almost entirely characterized by 
the concern for human rights and the suffering of the Croat people (2003, 159). 
Chancellor Kohl would later call the news and media images coming from the Yugoslav 
civil war as unbearable.181 Influential conservative dailies including the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine and Die Welt had launched effective press campaigns in support of 
recognition (Maull 1995, 102; Heidenheimer 1995, 51; Woodward 1995, 149). In press 
reports and editorials, the rump-state of Yugoslavia as controlled by the Serbs was 
frequently painted as the aggressor.182 Public sentiment, as yet, was not fully supporting 
recognition but public opinion was beginning to exert pressure on politicians to act in 
some meaningful way to stop aggression and violence in Yugoslavia. Leaders of the 
Catholic Church had been adamant supporters of recognition (Jakobsen 1995, 405). As 
                                                
180 Yugoslavia’s and, specifically Croatia’s close ties with Germany are exemplified by a joke according to 
which Yugoslavia had not six but seven provinces – the seventh one being Germany – in reference to the 
many cars with German license plates on the road (Woodward 1995, 469, notes).    
 
181 Kohl used the terminology of “kaum auszuhalten” to describe the intolerable images (Kohl 2007, 564). 
 
182 The Serb-controlled state media ran orchestrated campaigns to denounce German diplomacy by 
associating the Federal Republic with Nazi Germany (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49-50).  Kohl and Genscher, 
who grew up resisting Nazi totalitarianism, were gratly offended and saw the campaign as evidence for 
intransient totalitarianism of the Serb-run Yugoslav regime that needed to be resisted.   
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additional indicator of public sentiment moving policy-makers, representatives of all 
German state governments (Länder) requested EEC recognition of the two republics if 
the Yugoslav army continued to attack with the state government of Hessen even offering
material aid to Croatia.183 
The public’s empathy for the suffering of the Croat people influenced German 
political elites. Within the main parties, the principle of self-determination began to 
trump other issues and concerns–often to the surprise of party leaders (Axt 1993, 355). 
The Alliance 90/Green party had supported recognition as early as February 1991 
(Crawford 1996, 508).184 Leading politicians of the Social Democratic Party, noticing 
that recognition seemed to strike a chord with the electorate, had called for diplomatic 
recognition within days after the declaration of independence of the two break-away 
republics (Heidenheimer 1995, 51). The FDP had decided on a policy in support 
recognition by July 9th (Crawford 1996, 493-94) and at the annual Party conference of the 
CDU in Dresden on December 15, 1991, Chancellor Kohl declared to thunderous 
applause that Germans had won the valuable prize of national self-determination at the 
time of unification and wanted others to share in the same good fortune (Horsley 1992, 
239).   
Internationally, the failed coup in the Soviet Union, followed by the rapid 
dissolution of the Soviet Union had changed strategic realities that had existed for a 
generation. The successor states of the Soviet Union were recognized fairly swiftly. The 
                                                
183 FAZ, July 11, 1991, 2. 
 
184 Both the Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Green parties were trying to recover from rather 
embarrassing electoral defeats at the time. 
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international community’s relative lack of concern for minority rights in the new states 
underscored the inconsistent and interest-driven application of international norms 
governing recognition at the time–a fact that may have contributed to the German 
decision to extend recognition unilaterally.185 The deterioration of the situation in 
Yugoslavia and the escalation of force was another important concern that increased th  
urgency of the need for some kind of diplomatic action. 
Genscher had visited Yugoslavia in July. The fact that he had been unable to meet 
with Croat and Slovenian leaders in their own capitals due to Serb attacks had apparently 
left quite an impression on him (Maull 1995, 102; Libal 1997, 16). The German foreign 
minister identified Serb aggression as leading cause of the conflict during the July 
meeting of the CSCE (Crawford 1996, 493).  The violence unleashed during the brutal 
battle for Vukovar which started in August, followed by the Serb siege of the city of 
Dubrovnik in October clearly helped push Germany towards accepting the dissolution f 
Yugoslavia as irreversible at a time when other governments still clung to the possibility 
of maintaining Yugoslav unity. In fact, Ramet and Coffin claim that it was “Yugoslavia’s 
continued use of force in Croatia that changed the nature of the conflict for Germans and 
reoriented German foreign policy” (2001, 50).  
Policy divergence did not mean abandoning multilateralism and Germany became 
a leading force behind the pro-unity EEC initiatives that were generated during the 
                                                
185 Crawford (1996, 501) writes that “…underdeveloped r gimes and conflicting international norms 
provided permissive conditions for defection”.  
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summer and fall of 1991 (Duffield 1998, 188).186 When Chancellor Kohl first suggested 
recognition in July, he also warned that unilateral German policy actions would 
jeopardize European integration (Maull 1995, 102). As late as September 20, 1991, 
Genscher rejected unilateral steps in a declaration to the German Bundestag.187 Despite 
the official insistence on multilateralism, however, Germany had begun to ignorethe 
wishes of its allies by beginning to establish increasingly closer ties with Croatia and 
Slovenia. Between July, when Croatian President Tudjman was received for official talks, 
and recognition in December 1991, Croatia was perceived by many international 
observers to have assumed the role of a rather unpredictable German protégée. A German 
consulate was established in Ljubljana in November and unofficial assurances were given 
after President Kučan’s visit to Bonn in October that recognition was “only a matter of 
choosing the right moment and right circumstances”.188 These developments raised the 
specter of a reunited Germany resuming traditional power politics in the Balkans.189 The 
                                                
186 In early July, Genscher tentatively proposed that t e EEC consider a joint recognition in the event tha
the Yugoslav Army continued to violate cease-fires. He quickly dropped the idea when he encountered 
opposition from other community members. 
 
187 Emphasizing joint action with France, Genscher said that “the widest possible support will make every 
step we take more efficient. The same holds true for the issue of whether Croatia and Slovenia should be 
recognized…We consider it crucial to take a stand with France.” Indicating the government’s desire to 
move towards recognition within a multilateral setting was a joint statement by Kohl and Mitterrand from 
September 19, 1991 which confirmed respect for the ight to self-determination as long as it was exercis d 
peacefully, democratically and safeguarded the rights of minorities (Genscher 1998, 505). 
 
188 The line is taken from a statement of a spokesman for the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs after 
President Kučan’s visit to Germany in early October (FBIS-EEU, October 10, 1991, 35, as cited by Cohen 
1995, 238). The close link between Croatia and Germany was indicated by the levels of arms exports. 
Between April 1992 and April 1994, the Federal Republic exported $ 320 Million worth of arms to Croatia 
despite the existing arms embargo on Yugoslavia (Der Spiegel 32/94, Prügel vom Ziehvater, 121). That 
was roughly 25 percent of the total arms exports to Serbs, Croats and Muslims.   
 
189 A number of international observers viewed Germany’s unilateral pro-recognition initiatives as 
indication of the intention to reestablish German hegemony in Eastern Europe and to force the EC to 
legitimize these hegemonic aspirations. For examples of these critiques see, Misha Glenny, "Germany Fans 
the Flames of War," New Statesman and Society, December 20 and 27, 1991, 145; Daniel Singer, 
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negative perception was not helped by the fact that Germany had begun to put together a 
pro-recognition group of states that, not counting Denmark and Belgium, looked 
embarrassingly like the World War II coalition that had backed fascist Croatia (Crawford 
1996, 496). However, any association with power politics was vehemently denied 
officially and in parliamentary speeches.  
In a speech to the Bundestag on November 6, 1991, Chancellor Kohl said that his 
government would continue to pursue the recognition of all Yugoslav republics that 
sought recognition (Kohl, PB 12/53, November 6, 1991, 4367). By early December, Kohl 
promised Tudjman that Germany would recognize Croatia before Christmas. In a letter 
sent to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, Genscher clearly broke with the tradition 
of multilateralism when he argued that the EEC’s founding treaty of Paris allowed for 
unilateral action when a member state’s overriding national interest was involved (Owen 
1995, 343). In an uncharacteristically stern reply, the General Secretary rejected the 
German position.190 France and the United Kingdom, recognizing that Germany was 
clearly heading towards unilateral recognition, introduced a UN Security Council 
resolution on Yugoslavia on December 13 designed to forestall any unilateral state ction 
that could change the political balance between the parties engaged in the civil war 
(Crawford 1996, 496). The resolution had the backing of the United States which had 
earlier issued an official statement that recognition should be part of only alarger peace 
                                                                                                                                                 
"Germany Muscles In," The Nation, February 3, 1992; Quentin Peel, "Damned If It Does--and If It 
Doesn't," Financial Times, January 18-19, 1992, 6.  
 
190 Making his preference for non-recognition very clear, the Secretary General sternly reminded Genscher 
of the EC declaration in Rome from November 8, 1991 in which the recognition of independence had been 
viewed as acceptable only within the context of a comprehensive settlement (Owen 1995, 343-344).  
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settlement.191 At the margins of the NATO summit in Rome in November, the US 
strongly pressed Germany not to break the non-recognition consensus (Baker 1995, 638, 
footnote *). Germany remained undeterred with Foreign Minister Genscher confirming 
the government’s decision of official recognition on December 16 (Maull 1995, 104) 
against the objectives of Britain’s foreign secretary who cautioned of an esc lation in the 
Balkans (Cohen 1995, 238). Germany’s official recognition of Croatia and Slovenia 
followed on December 23, 1991.192  
In extending unilateral recognition, Germany was preempting the decision of the
EEC’s Badinter Commission sent to the region on December 16 as well as joint EC 
recognition agreed on for January 15, 1992 pending the results of the arbitration 
commission. More importantly, Genscher had promised German recognition regardless 
of the Badinter Commission’s findings (Maull 1995, 104) and on December 19 pledged 
economic, legal and cultural assistance to Croatia.193 A diplomatic ‘firestorm’ during 
which Genscher had tried to convince other states to join the German position had done 
little to alleviate what Maull has called ‘a bad aftertaste’ of German diplomatic tactics 
(Maull 1995, 105). The ‘premature’ act of recognition stunned the international 
community. Germany had disregarded the wishes of the United States, ignored the 
warnings of the United Nations and risked diplomatic repercussions within the European 
Community.  
                                                
191 Stephen Kinzer, "Germans Follow Own Line on Yugoslav Republics," NYT, December 8, 1991, 18. 
 
192 The unilateral act was cushioned diplomatically by the qualification, lost on most international 
observers, that recognition was ‘awaiting implementation’ until January 15, 1991 at which point the act was 
formally concluded together with the multilateral recognition by the member-states of the European Union. 
 
193 Agence France-Press, December 19, 1991. 
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The impression left of unilateral and bullying conduct was strikingly out of line 
with the role of the reliable, calculable and consensus-focused actor that the country had 
played in the past. Where did the reticence, patience and caution go that had 
characterized German foreign policy conduct since World War II? Germany failed to 
comply with the expectations of its French, English and American allies as well as the 
United Nations. But the country acted unilaterally while supporting multilateralism in 
European institutions with its bureaucratic elite busy preparing for the important 
Maastricht summit.   
 
Role Expectations and Role Conceptions 
 
Expectations of German behavior during the role episode were generally based on 
German support for the consensus on maintaining Yugoslav sovereignty that prevailed 
within the international community. Expectations were based on having Germany play 
the role of a mediator pursuing a non-assertive foreign policy with a low diplomatic 
profile that would lend its weight to the establishment and maintenance of a multilateral 
consensus. When German elites showed inclinations to deviate from that international 
consensus, social pressure was applied to make the country’s policy conform. UN 
Secretary Perez de Cuellar’s exchange with Foreign Minister Genscher and the efforts by 
the United States, France and the United Kingdom to prevent Germany from unilateral 
recognition represent but a few important actions in a sequence by which external 
pressure was applied to change German behavior.   
 Scathing criticism of German actions, mixed with apprehensions about its future 
role and intentions, further confirms the nature of external expectations. US Secretary of 
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State Warren Christopher later claimed that “Germans bore a particular responsibility for 
the failure of the international community to stop the bloodshed”194 and Lord Carrington, 
the chief negotiator between Croatia and Serb-controlled Yugoslavia alleged that the 
peace conference “had been torpedoed by Germany’s premature recognition…”.195 More 
importantly, observers saw in this “first action taken by Germany against the expressed 
preferences of its allies since 1949” a sort of reawakening of the German giant (Jakobsen 
1995, 401). French President Mitterrand warned that the days of the “good German are 
almost over and that the world must brace itself for the worst.196 Daniel Vernet expressed 
the concern of many around the world when he wrote in Le Monde that the “lesson drawn 
from the Yugoslavia affair is that Germany no longer will accept European integration to 
bind its potential power”.197 Foreign criticism of German actions was not confined to 
political decision-makers and journalists but extended to the academic community in 
which power-based positions predicted the reestablishment of German influence in the 
Balkans on the basis of the ethnic alliances forged during World War II and made 
possible by the waning of Soviet power (Jakobsen 1995, 401-402).198  
                                                
194 Quoted in Ramet and Coffin 2001, 49 and Jakobsen 1995, 403. Originally from Martin Fletcher, “US 
Points Finger at Germany”, The Times, June 18, 1993. 
 
195 Conversi (1998, 14), quoted in Ramet and Coffin 2001, 51. The critical remarks of Carrington and 
Vance are also quoted by Jakobsen (1995, 403).   
 
196 Hella Pick, “A Master Germany wants to lose”, The Guardian, January 10, 1992. 
 
197 Cited in Christoph Bertram “Eine Macht Ohne Augenmaβ”, Die Zeit, January 3, 1992, 
http://www.zeit.de/1992/02/Eine-Macht-ohne-Augenmass (accessed March 30, 2009). 
 
198 Woodward (1995, 146-147), for instance, criticizes Germany for pushing the EU towards recognition 
ahead of the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement involving all provinces in spite of warnings of 
future violence. Horsley (1992) is equally critical. Academic concerns included the arguments made by 
Waltz (1990; 1993) and Mearsheimer (1990) that foresaw Germany’s return to power-based unilateralism 
within the emerging multipolar order after the Cold War. The time period immediately before and after 
reunification was characterized by widespread fears that Germany would resume a traditional role 
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 The scathing criticisms of German foreign policy conduct coming fromits close 
allies disaffirmed German role behavior in Yugoslavia. The international community 
rejected Germany’s role as trailblazing policy leader that acted commensurate with 
capabilities in this case. Contrary to the Persian Gulf War where German actions were 
viewed as inappropriate because they were too reticent, German behavior in Yugoslavia 
was viewed as inappropriate and labeled as unilateral because it too brazen. What was t e 
role conception held by policy elites? 
Germany’s initial response to the crisis in Yugoslavia corresponded closely t  its 
traditional civilian power role conception with its role performance characterized by a 
strong emphasis on multilateralism, consensus-seeking and compliance with the norm of
state sovereignty. Core elements of the role conception including reliability nd 
calculability were maintained and the country was eager to meet the role expectations of 
its closest allies, France, United States and United Kingdom. When German elites first 
encountered French resistance to their desire to pursue EEC recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia, they backed down, deferring to the French position (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 
50).  German elites appeared united in supporting a multilateral course of action even 
though they had clearly developed a preference for the norm of self-determination by late 
summer of 1991. At the European level, Germany had been firmly committed to the 
integration process of the EEC and substantial bureaucratic and diplomatic effors had 
been expended on preparing the upcoming Summit of Maastricht with the intention of 
making it one of the most important integrative milestones in the history of the European 
                                                                                                                                                 
involving power politics. Woodward (1995, 470, note 121), for instance, quotes an unnamed Western 
ambassador as telling her that “Grossdeutschland is second nature to them [the Germans], it is part of their 
makeup; they can’t do anything about it, but it is a problem for others”. 
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Community.199 In support of the long-term project of European Monetary Union, 
Germany had signaled its willingness to make substantial concessions including the 
surrender of a key symbol of its post-war economic identity, the Deutsche Mark. German 
elites had also been on the forefront of the development of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy for the EEC which represented a significantly improved set of
multilateral procedures over the more loosely coordinated foreign policy adjustment 
through the European Political Cooperation mechanism of the past. Overall, German 
actions during this time were characterized by a desire to manage the rapid ch nges in 
Europe through the reorganization and empowerment of multilateral institutions 
including the EEC and its military arm, the Western European Union (WEU), the CSCE
and NATO (Maull 1995, 101). Given Germany’s diplomatic support for strengthening 
international organizations through a policy emphasis on multilateralism, it is not 
surprising that some of the strongest opposition to unilateral recognition came from the 
Foreign Ministry. 
Leading bureaucrats in Germany’s Foreign Ministry had a key interest in no  
wanting to risk Germany’s reputation as a good team player in Europe and a reliable al y 
of the United States (Horsley 1992, 239). Horst Grabert, the former ambassador to 
Belgrade aptly captured the prevailing attitude within the foreign service when he voiced 
legal concerns about recognition, stating it would set a bad precedent since it entailed the 
waiver of established rules on diplomatic recognition based on the control of 
                                                
199 The crisis has to also be understood within the context of Germany’s recent reunification. The new-
found sovereignty and increase in national power had given rise to apprehension even among Germany’s 
long-term allies within the European Community such as France and the United Kingdom. As a result, 
Germany felt pressured to show good faith by accepting increasing integration. The result was the summit 
of Maastricht and its main agenda points of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as well as 
monetary integration through the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  
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governments over their territory and populations.200 In internal memos, the embassy in 
Belgrade also warned of the possibility of a diplomatic failure and even accused policy 
makers in Bonn to have promised too much.201 President Tudjman’s ‘official’ visit to 
Bonn in mid-July was met with considerable criticism (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 50). 
When Secretary of State Dieter Kastrup, the highest ranking permanent official f the 
German Foreign Ministry, briefed leading parliamentarians on the Yugoslav situ tion on 
July 31, 1991, he did not even touch upon the question of recognition (Libal 1997, 26). 
Ministry bureaucrats also appeared to be concerned about the effects of recognition on 
multiethnic Bosnia.202 Outside of the government as well, there were prominent voices in 
society warning of unilateral policies while criticizing the merits of the recognition 
course overall.203 Rhetorical exchanges between elites in parliament had politicians 
distance themselves from any hint of wanting to reassert a hegemonial role in the 
Balkans.204 Thus, official announcements in support of maintaining role behavior based 
                                                
200 In a radio interview with the BBC on December 19, 91 (cited in Horsley 1992, 239). A number of 
diplomats voiced legal concerns. See, for instance, “Drei Tage lang am Telefon”, Der Spiegel, July 8, 1991, 
128. 
 
201 “Die Frist läuft ab”, Der Spiegel, December 9, 1991, 25.  
 
202 Ambassador to Belgrade, Hansjörg Eiff later pointed out that ethnic violence in Croatia started only 
after Tudjman’s intolerant course towards the Serb minority. Eiff had briefed Bosnian President 
Izetbegovic for a meeting with Genscher during which the president inexplicably failed to point out the 
possibility of civil war arising from a general recognition policy of all former Yugoslav republics 
(“Brennend nach Aktion”, Der Spiegel, June 26, 1995, 38-41).   
 
203 For instance, the centrist daily Die Zeit questioned recognition on September 19, 1991. 
 
204 Debating responses to the crisis, CDU/CSU parliamentarian Lummer rejected both unilateralism and 
regional hegemony as German motives by stating: “Wealso passed on unilateral recognition because we 
wanted to say: What happened in 1941 is over once ad for all; we will have nothing to do with it. We are 
not concerned with influence or supporting one or the other republic but we are supporting freedom, 
democracy, self-determination, rights of minorities and peaceful conflict resolution”. In German: “Wenn 
wir auf eine einseitige Anerkennung verzichtet haben, dann auch deshalb, weil wir sagen wollen: Was 1941 
war, ist endgültig vorbei; damit haben wir nichts zu tun. Uns geht es nicht um Einflüsse oder das 
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on consensus-seeking were not empty statements. Germany continued to be a ‘team 
player’ seeking the multilateral resolution of the conflict.205 Germany sought to comply 
with international norms and behavioral expectations based on the support of the 
principle of sovereignty but then attempted to change that international consensus on 
recognition through diplomatic persuasion within multilateral settings. Even aft r having 
achieved that goal, parliamentary elites still found it necessary to break with the 
European consensus unilaterally. 
 
Domestic Concerns of Parliamentary Elites 
 
 Parliamentary elites of Germany’s dominant catch-all parties were d aling with a 
number of challenges during the early 1990s. Party membership had declined 
substantially during the previous decade as the Germany constituency had grown weary 
of the tendency of the entrenched party system to maintain a stable consensus on major
foreign policy issues since the 1950s (Crawford 1996, 509). More radical parties emerged 
and grew their membership numbers at the expense of the traditional ones (Ibid.).206 The 
rapid socio-political transformations in Eastern Europe created additional challenges for 
German parties. The disappearance of the Communist threat and the controversies 
surrounding the German reunification process transformed the political landscape and 
presented the leadership elite of the main parties with the challenge to maintain party 
                                                                                                                                                 
Parteiergreifen für die eine oder andere Republik… sondern…wir ergreifen Partei für Freiheit, Demokratie, 
Selbstbestimmung, Minderheitenschutz und friedliche Konfliktlösung” (Lummer, PB 12/58, 4855). 
 
205 Erb (2003, 159) suggests that German actions could still be considered multilateral in nature. He writes 
that multilateralism “does not require a state to simply join in an existing consensus, but rather to act to 
persuade…others to go along should they be outside of the consensus”.    
 
206 The left-wing, anti-establishment Green Party emerged in 1980 while the right-wing Republikaner Party 
was formed in 1983 by former members of the CSU. 
 
 176
cohesion and appeal through the incorporation of popular issues. The reformulation of 
traditional ideology and incorporation of more popular and even radical positions offered 
the prospect of acquiring support from hitherto inaccessible voting groups as well  
arresting the defection of traditional constituencies to smaller parties. In this 
environment, foreign policy issues became politicized to a degree previously unknown. 
The appeal to national self-determination represented a logical move.  
Along with anti-communism, self-determination had been part of the conservative 
agenda since World War II (Crawford 1996, 506). The emphasis on the principle through 
the promotion of a speedy reunification course during the general elections of 1990 had 
provided the CDU/CSU with an election landslide.207 In West Germany, the 
conservatives had been able to overcome their legacy of being a party of primarily 
Western rather than Eastern policy orientation. In the Eastern Länder, the CDU cleaned 
up its tarnished reputation as former Block Party affiliated with the Socialist Unity Party 
(SED) that had controlled the German Democratic Republic. Thus, the public appeal of 
the self-determination principle had proven so effective that it had overcome the 
conservative party’s ideological and historical deficiencies and established it as the 
dominant force in reunification Germany. Chancellor Kohl closed his first inaugurl 
speech in January 1991 with his vision of the future that involved a new order for Europe 
and the world based on the self-determination of nations, the protection of human dignity 
and respect for human rights” (Kohl 2007, 316).  
After the successful reunification election, the party’s position among the 
electorate quickly came under attack: As public enthusiasm over reunification gve way 
                                                
207 Self-determination had been cast as the ‘expressed will of the people’ (Woodward 1995, 185). 
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to the realization that the project was immense, costly and associated with long-term 
sacrifices, the CDU-FDP coalition lost the successive Länder elections in Hessen 
(January 1991), Rhineland-Palatinate (April 1991) and Hamburg (June 1991). The loss in 
the Rhineland was particularly disconcerting because this was Chancellor Kohl’s home 
state in which he had actively campaigned. It was the first CDU defeat since 1946 
(Jakobsen 1995, 415; footnote 36; Kohl 2007, 322). The electoral victories allowed the 
opposition to take control of the upper house and effectively become a co-governing 
force. The decrease of electoral support in the West was somewhat expected given that its 
population stood to pay for the modernization of the East. Massive tax increases to pay 
for reunification costs and Gulf War contributions had been decided on in February and 
went into effect in July.208 But the party’s popularity in the Eastern provinces was also 
waning (Jakobsen 1995, 415). Here, the primary reasons were popular dissatisfaction and 
disappointment over the fact that reunification was resulting in massive job losses due to 
privatization and the closings of hundreds of companies. In his memoirs, Kohl wrote 
about the impact of the elections in 1991 that “…the five elections in 1991 brought 
soberness and created new challenges…the acceptance of the CDU had to be re-
conquered in manifest ways” and that the party had a need to differentiate itself moral y 
from the more economic orientation of the FDP (Kohl 2007, 324). Retracing the party’s 
success through the public display of support for the principle of self-determination in 
Yugoslavia became a logical line of action. Woodward writes that “Chancellor Kohl 
seized the opportunity of the vote in the Bundestag demanding recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia, which was initiated by the opposition SPD, to divert attention abroad to a 
                                                
208 The income tax increase of 7.5% percent would later come to be known as ‘Solidarity Tax’. 
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diplomatic gain and capture the issue for his party” (Woodward 1995, 185). The support 
of oppressed people offered strong moral appeal and was immensely popular. In 
conjunction with Kohl’s stated goal of taking on greater responsibility after the Gulf War 
debacle, the foreign policy action also offered the possibility of moral action and the 
display of international responsibility without having to face military respon ibilities as 
these were precluded by the present institutions. In fact, German policy demonstrates a 
very clever and flexible appropriation of existing values and institutions by Germany’s 
leading party at the time.  
On July 3, Volker Rühe asked the European Community to open the prospect of 
recognition to Slovenia and Croatia (Libal 1997, 19). The purported reference to reasons 
of demonstrating political and moral support for the two peoples based on the German 
people’s recent ability to reunify is in line with the emphasis on human rights that i a 
central component of German strategic culture. But the action also represented a shrewd 
political choice by this seasoned politician and ambitious ally of Chancellor Kohl. His 
position was quickly supported by the Deputy Chairperson of the CDU/CSU 
parliamentary party Karl-Heinz Hornhues, who went on to criticize Genscher’s hesitancy 
on the issue and called for immediate recognition.209 More important because of its 
proximity to actual recognition in December is the fact that Kohl and Genscher gav  the 
promise of recognition to Croatia on December 15, one day before the party’s important 
summit in Dresden. This provided the Chancellor with the political powder that 
unleashed the thunderous applause from the CDU delegates. The consideration of elite 
interests in conjunction with cultural variables is crucial to understanding this policy
                                                
209 SZ, July 6/7, 1991, 7, quoted in Ramet 1993, 327. 
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episode. It explains the conundrum of why Germany would push for multilateral 
recognition throughout the fall of 1991 and basically achieve that diplomatic victory by 
moving the EEC through strong arm tactics and promises of diplomatic concessions at 
Maastricht only to still defect on its promise. Self-determination and human rights were 
used instrumentally to shore up party support and win electoral support. The reason this 
could be done was because they appeared as morally superior actions within the German
cultural context.  
The leadership of the CDU’s sister-party CSU also was quick to embrace the pro-
independence position. The fact that both Croatia and Slovenia were predominantly 
Catholic and the existence of a sizable Croat community in Germany may have 
contributed to the urgency of the decision for a party with traditionally strong ies to 
catholic voters (Paterson, 1996, 142).210 The desire to aid the Croatians may also have 
been influenced by the Vatican’s early support for catholic Croatia which it exerted 
through Episcopal conferences in Bavaria.211 CSU politicians were among the earliest 
critics of Foreign Minister Genscher’s initial course of action in which he attempted to 
maintain Yugoslavian unity (Axt 1993, 353).212 In all likelihood, the CSU leadership was 
also worried about the party’s diminished importance in the united Germany as the role 
of Bavaria as pivotal player in the Bundesrat was being diluted through the addition of 
                                                
210 According to Jakobsen (1995, 407), about 700,000 Croatians lived in Germany at the time.   
 
211 This was the view of Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis which he expressed in a personal interview 
with Woodward in 1994 (1995, 149). Woodward also suggests that the Croatian community in Germany 
was well-organized and politically active. Serb emigrants, who had arrived more recently, were lacking this 
political power (Woodward 1995).  
 
212 The impact of the element of religious affinity should not be exaggerated. Genscher was also criticized 
by the Social Democratic Party which did not have ties o Catholic voting groups and Alliance 90/Green 
Party politicians had endorsed recognition ahead of everyone else.  
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the new Eastern provinces. The electoral benefits generated by the popularity of the 
principle of self-determination were too good to pass up. Thus, in the fall of 1991, 
conservative elites increasingly began to embrace the self-determination for instrumental 
reasons.213  
Support for the principle of self-determination was steadily increasing within the 
Social Democratic Party. During the German general elections of 1990, the SPD had 
opposed the rapid reunification platform of the CDU with a slower, incremental 
integration course. The CDU’s resounding success in all of the five new provinces of 
Germany convinced the SPD leadership that the will of the people expressed in th  
movement for self-determination had not been adequately accommodated by the party 
line. The SPD had been unable to reap the benefits from the political opening to the East 
that had been initiated by Willi Brandt’s Ostpolitik during the 1970s and the party’s 
linkage to the East German intellectual opposition. It had viewed itself as instrumental in 
contributing to the fall of the Socialist regime yet was facing with the prospect of being 
consigned to the political sidelines during this critical juncture in the nation’s history. The 
SPD had also experienced the erosion of its traditional voter base during the late 1980s 
(Crawford 1996, 509).  Struggling to regain its former political role and recognizing the 
popular appeal of the recognition course, leading figures in the SPD called for diplomatic 
recognition within days after declaration of independence of the two break-away 
republics in spite of the party’s traditional aversion to ultra-nationalist move ents 
                                                
213 Elite competition between the CDU-controlled Chancellery and the FDP-controlled Foreign Ministry 
may also have been an issue. The Chancellery’s leading figures including Foreign and Security Advisor 
Horst Teltschik had a poor personal relationship with Genscher and his top aides. Teltschik’s appointme  
ran counter to the established pattern of Chancellors recruiting security advisors from the Foreign Office. 
See, Merkl (1995, 48). 
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(Heidenheimer 1995, 51). At the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Bundestag on July 1, 1991, SPD leaders joined the CDU in demanding from Genscher 
that he commit the European Community to the speedy recognition course sought by the 
German public.214 Indicative of the party’s position, SPD leader Björn Engholm later 
remarked that the recognition was arriving too late for Croatia and Slovenia and Norbert 
Gansel stated that “if the EU sticks to this schedule [of recognition on January 15, 1992], 
she might be able to only recognize corpses and ruins”.215 The second parliamentary 
resolution for recognition on November 14, 1991 received widespread support from both 
the SPD rank and file. The threat of further party fragmentation became more pressing 
when considering the position and the influence of the SPD’s junior partner in 
opposition–the Alliance 90/Green party. 
Germany’s Green Party had been founded in 1980. With a platform centered on 
environmental and gender equality issues, the party had steadily gained strength and 
credibility with the electorate through the 1980s. During the parliamentary elections of 
1987, the Greens had received a stunning 8.3 percent of the vote.216 Th  party’s success 
steadily eroded the central role that the Liberal Democrats had played as ‘kingmaker’ in 
Germany’s multi-party system. The successful run came to an abrupt halt when the 
Greens experienced a catastrophic defeat during the 1990 federal elections. The emphasis 
                                                
214 A controversy developed within the SPD between foreign policy expert Karsten Voigt, Norbert Gansel 
and Guenther Verheugen who pleaded for recognition and the party’s East European specialist, Gernot 
Erler who urged caution. Eventually, Voigt and Gansel succeeded in persuading the SPD minority faction 
in parliament to support a course of speedy recogniti n against the advice of Erler. See Heidenheimer 1995, 
51.  
 
215 “Ein Groβer Erfolg für Uns”, Der Spiegel, December 23, 1991, 19. 
 
216 “Dagobert vorm Fleischerladen”, Der Spiegel, October 12, 1990, 29. 
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on environmental issues had not appealed to an electorate concerned with reunification 
and nationalism. In addition to campaign-related mistakes, the party had always struggled 
with profound internal problems. Fierce personality clashes, ideological conflict between 
the left wing (the Fundis) and the more mainstream (the R alos) side as well as an 
unorthodox style in organization, decision-making and debating had always characterized 
the anti-establishment party whose leaders had been active in the civil rights movements 
of the 1960s. In 1990, the electorate punished the party severely. Receiving just 4.8 
percent of the vote, the Green Party support fell beneath the critical five percent threshold 
necessary to retain the right to parliamentary representation (Ibid.). The special nature of 
election law during reunification offered the last way out. 217 In East Germany, the 
Greens had survived because they had campaigned as part of a coalition with the Alliance 
’90 Party formed by notable civil rights activists. Thus, in December 1990, 41 West 
German Green parliamentarians were given notice by the Bundestag administration to 
vacate their seats while two East German Greens along with six members of the Alliance 
90 moved in. The existential threat posed by the West German Greens’ poor showing at 
the polls thus necessitated a merger with the East German civil rights activi ts. The defeat 
and the nature of the newly combined party would profoundly influence the emergence of 
the German foreign policy preference for recognition.   
Forged for pragmatic reasons, the union between East German activists and West 
German Greens created a marriage of convenience characterized by an uneasy and 
                                                
217 Election law in the Federal Republic bars parties receiving less than five percent of the vote from 
parliamentary representation. Prior to the historic election of 1990, an exception was made that allowed for 
representation for a party that achieved five percent in either West or East Germany. As a result of this new 




conflict-prone relationship from the start. The East German activists from the Alliance 
90, who had been instrumental in bringing about the peaceful changes leading to 
reunification, harbored strong resentments against the West German Greens whom they 
accused of having viewed the former regime in the Democratic Republic through rose-
tinted glasses. They claimed that Greens had emphasized peace and détente while turning 
a blind eye to human rights violations committed under the East German regime (Der 
Spiegel 7/1992, 30).  The two parties shared a tradition of grass-roots activism but greatly 
differed on the goals that should be pursued. Alliance 90 members were more 
conventionally oriented and considered the ideological squabbles within the Green party 
as childish enterprise of a generation of privileged Westerners who, unlike the Alliance 
90 activists had never managed to fundamentally transform society (D r Spiegel 16/1991, 
26). The former East German activists were particularly at odds with the left wing of the 
Green party and its anti-capitalist polemics. As a result of having achieved a grass-roots 
revolution against a totalitarian and communist regime through the will of the people, 
Alliance 90 activists brought with them a loathing of undemocratic regimes combined 
with a principled emphasis on human rights standards. Thus, the prominence of the 
Alliance 90 activists within the parliamentary faction of the Greens and their moral 
authority derived from their activism in support of civil rights translated into a powerful 
endorsement of self-determination and human rights in former Yugoslavia. But that is not 
the whole story. Within the Green Party, important changes were taking place as well.  
The Green party’s devastating defeat prompted a process of inner soul searching 
and programmatic reorientation. Joschka Fischer, one of the Greens most popular and 
charismatic politicians, strongly supported the long-range goal of participating in 
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government through the pursuit of a more pragmatic orientation. Stating after the election 
that “we will be different in four years or disappear” (Der Spiegel, December 10, 1990, 
90), Fischer worked hard on achieving a more pragmatic consensus build on 
environmental and human rights issues.218 This emphasis on core issues was intended to 
forestall further losses to the SPD which had increasingly appropriated some of the 
traditional policy suggestions of the Greens. Rather than the party’s anti-unification 
stance during the election, Fischer saw issue convergence as main reason for the massive 
voter losses during the parliamentary elections (Ibid.). Against the backdrop of a 
generally accepted need for reform within the party, his pleas for a streamlin d and more 
pragmatic position took hold. At the Green Party’s congress in April 1991, Fischer and 
his Realos were able to isolate the most adamant of the radical Fundis under Jutta 
Ditfurth who chose to leave the party.  
While ensuring that the Greens continued to differentiate themselves from the 
catch-all parties through the adherence to a set of core issues, Fischeral o was crucial in 
laying the groundwork for future cooperation with the Social Democrats as stepping 
stone to governmental power. As first Green politician to join government as 
environmental minister in a Social-Democratic/Green coalition ruling the stat of Hessen 
between 1985 and 1987, he would serve in that position again after the defeat of the 
conservatives in January 1991. Greens and Social Democrats had shrewdly exploited the 
German public’s antimilitant attitudes during the Persian Gulf War (Kohl 2007, 307).  
The process, by which the two left-of-center parties would move towards one another 
culminating in their eventual coalition and victory during the 1998 parliamentary 
                                                
218 Spiegel Interview with Fischer, Der Spiegel, January 14, 1991.  
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elections, was among the crucial developments in German politics of the 1990s. The 
incrementally occurring normalization of their policy stance on the use of force and 
German participation in international peacekeeping efforts would play a critical ole as 
convergence point which increased both the prospects for a workable coalition as well as 
electoral viability. 
The move from radicalism towards the center, the renewed focus on core issues 
with the strong emphasis on human rights as well as the prominence of the Alliance 90 
activists after the demise of the West German Greens in parliament all expl in the joint 
party’s concern with minority rights in Yugoslavia. Consequently, Alliance 90/Greens 
were calling for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on the basis of the principle of 
self-determination as early as February 1991 when the other parties were till concerned 
with the negative consequences of the Yugoslav breakup (Crawford 1996, 508). By June, 
when Green parliamentarian Poppe advocated peaceful self-determination as only viable 
option because “the current basis for coexistence no longer enjoyed the consensus of all 
Yugoslav nations”, he also noted that the other parties’ desire to maintain Yugoslav unity 
had finally given way to a more realistic assessment of the situation.219 The fact that the 
other parties had moved over to the Alliance 90/Green position on self-determination 
indicates that the small party was somehow crucial in the process.220 The groundswell 
supporting self-determination and national independence as a solution to the conflict in 
                                                
219 Poppe, PB 12/33, June 19, 1991, 2690. 
 
220 Crawford (2006) also sees the Alliance 90/Greens as crucial in explaining the emergence of an all-party 
consensus on recognition. She views the Alliance 90/Green Party promotion of self-determination as 
example of small parties’ attempts to distinguish themselves on foreign policy issues. Concern over loss of 
votes then prompted the catch-all parties to embrace the new position in a process she calls ‘elite 
bandwagoning’. The temptation of larger parties to embrace the new position is likely to be stronger with 
increasing salience of the issue and perceived popularity of the proposed policy decision.  
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Yugoslavia also enveloped the liberal FDP with its strong legacy of promoting 
multilateralism in foreign policy. 
 The outcome of the election in 1990 had generally been positive for the 
Germany’s small but influential liberal FDP. The traditional king-maker party had fared 
well in the new provinces with its relative gains outpacing even those of the CDU. But 
given its small constituency, FDP politicians always had to be concerned with correctly 
maneuvering politically among the fluctuating policy interfaces produced by the catchall 
parties. Foreign Minister Genscher personified and became famous for this ability to 
survive by reconciling contradictory foreign policy positions and decisions.221  
The convergence of interests between politicians of the CDU/CSU and SPD in the 
fall of 1991 created a dilemma for the FDP. Controlling the Foreign Ministry, 
parliamentary elites like Genscher were most concerned with not alienating the allies of 
the Federal Republic by straying from the traditional path of reliability and calculability. 
This had left FDP elites in a position of wait-and-see on recognition while focusing on 
the upcoming Summit of Maastricht. The sudden alignment of CDU/CSU and SPD 
politicians caught leaders of the FDP off-guard and created the possibility of leaving the 
party isolated–an untenable political position given its minor popular basis of support 
(Axt 1993, 354). The convergence of the main parties’ positions on recognition became 
evident during the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee in early July. This meeting 
had a profound effect on Foreign Minister Genscher. According to an eye-witness, 
Genscher went into the meeting a cautious diplomat opposing recognition and left it 
                                                
221 Foreign observers of German foreign policy coined the verb ‘to genscher’ or ‘Genscherism’ to describe 
the foreign minister’s uncanny ability to survive by periodically adapting his political position. 
 
 187
singing the recognition tune (Horsley 1992, 240).  By July 9, Genscher had succeeded in 
revising the FDP’s position to accommodate the pro-recognition course (Paterson 1996, 
142; Crawford 1996, 494). 
The investigation of the interests of party elites at the time of recognitin 
indicates the instrumental appropriation of the norm of self-determination. In essenc , 
elites were falling over each other in trying to be the first to embrace the new position 
because it offered electoral benefits for the ruling coalition parties CDU/ S  as well as 
the opposition Social Democrats and the struggling Alliance 90/Greens. In the case of the 
FDP, perceived electoral advantages may have taken second place to the desire to avo d 
political isolation. Given the popularity of the recognition decision, parliamentary elites 
were tempted to pursue career and party interests over those of the country as a whole.
The fact that the parties that lost the previous election seemed to be the first to embrace 
the recognition course while Genscher’s FDP and Kohl’s CDU were the last, support 
that view that domestic considerations were important and eventually trumped role 
expectations of multilateral calculability.  
 
Strategic Culture: Antimilitarism and Self-Determination 
 
 Elite policy actions in support of national self-determination in Yugoslavia were 
generally in line with constituent elements of German strategic culture. Two important 
values of strategic culture after World War II include human rights on one hand and 
antimilitarism and a negative perception of force on the other. The official commitment 
to the protection of human rights differentiates the identity of the Federal Republic from 
that of its predecessors. The protection of minority rights is viewed as part of the 
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country’s special responsibility and historical burden and enjoys a general national 
consensus (Crawford 1996, 504). Statements about the preservation of human rights and 
dignity regularly find their expression in official documents and statements of 
government principles as well as state policies.222 Debating the escalating crisis in 
Yugoslavia just days before the declarations of independence, all parties in the Bundestag 
applauded the statement, “where the process of state disintegration is taken as 
opportunity to mistreat and deprive minorities of their rights, we, the German Bundestag 
are on the side of the minority”.223 Later, the Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU 
parliamentary party, Rupert Scholz, would justify Germany’s support for self-
determination by invoking United Nations’ principles and stating that misperce tions of 
German foreign policy during the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia may have to be the 
price for “doing the right thing” (Scholz 1995, 51). Support for self-determination is also 
found among the public which showed a majority of those polled indicating a preference 
for self-determination and possible independence for Yugoslav republics in Septemb r 
1991.224 Support for human rights also can be linked to Germany’s post-war history as a 
divided nation existing in two separate states which necessitated the support for eaceful 
self-determination to allow for reunification. After achieving this goal, German elites 
                                                
222 For instance, in the preamble to the Constitution and Germany’s asylum policy, which until amended in 
1992, was considered one of the most tolerant in the Western world. As strong supporter of strengthening 
international human rights regimes, Germany has traditionally been very sensitive to arguments related to 
human rights and prone to take diplomatic action when such rights were demonstrably violated.  On 
German human rights policy, see Boekle (2001). 
 
223 Glotz, PB 12/33, June 19, 1991, 2560. 
 
224 A September 1991 poll shows 63 percent in favor of self-determination and independence (“The 
Yugoslav Crisis”, Eurobarometer 36, December 1991, A41). 
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thought that the country’s moral and political credibility depended on recognizing the 
right to self-determination in Croatia and Slovenia.225  
 A final issue in regards to the central human rights value was the nature of he 
regime in Yugoslavia. Discourse and government statements indicate that German elites 
viewed rump Yugoslavia as totalitarian. Totalitarian regimes violate human rights and 
employ violence as part of state policy to control their populations through fear. As such, 
Belgrade and the JNA enjoyed very little legitimacy from parliamentary elites in 
Germany many of whom had experienced Nazism in their youth and who had helped 
develop a political culture in which force and intimidation were frowned upon. The 
prevalence of the human rights value in Germany’s strategic culture explains the urgency 
of German elite actions although the preference for protecting minority rights through 
reliance on the principle of self-determination also raises a number of questions.  
 For one, the cultural emphasis on the protection of human and minority rights 
does not have to be automatically linked to a policy in support of self-determination, 
much less the immediate recognition of the independence for oppressed minorities. 
Institutional and cultural forms guaranteeing minority rights have been developed in 
many states. In addition, serious doubts exist whether the cultural preference for the 
support of human rights translated into actual German policy. Woodward, for instance, 
claims that within the CSCE, German policy was more focused on stability concerns and 
the inviolability of post-1945 borders (Woodward 1995, 153). Lastly, if protecting the 
                                                
225 General Secretary of the CDU, Volker Rühe, argued in July 1991 that “we won unification through the 
right to self-determination…if we may pursue a policy of the status quo without recognizing the right to 




rights of minorities in Yugoslavia was such important concern, why were th German 
government, parliament and the public so keen on supporting the rights of Slovene and 
Croatian minorities in Yugoslavia while all but ignoring the rights of Serb minorities in 
the breakaway provinces?  More likely, self-determination served as surrogate f r some 
other motivating force. 
The most important of the values constituting German strategic culture since 
World War II was that of antimilitarism. Elite aversion to the use of force characterized 
the parliamentary discourse at the time of recognition. The debate on June 19, 1991, for 
instance was characterized by the frequent use of expressions of such as “preventing the 
use of violence” (Gewaltanwendung verhindern), “seeking an mutually agreeable 
solution without force” (einvernehmliche Lösung ohne Gewalt), “peaceful resolution of 
the conflict”, (friedliche Beilegung des Konfliktes), and the “renunciation of force” 
(Gewaltverzicht).226 The value of antimilitarism naturally predisposed German politicians 
to take sides against actors in the civil war who engaged in violence. The Serb-controlled 
rump state and the JNA were quickly perceived to be the prime culprits. In a radio 
interview from July 3, 1991, Genscher blamed military force by the JNA in support of 
totalitarian state objectives for the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Libal 1997, 17). 
Contrary to the position held by the United States, United Nations and chief negotiators 
who viewed recognition as a trump card that could be used to force the civil war parties 
to settle their differences, Genscher argued in his letter to the UN General Sec etary that 
“delaying recognition would lead to further escalation of violence by the Yugoslav 
People’s Army, since the troops would necessarily regard our refusal to recognize the 
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republics as encouragement for their policy of conquest toward Croatia” (Genscher 1998, 
513). The escalating of violence in Yugoslavia made vivid by the German media and the 
identification of the main aggressor created a moral imperative for politicians to act. 
Thus, at the important Foreign Affairs Committee meeting of the Bundestag on July 1, 
Genscher had to defend himself against accusations of German inaction in the face of 
Serb violence by emphasizing that the government’s chief aim in Yugoslavia’  crisis had 
been the prevention of violence (Libal 1997, 15). The trouble for elites was that the 
country’s antimilitant culture and traditions disallowed anything but diplomatic ac on.  
Public opinion imposed significant and clear constraints on elite actions towards 
Yugoslavia. Military involvement was widely rejected with public opinion polls 
indicating a clear preference for humanitarian missions (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Public Attitudes toward Military and Non-Military Missions 
 
Source: Asmus/Rand 1994, 63. 
The Rand data shows that the public generally rejected the participation in peace 
enforcement missions even if sanctioned by an international organization. Furthermore, 
the declining support for such missions within the population between 1991 and 1993 
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suggests that, if anything, the escalating violence in Yugoslavia only strengthened the 
public’s generally negative perception on the efficacy of force in addressing domestic 
instabilities.  
 
Conclusion: Explaining Non-Compliance 
 
The crisis in Yugoslavia leading to the fragmentation of the state, ethnic warfare 
and the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1992 found German parliamentary elites 
initially performing role behavior corresponding to that of a civilian power hich 
international society had affirmed for many years. This explains the emphasis on 
multilateralism which was very strong in the beginning of the crisis and never completely 
disappeared until Germany clearly broke with the consensus by recognizing the two 
breakaway republics in December 1991, roughly three weeks ahead of the scheduled 
recognition by the European Union and the presentation of the Badinter Commission 
findings. Thus, the actions of parliamentary elites also showed a clear desire to play a 
more prominent role based on leadership conduct instead of the traditional reticence.  
Germany had been encouraged to play that leadership role by the United States 
(Woodward 1995, 153). Foreign expectations in the form of shaming criticism conveyed 
during and after the Persian Gulf War amplified the power of the social message to 
change role behavior. Conservative politicians had begun to promote external 
expectations, trying to find a middle ground between the role of hegemonial power and 
normal expression of natural capabilities. They encouraged a redefinition of he behavior 
associated with reliability and calculability in German foreign policy. The key argument 
they used was one of solidarity with Western allies and the avoidance of foreign pol cy 
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singularity. Foreign expectations should have produced compliance with international 
norms upholding sovereignty and Germany should have exhibited its new leadership role 
in the form of foreign policy initiatives designed to coordinate a general consensus o  
withholding recognition until orderly and peaceful secession processes could be 
negotiated. A number of factors made this impossible and help explain German non-
compliance in this episode.  
The first factor is the context provided by Germany’s unique strategic culture. 
Antimilitarism created a compelling urgency for German politicians to address the levels 
of violence unseen in Europe since World War II. The value of human rights put 
Germany at odds with a regime that used its massive army against its own people and that 
deployed its state-run media in classic totalitarian fashion to demonize its political 
opponents. Antimilitarism in both culture and institutions also constrained elite actions. 
Arms transfers to regions of instability were prohibited and military involvement even in 
the form of multilateral responses was unacceptable both for elites as well as the general 
public. It was not until February 1992, that the Bundeswehr even received authorization 
to participate in operations outside Germany but within NATO treaty area (Asmus 1994, 
62). This left a diplomatic response to the crisis as the only option and the vehement push 
for recognition can in part be understood as an attempt at crisis resolution through the 
internationalization of the conflict (Genscher 1998, 510).227 As such, recognition may be 
understood both as a response to violence that was viewed as particularly appalling due to 
                                                
227 Former Foreign Minister Genscher gives this as the main reason for the German policy drive towards 
recognition when he writes: “What, I asked myself over and over, can end the bloodshed? More and more it 
seemed as if recognizing Slovenia and Croatia and thus turning the conflict into an international matter was 
the only remaining political means” (1998, 510). 
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the antimilitarism of Germany’s post-war culture as well as an attempt to address a 
foreign policy issue with as yet underdeveloped means. Antimilitarism may also have 
influenced the key element of multilateralism that is so prominent in the traditional role 
conception.  
While the German public was not any more in favor of self-determination than 
that of other countries, an important element of the civilian power role, mainly the 
widespread support for multilateralism was experiencing a significant decline as violence 
escalated in Yugoslavia. Initial public support for the multilateral conflict resolution 
efforts undertaken by the EEC during the summer of 1991 was high but criticism of the 
EC mediation efforts soon began to increase (Libal 1997, 15). In fall, at the time of the 
fighting in Vokovar and Dubrovnik, a Eurobarometer poll found the German public 
rapidly losing faith in the ability of the ongoing mediation efforts to restore peace to the 
region.228 The growing disenchantment with multilateral conflict resolution initiatives 
through EEC and UN was shared by the parliamentary elites with even the oppositi n 
pushing for early recognition lest the government wanted “to recognize only corpses and 
ruins”.229   
A second important factor explaining noncompliance was the ambiguous 
normative context provided by conflicting standards of state sovereignty and self-
determination which provided a permissive condition allowing for national 
interpretations and, hence, unilateral diplomacy. Both the Helsinki Final Act and the UN 
                                                
228 Over 65 percent of those surveyed saw the EC efforts as either not very useful or not at all useful 
(Eurobarometer 36, Fall 1991, 128). 
 
229 “Ein groβer Erfolg für uns”, Der Spiegel, December 23, 1991. 
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Charter provide equally for the inviolability of borders and the right to self-
determination, as Germany was quick to point out (Crawford 1996, 500). The legitimacy 
of multilateral standards regarding state recognition was also undermi ed by the EEC’s 
selective enforcement of the principles of conditional sovereignty based on human rights 
considerations. For instance, while the four nuclear republics of the former Soviet Union 
were recognized on the basis of their promise to ensure human rights, Croatia was 
expected to implement these rights before recognition was even considered. Mac oni , 
which met all conditions established by the EEC, was not recognized at all dueto 
vehement Greek objections. Thus, the normative environment governing role 
expectations provided mixed messages. During his diplomatic initiative, Genscher was 
able to persuade a number of states to support the German pro-recognition group–no 
doubt in part due to the widespread conviction that self-determination represented an 
important principle worth honoring.230 The fact that the position of the EEC shifted 
increasingly to accommodate that of Germany indicates the ambiguity of the normative 
context. Germany was able to ‘bend’ the rules because the rules governing the 
recognition of state sovereignty were ambiguous and allowed themselves to be 
interpreted. This allowed German elites to deploy self-determination norms in 
instrumental fashion as dictated by their electoral interests at the time. Thus, Chancellor 
Kohl was proud to present German actions as “great success for us [the CDU] and 
German politics” at the CDU Party Congress in Dresden.231 Foreign policy elites did 
                                                
230 For instance, the Danish Foreign Ministry stated after the Slovenian and Croatian referenda indicating a 
clear desire for independence that “it is now time to fulfill the desire their people have expressed” (Stephen 
Kinzer, “Europe, Backing Germans, Accepts Yugoslav Breakup”, NYT, January 16, 1992). 
 
231 “Ein groβer Erfolg für uns”, Der Spiegel, December 23, 1991. 
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engage in an effort of international persuasion of their own through forceful leadership 
within the EEC and communication with the UN and US but ultimately failed to receive 
international affirmation for the country’s assertive leadership style.  
Taken together, the various factors impacting this role episode allow the 
following conclusions to be drawn about German foreign policy behavior. Germany, 
which had been encouraged to play a more prominent role in world politics after the 
Persian Gulf War, encountered an extremely violent situation in its backyard which 
required immediate attention. Violence projected from the totalitarin regime in Belgrade 
predisposed German elites to take sides for the besieged breakaway states. Initi l German 
support of multilateralism was reflexive and immediate. But as EEC and UN efforts at 
mediation failed to stop violence in the region, German elites and the public lost faith in 
the ability of these efforts to stop the violence. They then began to support recognition as 
means of deterring further Serb aggression because it was the only proactive means in the 
diplomatic toolbox. The final break with multilateralism can be explained through the 
developing spiral of distrust towards multilateral processes. The compromise n January 
recognition achieved at Brussels on December 16, 1991 was hard-fought and remined 
subject to the findings of the Badinter Commission. The outcome was not guaranteed and 
elites preempted recognition to force the community to comply. This also allowed elites 
to reap the domestic benefit of scoring points with the electorate.     
Overall, the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia constituted a role episode in the 
evolution of German role conceptions that was to be followed by the challenges creat d 
by the unfolding tragedy in Bosnia. Each time Germany was forced to address the 
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situation in Yugoslavia, it faced the pressure of complying with international 
expectations. The recognition case suggests that German elites and the public were 
getting ready for a larger role within the international system but strategic culture and 
institutions were hampering the effort. Germany led the world without the cultural or 
institutional ability to back up its diplomacy. The result was inconsistent diplomacy that 
emphasized the civilian power preference for multilateralism on one hand and the desire 
for the policy autonomy of a great power addressing its national interests on the ther. 
The change in the security environment after the Cold War was also reaffirmd. Contrary 
to the claim made by President von Weizsäcker that the Persian Gulf War had been an 
exception, the war would prove to be an indicator of changes in the international security 
environment which was further confirmed by the unfolding events in Yugoslavia. The 
central message emerging for elites struggling with role adaptation after reunification was 
that the new security environment required the strengthening of international institutions 
through full German participation as an equal partner and that diplomatic singularity w s 
























THE BOSNIAN CIVIL WAR 
 
Introduction: Script Change 
 
Parliamentary elites drew important social lessons from the international response 
to unilateral behavior over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. For the most part, the 
response to Germany’s more assertive stance in international politics had been negative 
and marked by a “growing disquiet”.232 A fundamental break with consensus-oriented 
policy behavior and normalization towards a more nationalistic policy stance had clearly 
been rejected by the international community. Self-critique of the unilateral ‘adventure’ 
also erupted in Germany as fears of political isolation emerged and the possibility of 
having contributed to violence in Yugoslavia was considered.233 German elites quickly 
tried to minimize the significance of the policy behavior by claiming that worries about 
aggressive behavior after reunification were exaggerated.234 
                                                
232 John Tagliabue, “Kohl Seeks to Fend Off Criticism Of His Assertive German Politics”, NYT, January 
11, 1992. In January 1992, French President Mitterrand reprimanded Germany for offending the spirit of 
European unity through its vigorous support of the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (Ibid.). American 
officials expressed similar points of view with the N w York Times (Ibid.). Warren Zimmermann, the last 
U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, used the term ‘bullying’ to describe German diplomatic behavior within 
the European Community (1996, 181).  
 
233 Habermas and Fischer were among the more notable critics. 
 
234 Claiming that the united Germany’s energies would be spent rebuilding the East, Chancellor Kohl 
dismissed suggestions that Germany had any intention of seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council, content with the fact, that the United Kingdom and France adequately represented 
European interests. At the same time, Kohl indicated that a newly expanded role stemmed from reunited 
Germany’s size and its position as “No. 1 in Europe in conomic might” (Ibid.).  
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The behavior associated with a ‘natural’ role for Germany after the Cold War 
remained highly contested within the country. The need to show greater responsibility for 
global stability after reunification and to act commensurate with capabilities was widely 
acknowledged among elites and the public but what type of behavior this ‘normalization’ 
entailed was less clear. Against the backdrop of the domestic debate about future German 
responsibilities within international society, Europe’s worst violence since World War II 
began to unfold in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 The Bosnian Civil War would dramatically illustrate and confirm the new threa  
perceptions held by policy-making elites. It was a prime example of the new security 
problems characterizing the more complex security environment arising after the end of 
the Cold War. The conflict would repeatedly test the network of European and global 
institutions addressing international conflict and play a substantial role in prompting the 
redefinition of strategies and missions of international institutions.  As UN, NATO, 
OSCE and EU moved irrevocably towards the adoption of out-of-area missions, the 
obligations of member states including Germany, which was at the heart of this 
institutional structure, took on concrete form and the process of role socialization became 
much more intense. Increasingly, Germany would be called upon to contribute to 
multilateral peacekeeping missions in line with its economic and military wherewithal. 
The international community began to decisively reject the cultural or institutional 
argument that limited Germany’s contributions to the use of force. This would provide 
domestic role entrepreneurs with ample opportunities to promote the adaptation of role 
behavior. 
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 The escalating horrors in Bosnia also shook the remaining support for a position 
of radical pacifism, particularly after the large scale violations of human rights committed 
in Žepa and Srebrenica. These atrocities empowered role entrepreneurs further by 
undermining the credibility of radical antimilitarism on the left and re ucing the moral 
credibility of positions promoting the purely civilian role of the Federal Republic. Role 
entrepreneurs would effectively turn the accepted interpretation of Germany’s historical 
burden on its head by promoting the efficacy of force to help victims of genocide and by
casting neutrality and antimilitarism as accessory to crime. This was both tricky yet 
ultimately effective within the Balkan context with its strong historical association with 
previous German aggression.235  
 The effect of the Bosnia civil war on German views on the efficacy of force and 
subsequent possibilities for security policy reorientation was significant. The policy 
challenge represented the final stage in policy reorientation towards the renewed adoption 
of the use of force. Other actions would follow by which troops would eventually 
conduct combat and even secret missions in faraway places such as Afghanistan. The 
beginning of the Bosnian civil war found German elites generally adhering to the 
traditional civilian power role in which a military role for Germany besides territorial 
defense was generally rejected as unthinkable for reasons of history and strategic culture. 
By the time of the Dayton Accords in 1995, Germany had provided soldiers for 
                                                
235 Parliamentary elites agreed on the importance of the historical burden during the out-of-area debate.  
Germany’s first steps in contributing to humanitarian missions outside of its territory were in Iraq, 
Cambodia and later Somalia. There areas were considered untainted by the burden of history. The 
deployment of troops on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, however, produced additional problems for 
it had been invaded and occupied by the W hrmacht during World War II. Even members of the cabinet 
were hesitant about intervention in the Balkans even though they were inclined to accept increased 
responsibility. The cabinet consensus on avoiding intervention in the Balkans was informally referred to as 
the Kohl Doctrine. 
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monitoring missions, contributed Luftwaffe Tornado fighter jets that had engaged in 
bombing missions over Bosnia and through its support of NATO’s implementation force 
(IFOR), deployed ground troops outside of German territory for the first time since 
World War II. During the IFOR vote on December 6, 1995, 543 out of 656 
parliamentarians voted in favor of German participation to enforce the Dayton Peace
Accords.236 This was widely perceived to be a historical turning point in Germany’s 
foreign policy. It signaled the completion of post-war Germany’s rehabilitation into the 
community of nations (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 55). Germany left behind its non-military 
identity as an international actor (Zehfuss 2001, 32).237 
 The following chapter will present the context of the Bosnian civil war and the 
international response, the concretization of strategic doctrines and the behavioral 
expectations this generated. Social pressure on German elites and the reactions of 
domestic role entrepreneurs are investigated next with particular emphasis on the way in 
which role entrepreneurs used foreign expectations to persuade others that maintining 
the country’s role as predictable and reliable partner required role adaptation. The 
domestic concerns of parliamentary elites and coalesce of these concerns on the basis of 
external expectations are addressed. As in previous chapters, German strategic culture is 




                                                
236 PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6673-5; Ramet and Coffin 2001, 55. 
 
237 The journal Focus used the headline ‘At the Rubicon’ t  underscore the significance of the vote for the 
Bosnia Deployment: The journal wrote that “step by step, the population and the army are being led to the 
threshold of combat missions” (“Am Rubikon”, Focus, December 22, 1995). 
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The Bosnian Civil War and the International Response 
 
Hostilities in Croatia ended in spring 1992 when Serbs and Croatians honored a 
ceasefire negotiated in The Hague in November 1991. Cyrus Vance was able to expand
the agreement into a comprehensive truce monitored by the United Nations. The ethnic 
atrocities committed and the hitherto unthinkable levels of violence of the conflict had 
ruptured the sense of continuity of the old Yugoslavia. Nowhere had this been felt more 
severely than in the heart of Yugoslavia, the multiethnic province of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  
In 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted an ethnic mosaic made up of 43.7 
percent Moslem, 31.4 Serb, 17.3 percent Croat and 5.5 percent Yugoslav (Cohen 1995, 
241). Ethnic concentrations existed with Serb enclaves surrounding a generally Muslim
center. Frequently, however, the different ethnic and religious groups lived side-by-side 
with Sarajevo being a multiethnic city characterized by fairly advanced levels of 
integration. However, anxiety and distrust between the groups had increased steadily with 
the intensification of interethnic hostilities in Croatia. During the six months following 
Croat and Slovenian secession and the states’ subsequent recognition, the leader of 
Bosnia, Alija Izetbegović had warned repeatedly that the fragmentation of Yugoslavia 
and the international recognition of its individual parts would spell disaster for 
multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. That it would, should have been clear to all parties 
observing the drift into the abyss of total ethnic war: The international community had 
followed Germany’s leadership in recognizing Croatia without establishing adequate 
protections for the sizable Serb minority located in the republic’s Krajina region. 
Nationalists in Croatia and Serbia had openly declared their territorial ambitions in 
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Bosnia with Croatia issuing an economic blockade and supporting the formation of an 
army among autonomous Croats in Western Herzegovina (Woodward 1995, 276).238 
Autonomous Serbs had declared regional governments in at least four areas (Ibid.). 
Lastly, interethnic hostilities including barricading and sporadic assassinations had been 
occurring throughout the summer and fall of 1991.239    
Map 1: Ethnic Composition of Bosnia Herzegovina Prior to the Civil War (Source: Wikipedia Commons)  
 
 
Repeatedly failing to secure support for a plan based on the continued existence 
of Yugoslavia as a loose federation of independent states and faced with the realities of 
                                                
238 US ambassador Zimmermann (1996, 181-184) learned in his meetings with Tudjman that the Croatian 
leader’s territorial claims to Bosnia were based on the rejection of Bosnia’s legal right to exist since it had 
been formed under communist rule. In addition, he justified the partition of the state between Croatia nd 
Bosnia by conjuring up the paranoid claim of the ris  an Islamic fundamentalist state threatening the 
region.  
 
239 Woodward (1995, 277) claims that in October, 1991, both the Yugoslav leadership which was now 
dominated by Serbia, as well as the government in Sarajevo repeatedly appealed to the UN for monitors n 
Bosnia to stop ethnic violence from terrorist gangs i  the villages of eastern Bosnia. 
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Croat and Slovenian independence, Alija Izetbegović began to embrace the idea of 
independence of an undivided Bosnia by the autumn of 1991.240 This objective clashed 
with that of the Serb minority which feared being reduced to minority status in what they 
considered to be their own state. Serbs in Bosnia considered their link with Serbia as 
guarantee of their ethnic survival and political freedom.   
In October 1991, Muslim and Croat legislators, over Serb protests, decided to 
initiate the process leading to Bosnian independence by approving documents allowing 
for secession (Cohen 1995, 241). In December, Bosnia under President Izetbegović 
formally sought EEC recognition as independent state. An important consideration in the 
hurry towards independence had been the establishment of a one-week window during 
which the European Community would consider requests for recognition (Woodward 
1995, 276).241 In compliance with EEC rules governing recognition of break-away 
provinces of Yugoslavia, a referendum was held in February 1992 in which Muslims and 
Croats overwhelmingly supported independence. The vote was boycotted by Bosnia’s 
Serbs. Interethnic violence flared up in March following an attack on a Serb wedding in 
Sarajevo and quickly spread throughout the province (Cohen 1995, 242). On March 3, 
1992, the Bosnian parliament declared independence without the support of the Serb 
party and its leader, Radovan Karadžić. On April 7, 1992, Serb party representatives on 
the Bosnian collective presidency resigned and an assembly composed of Serb SDS and 
SPO parliamentarians proclaimed the independence of a Serb republic in Bosnia 
                                                
240 On March 16, 1991, Milošević declared Serbia to be independent during a television address.  
 
241 Woodward (1995, 278) considers this to have been a major mistake. One week was too little time to 
make such a momentous decision for a deeply divided political entity.  
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(Woodward 1995, 284). In July of that year, a separate Croatian entity in Bosnia, aided 
by Croatia was also proclaimed. In spite of the escalating violence and the questions that 
should have been raised about the viability of the Bosnian state, the European 
Community recognized Bosnia on April 6, 1992 with the US following suit the following 
day.242  
Preoccupied with the situation in Croatia, the European Community had largely 
ignored events in Bosnia until January and February 1992. The Badinter Arbitration 
commission had been mostly concerned with questions of human rights and democratic 
standards in the new republics that were beginning to replace Yugoslavia. Among the 
provisions governing recognition established by the commission were requirements of 
constitutional guarantees for human rights and referendums on independence.243  
Germany’s unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and the wave of recognitions 
the action prompted set a dangerous precedent for the international recognition of 
national sovereignty even in the absence of a resolution of fundamental questions of 
national identity. Viewing sovereignty in terms of national identity which, in tur was 
linked to territory, the European Union brokered a peace agreement between Muslim, 
Serb and Croat groups in Lisbon in March 1992 that divided Bosnia into three separate 
territorial units and provided for power sharing between the groups (Cohen 1995, 243). 
However, the agreement fell apart within weeks when Izetbegović reneged, suddenly 
concerned about the issue of territorial division. Croat leader Mate Boban also rejected 
                                                
242 It did not help international relations with Serbia that the recognition date fell on the anniversary of the 
Nazi bombing of Belgrade in 1941. 
 
243 Although the commission specifically found in regards to Bosnia, that referenda should include 
‘respectable numbers’ from all three major ethnic groups within the province (Woodward 1995, 280). 
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the accord because he saw a possibility for his group to gain additional territory in new 
talks (Woodward 1995, 281).244  
Violence between the groups erupted into full-fledged civil war as the April 6 
recognition date drew near. The Bosnian government had ordered a general mobilization 
of National Guard troops and reserves in preparation for a Serb attack on Sarajevo which 
took place on April 5 when Serb forces began shelling the city from the surrounding hills. 
A number of Bosnian and international observers had called for the UN to make Bosnia a 
protectorate in order to stop the escalation. However, the new Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali had concluded that conditions were not appropriate for UN involvement 
(Woodward 1995, 285). In June, Boutros-Ghali further expressed his view that the 
position of the UN as conflict management after the Cold War being foremost the 
responsibility of regional organizations. The UN did establish a presence in Sarajevo–
UNPROFOR, which was actually the headquarters for the mission in Croatia, the 
implementation of which had been delayed due to wrangling by state governments over 
the financing of the operation. This mission was soon forced to address the situation in 
Bosnia but its size was dramatically reduced as fighting intensified. Overall, the 
international community had begun to view the violence in Bosnia as a civil war in which 
inviolably borders were given priority and only humanitarian aid should be provided. In 
any case, the United States, the United Kingdom and France were not inclined to commit
troops to pacify the situation.  
                                                
244 It is unclear why Izetbegović reneged on the agreement so soon. Cohen (1995, 243) offers a range of 
possible explanations.  
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International diplomatic pressure mounted on the warring groups as a 
humanitarian catastrophe of a scale not seen since World War II rapidly unfolded. As 
heavy fighting ensured, even the International Red Cross was forced to pull out of the 
province and a stream of refugees began to leave the province for safer countries in 
Europe. Even though the UN deployed a small force of about 1100 troops from Croatia in 
June to open the airport of Sarajevo for humanitarian purposes, overall the number of 
international monitors in Bosnia dramatically declined.   
Yugoslavia, now composed of just Serbia and Montenegro, was increasingly seen 
by many countries as the villain in the escalating Bosnian civil war. Serbia was directly 
and indirectly aiding the Bosnian Serbs who had begun to conduct an utterly repugnant 
campaign of ethnic cleansing in eastern Bosnia. The United States took the lead in 
seeking harsh international measures against Serbia. Severe economic saction  were 
imposed on the country in the end of May 1992 and in November, the UN Security 
Council imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia designed to keep the Serb air force from 
aiding Bosnian Serb forces. The first serious enforcement of the no-fly zone by NATO
planes began in March 1993 with Operation Deny Flight. The monitoring mission 
required the use of NATO AWACS planes and naval forces. Later that year, the United
Nations provided protection under Chapter 7 of its charter to so-called safe havens 
starting with Srebrenica.  
During the escalating civil war, a number of peace talks were sponsored by 
multilateral institutions.245 The most notable of the early efforts to achieve peace was the 
                                                
245 The first multilateral attempts at resolving the situation within Bosnia took place in Brussels on March 
30 and 31, in Sarajevo on April 12 and in Lisbon at the end of April 1992.   
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Vance-Owen Plan from spring 1993 which proposed a division of the Bosnia into ten 
semi-autonomous cantons with an ethnic power-sharing type of government. This plan 
was soon rejected by the Bosnian Serbs who favored a firm territorial and administrative 
division, thereby rejected the membership in any potential multiethnic entity. A key issue 
explaining the failure of the many attempts at conflict resolution was confusi  over 
leadership. Individual actors including the United States, France and even Germany and 
the UN, OSCE and the EU would repeatedly initiate some kind of action involving 
mediation or the coordination of relief efforts aimed at addressing the humanitarian 
disaster but leadership from the international community would prove to be sporadic 
without conviction or follow-through. Woodward blames this on a general absence of a 
major powers’ strategic interests in the region as well as the as-yet underdeveloped nature 
of conflict resolution institutions and mechanisms after the Cold War.246 Another issue 
was the ever-changing power constellation between the fighting groups. The constant 
fluctuation in relative group power must have influenced the pay-off matrixes of ethnic 
negotiators, determining their preferences for compliance with or defection from 
agreements.247  
                                                
246 Bosnia was fully contained within former Yugoslavi. The fact that the state did not share borders with 
outside states like Greece reduced the destabilizing mpact of the refugee crisis and the fighting. This was a 
very different situation from the one that would develop in Kosovo in 1999 where there were significant 
security implications for neighboring countries (Woodward 1995, 316-25). 
 
247 For instance, the initial arms embargo against Bosnia had the effect of reducing Muslim power, the no-
fly zone established over Bosnia and later NATO airstrikes against Serb positions reduced Bosnian Serb 
capabilities, the fluctuating military allegiance of the Bosnian Croats controlling an area they called the 
state of Herceg-Bosna and the vacillating support offered Croatia and Serbia for the parties in of the 
conflict which was itself a function of international pressure or lack thereof. Finally, international arms 
embargoes of Serbia and Montenegro also affected relative power.  
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And so Europe worst violence since World War II continued on. The year 1993 
saw major territorial gains by Izetbegović’s Bosnian Army against the Croat forces. 
These losses would soon compel the Bosnian Croats to question the tutelage of their 
supporter Tudjman in Croatia and open the door for an alliance with the government in 
Sarajevo. The bloody civil war would grab the international headlines again in the spring 
of 1994 when a mortar shot fired into a market square in Sarajevo killed 68 people and 
wounded many more. The incident prompted NATO to force the Bosnian Serbs to end 
the siege of Sarajevo. In May of 1994, fresh mediation efforts led to the establishment of 
a contact group comprised of representatives from the United States, Britain, Fance, 
Germany, Italy and Russia. Under the leadership of the United States, the group was to 
work out a general peace agreement between the newly formed Bosnian-Croat feder tion 
and the Bosnian Serbs but it failed its first major test when the Serbs rejected the plan 
(Burg and Shoup 2000, 322). The rejection of the plan accelerated a growing rift between 
the Bosnian Serbs and their protector in Serbia, President Milošević, who decided to 
break off relations on August 4, 1994 (Ibid., 309).  
In July 1995, the hitherto unrivaled levels of brutality in post World War II 
Europe reached yet new stages in abject human depravity when Bosnian Serb forces 
overran the UN declared safe areas of Srebrenica and Žepa, two of four remaining 
Muslim enclaves in the ethnically cleansed eastern Bosnian Serb corridor. In Srebrenica, 
thousands were murdered in what became the largest mass murder in Europe since World 
War II. With that, the international community finally had had enough and in August and 
September 1995, NATO conducted a major bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb 
positions called Operation Deliberate Force. That summer, the Serbs were also 
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experiencing major military and territorial losses against the Bosnian-Croat Federation 
and in Croatia, where a newly trained and equipped Croat army emerged as an effective 
fighting force. Serb resistance in Croatia’s Krajina was quickly crushed and the majority 
of the Serb population expelled from the region. The various military and alliance 
developments in the crisis set the state for the final diplomatic effort to end th  hostilities. 
In November 1995, President Clinton invited all parties to the conflict to Dayton, Ohio in 
November 1995 where they negotiated a lasting peace agreement. After the p ace 
accords were formally signed in Paris in December 1995, the three and a half year long 
civil war finally came to an end.  
 
The German Response to the Civil War in Bosnia  
 
 Germany initially remained relatively reticent during the escalation of the war in 
Bosnia, ceding the diplomatic initiative to other powers like the United States, France and 
the United Kingdom. International criticism of the prominent role the country had played 
during the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia had had a stinging effect (Duffield 1998, 
212; Maull 1995, 105; Ramet and Coffin 2001, 53). A number of international observers 
and negotiators were quick to blame German pro-recognition diplomacy for the 
international rush to recognize Bosnia which, in their opinion, caused the ethnic powder 
keg to ignite (for instance, Horsley 1992; Zimmermann 1996). When the issue of lifting 
the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina caused controversies between European states 
in 1992, German Foreign Minister Kinkel declared: “No matter what, there will be no 
unilateral German decision …”.248 
                                                
248 Quoted in Axt 1993, 354. 
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 But major issues developed that forced the hand of the government. The first one 
was the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding at an alarming rate which dramatically 
increased the number of refugees arriving in Germany. By July 1992, Foreign Minister 
Kinkel249 reported to parliament that the country had taken in about 200,000 refugees 
from the former Yugoslavia with 140,000 requesting asylum (Kinkel, PB 12/101, July 22, 
1992, 8610). The Federal Republic began to contribute aid to address the situation, 
promised to take in specific numbers of refugees from Bosnia and the Luftwaffe 
contributed two of the transport planes for the humanitarian air lift operation to 
Sarajevo.250 The government also advanced a quota system for the European distribution 
of refugees at an EC summit of foreign ministers although it received littl support for 
this position (Woodward 1995, 295).   
The second major foreign policy issue arose from the growing conviction among 
the international community that Serbia and Montenegro were chiefly to blame for th  
escalating violence. On May 30, 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
resolutions 713 and 757 which established harsh military and economic sanctions against 
Serbia and Montenegro. The Federal Republic strongly supported the sanctions251 
because parliamentary elites shared the view that Milošević’s Serb government was 
                                                
249 Germany’s longest-serving Foreign Minister Genscher departed from the scene in mid-May 1992. He 
was succeeded by Klaus Kinkel from the FDP. Kinkel had been Minister of Justice for a year prior to his 
appointment and would maintain Genscher’s foreign policy stance.  
 
250 Kinkel estimated the amount of humanitarian assistance payments rendered by July at 57.6 Million 
along with an additional 92 million provided as part of EC contributions (PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8610). 
 
251 PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8609. 
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primarily to blame for the violence.252  When NATO and WEU began to enforce the 
sanctions through air and sea patrols in the Adriatic Sea, Germany faced allied pressure 
to contribute militarily (Duffield 1998, 195). The Kohl government dispatched a 
destroyer and three marine patrol aircraft.253 The action sparked a major debate in the 
Bundestag indicating that parliamentary elites were as yet divided about the f ure 
military role of the country. However, the Bundestag did pass a resolution supporting 
government actions with the limitation that further actions in this regard would require 
the consultation of parliament. When the United Nations Security Council approved the 
interception and searches of ships violating the sanctions in November 1992, neither 
Defense Minister Rühe nor Foreign Minister Kinkel thought it politically feasible to push 
the parliament beyond monitoring missions. Even though they were willing to comply 
with foreign expectations and also saw major diplomatic and political advantages of such 
compliance, they chose to not pursue the normative agenda given political realities. This 
indicates that interests constantly influence the use and subsequent evolution of 
normative standards. However, the country’s failure to comply with NATO expectation 
prompted a new round of international criticism (Duffield 1998, 196).  
When the UN Security Council imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia in October 
1992 with the possibility of NATO AWACS planes being called upon to monitor the 
airspace above former Yugoslavia, Germany was again confronted with international 
                                                
252 Kinkel used the following words in parliament to explain the origins of the violence in Bosnia: “These 
are the methods and the aims with which the Serb ext emism is fighting this war…the shadow is falling 
upon the entire Serb nation which is allowing this o be done in their name…the responsibility for thiswar 
and especially the means by which it is fought rests predominantly with Serbia’s military and political 
leadership…” (PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8608).  
 
253 Initially, the destroyer “Bayern” was deployed whic  served in the Mediterranean as part of routine 
NATO operations. It was relieved by the frigate “Niedersachsen” on July 31, 1992.  
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expectations of contributing to the military mission. In this case, participation was 
considered vital to the success of the monitoring operation because more than a quarter of 
the highly trained flight crews were German.254 The UN Security Council decision to 
enforce the ban in March 1993 caused a major controversy in parliament and more 
importantly, among the cabinet elites themselves. Even though AWACS planes perform 
non-combat surveillance missions, their information is relayed to command centers or 
fighter pilots and could lead to decisions involving the use of force against aircraft 
violating the no-fly zone. In addition, the planes themselves could be attacked, placing 
their German crews in danger.  
The resulting parliamentary controversy over whether to leave German flight 
crews on the AWACS planes created major strains within the government coalition. CDU 
politicians supported the move while FDP politicians continued Genscher’s tradition of 
rejecting any use of force. Members of the opposition parties as well, opposed any 
change in Germany’s long-standing policy of not participating in internatio l actions, 
including multilateral ones that could involve the use of military force.  Squeezed 
simultaneously by international expectations to contribute to the enforcement of the flight 
ban and domestic pressures for continuity in policy, cabinet elites devised a rather clever 
if politically embarrassing solution: The cabinet voted to support the mission by leaving 
German flight crews on the AWACs planes while the FDP Bundestag faction filed for an 
injunction with the Constitutional Court to stop participation. In effect, the government 
was filing suit against itself. The court was quick to render its verdict which it pointed out 
                                                
254 Maull (1995, 110) provides a number of 161 out of 620 AWACS plane crew members and up to a third 
of all personnel for some functions. 
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addressed this particular government decision only. It let the cabinet action stand, 
rejecting the request for an injunction.  As a powerful indication of the importance of 
external expectations for German domestic processes and controversies, the court found 
that “a loss of confidence by the allies and all European neighbors would be unavoidable, 
and the resulting damage irreparable”.255 Thus, the court considered alliance solidarity to 
be more important than a potential violation of constitutional principles. The court also 
found that future missions required parliamentary approval (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 53). 
When the UNSC decided to enforce the flight ban with resolution 816 on March 31, 
1993, German AWAC crews participated in the monitoring missions. 
The next important challenge on the path to German security policy reorientation 
occurred in December 1994, when the German government was confronted with a 
request by the NATO commander in Europe, General George Joulwan, for aerial support 
(Ibid., 54). The request constituted a significant escalation in the demands for an 
increased German military role because of the possibility of German pilots getting 
involving in air-to-air and air-to-ground combat. In addition, the deployment of 
sophisticated fighter jets like the Tornado would require the accompaniment of logistical 
as well as combat-ready support units.   
Amid parliamentary disagreements, the government announced that it had agreed 
to the deployment of six to eight jets by the end of the year (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 54).  
                                                
255 The court did not rule on the constitutionality of the missions but rather on the political consequences of 
upholding or denying the request for an injunction by the FDP Bundestag faction. Indicative of the moral 
and value-based struggle going on between the elites, th  court considered the negative consequences of 
allowing German flight crews to remain on board the AWAC planes to be smaller than the potential for 
violating the constitution. The court’s willingness to risk violating the constitution demonstrates the power 
of external role expectations in the elite debate about foreign policy reorientation (Der Spiegel, April 4, 
1993).   
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The move was strongly opposed by the SPD with vice chairman Oskar Lafontaine 
rejecting NATO’s role as the world’s policemen as incommensurable with German 
foreign policy (Interview in Spiegel/Reuters, January 2, 1995) and federal manager 
Verheugen categorically ruling out the use of the Bundeswehr (Reuters, February 22, 
1995). The deployment was eventually approved by parliament on June 30, 1995 by a 
narrow majority.256  
In the fall of 1995, a lasting peace agreement for Bosnia finally became a distinct 
possibility. The peace would have to be enforced by UN and NATO forces. In Septemb r 
1995, Foreign Minister Kinkel indicated that Germany might be part of such a 
peacekeeping mission and that the United Nations had asked Germany to contribute to 
such an operation.257 Military contributions to the force protecting the Dayton Peace 
Accords represented the final link in the chain of escalating German partici tion in 
extraterritorial missions. When parliament voted with a vast majority supporting the 
action in December 1995, German security policy had effectively been reoriented from 
its non-military character to the support of out-of-area mission with the possibility of 
both inflicting and taking casualties. The parliamentary and extra-parliament ry discourse 
surrounding German contributions to the 50,000 strong NATO peacekeeping force 
(IFOR) enforcing the Dayton Accords would prove decisive in establishing a new policy
context enabling the use of military force for future governments.  
                                                
256 During the Bundestag vote on June 30, 1995, 258 of the parliamentarians opposed the action (Focus, 
December 22, 1995).  
 
257 In Welt am Sonntag, September 24, 1995, quoted in Ramet and Coffin 2001, 54. The government tried 
to delay the decision to deploy troops but foreign pressure was strong, particularly from France. The French 
foreign minister Herve de Charette had in effect preempted the German decision by announcing that France 
was going to send the German-French Eurocorps to the Balkans (Der Spiegel, October 10, 1995, 36b-37a). 
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Role Expectations and Social Pressure 
 
The period between 1992 and 1995 would prove decisive in altering international 
conceptions of security that had existed during the Cold War. It was during this time that 
the debate about the future of NATO was settled in favor of maintaining the organizatio , 
expanding its reach by incorporating former members of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern 
Europe and to redirect the emphasis of its missions from territorial defense to rapid 
reaction and out-of-area missions designed to address instabilities arisingfrom the less 
1992            
   
January 15 EC recognizes Croatia and Slovenia 
February Referendum in Bosnia in support of independence, Serbs abstain   
March 3 Bosnian parliament declares independence over Serb objections 
May 30 Economic sanctions enforced against Serbia; Germany deploys Navy 
July 3 Sarajevo airlift begins; German planes participate  
October 9 UN imposes no-fly zone over Bosnia; German AWACs crews participate  
 
1993           
 
March 16 Bundestag debates German responsibilities to global society and alliance 
April 12 Constitutional Court rules that AWAC deployment is constitutional 
March 31 Operation Deny Flight commences 
 
1994           
 
April 26 Formation of the Contact Group 
July 12 Constitutional Court rules ‘out-of-area’ missions as constitutional 
December NATO formally requests German aerial support, K hl cabinet consents   
 
1995           
 
June 30 Bundestag approves Tornado deployment, SPD objects but party discipline  
 breaks down with many members voting for the action 
Summer Fischer writes open letter to Green Party advocating use of force 
November Dayton Conference 
December 2-3 Green Party congress rejects potential mil tary role in Bosnia 
December 6 Bundestag debates and approves German military contribution for IFOR  
December 14 Dayton Peace Accord signed, IFOR deployment commences  
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structured security environment of the Post-Cold War era. NATO’s important London 
summit of July 1990 had already characterized the new security threats as 
multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional… hard to predict and assess…less 
likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but 
rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the 
serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and 
territorial disputes.258  
 
The new Strategic Concept articulated the goal of creating multinational rapid 
reaction forces to support the increasing scope of United Nations peacekeeping miss ons 
pursued in accordance with Chapter VII of its charter.259 The Rome Summit of November 
1991 was also very significant in the process of “the Alliance's transformatin and … 
[the redefinition] … of its role and missions in the new Europe” (Wörner 1991). This was 
followed by a declaration to contribute to peacekeeping operations under the auspices of 
the CSCE at the May 1992 Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and 
the Nuclear Planning Group (Baumann 2001, 165). The Brussels summit of January 1994 
again affirmed NATO’s willingness to conduct out-of-area missions within the limits of 
mandates established UN or CSCE.260 The European Union pursued a similar course of 
action as indicated by the members’ concerted efforts at elevating the European Political 
                                                
258 The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, Paragraph No. 7 and No. 8, NATO On-line bibliography, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm (accessed January 6, 2009). 
 
259 Ibid., Paragraphs 46 and 47. 
 
260 Article No. 7 of the Brussels Summit Declaration from January 11, 1994 reads. “In pursuit of our 
common transatlantic security requirements, NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake mission 
in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defence of its members, which remains a 
core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own 
procedures, peacekeeping and other operations underthe authority of the UN Security Council or the 
responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. Participation 
in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with 
national constitutions” (NATO On-Line Library, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940111a.htm, 
accessed February 6, 2009).  
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Cooperation procedure which had existed since the 1970s to the level of Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and by revitalizing the Brussels Pact organizatio  Western 
European Union. 
 The Maastricht Declaration on the Western European Union from February 7, 
1992 noted that “WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European 
security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence 
matters”.261 These new responsibilities were defined more thoroughly at the important 
Petersberg meeting on June 19, 1992 which took place at roughly the same time as the 
dramatic escalation of the Civil War in Bosnia. The meeting led to the establishment and 
declaration of the so-called Petersberg Tasks which involved developing the capabilities 
to rapidly deploy–mobile forces for peacekeeping missions in response to the “significant 
changes that had taken place in the security situation in Europe since [the] last regular 
meeting in November 1991” (Petersberg Declaration, art. 1).262 WEU Secretary-General 
Jose Cutileiro later considered this time period to be crucial for the formatin of a real 
operational role for the organization in defining new missions, such as crisis management 
and peacekeeping, that “matched the specific challenges of the Post-Cold War world” 
(Cutileiro 1995). A draft recommendation of the EU’s Political Committee on European 
Security Policy from 1993 also emphasized the range of domestic instabilities now being 
                                                
261 Treaty on European Union, Declaration on WEU, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0105000050 (accessed February 7, 2009). WEU 
member states included Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Greece and the United Kingdom. Greece joined in 1995.   
 
262 “The WEU seeks to develop its operational capabilities, the effective implementation of conflict-
prevention and crisis-management measures, including peacekeeping activities of the CSCE or the United 
Nations Security Council” (Petersberg Declaration, art. 2). 
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perceived to be the primary security threats after the Cold War.263 Thus, threat 
perceptions established a decisive and permanent basis for the need of new roles for 
international institutions and their missions that would address the regional insecur ties 
emerging after the Cold War. The new missions required new capabilities and member 
contributions leading to the definition of new actor responsibilities or behavioral scripts. 
The meaning of alliance responsibility now shifted towards actors’ embrace and 
contributions to NATO non-article V missions. The old meaning of responsibility that 
had been associated with contributions to territorial defense was no longer applicable.  
 For Germany, the new emphasis on extraterritorial deployment of combat-ready 
troops produced significant tensions not only because of the antimilitarism associated 
with the civilian power role but, perhaps more importantly, because German elites wre 
critically involved in the process of redefining the raison d’être and mission objectives of 
NATO, the OSCE, and the European Union. Elites supported this process both because 
they shared the prevailing threat conceptions and because they wanted for Germany to 
remain a predictable and calculable actor. The concretization of standards and state 
obligations in conjunction with the escalating Bosnian crisis dramatically increased the 
social pressure on German elites to comply with the expectations to play a more 
prominent role which included the acceptance of the use of force.   
 The Bosnian civil war caused the steady trickle of pleas for greater German 
involvement to turn into a torrent of requests which increased the foreign pressure on 
elites to adapt German role behavior. Foreign leaders attempting to resolve the Bosnian 
                                                
263 “European Security Policy”, Draft Recommendation on European Security Policy, Submitted on behalf 
of the Political Committee by Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur. 24th May, 1993. 
http://www.cec.lu/pub/history/military/a-weu/document (accessed on April 22, 1996). 
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crisis became increasingly less tolerant of Germany’s antimilitary culture and traditions 
which they viewed as anachronistic or as an excuse for inaction. During a visit to Bonn in 
January 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali repeatedly and publicly ca led for 
full German participation in the entire range of United Nations missions, arguing that 
without an unrestricted German contribution the UN would be unable to fulfill its 
tasks.264 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher also called on Germany to increase its 
support of NATO initiatives (Lantis 2002a, 93). In a closed meeting with SPD leaders in 
January 1995, fellow social democrat from Norway and chief Bosnia negotiator Thorvald 
Stoltenberg could hardly conceal his impatience and frustrations with German attitudes 
regarding the use of force when he argued that nobody abroad understood the internal 
discussion about the deployment of Tornado fighter jets. Since Germany had the military 
means, it should use them.265 NATO commanders, including General George Joulwan, 
repeatedly requested German aerial support in the fall of 1994 (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 
54; Zehfuss 2002, 30). Pressure to conform to expectations came from President Clinto  
who, during a state visit to Germany in July 1994 said: “I do not see how Germany, the 
third-biggest economic nation in the world, can escape a leadership role…[it] has no 
other choice but to assume a leadership role. Germany cannot withdraw from its 
responsibility”.266 Foreign leaders also used peer pressure in an attempt to convince 
German elites to get more involved. For instance, when Chancellor Kohl tried to delay 
the decision to deploy German troops in the fall of 1995, France’s foreign minister Herve 
                                                
264 FAZ, January 12, 1993.  
 
265 Olaf Opitz, “Scharpings Schlingerkurs”, Focus, January 16, 1995, 32-33.   
 
266 SZ, July 4, 1994.  
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de Charette asked his counterpart during a short visit “are you ready?” after which he 
officially announced that France was going to send the ‘German-French’ Eurocorps to the 
Balkans.267 
 Effective social pressure to change Germany’s stance on the use of force also 
came from members of the parliamentary elite who, through the country’s enmeshment in 
international institutions, were actively involved in the process of restructuring 
international security organizations after the Cold War. Foremost among them was 
NATO’s influential Secretary General, Manfred Wörner268 who became one of the chief 
advocates of the organization’s regional stabilization role and the developm nt of rapid 
reaction forces deployable for out-of-area missions.269 Advocating a forceful and militant 
stance in Bosnia, Wörner repeatedly criticized non-interventionist attitudes in the United 
States and Europe.270 Concerned about the effectiveness of NATO’s new mission 
objectives he himself had advocated, the CDU politician applied public and personal 
pressure to increase German participation in an effort to bolster NATO capabilities.271 
SPD politician Hartmut Soell, who held the post of Secretary General of the assembly of 
                                                
267 Der Spiegel, October 10, 1995, 36b-37a. 
 
268 Manfred Wörner was NATO Secretary General from 1988 – 1994. His impact on the alliance was 
significant. Hendrickson concludes that “Analysts of NATO who attempt to explain the alliance’s 
transformation without giving some attention to theSecretaries General…in Woerner’s case, have missed a 
critical leader who helped shape NATO’s post-Cold War mission in the Balkans” (Hendrickson 2004, 524). 
 
269 In a speech to the National Press Club in July 1993, Wörner stated with conviction that “we cannot 
afford passivity…if we are surrounded by chaos…NATO’s job was to prevent major crisis, address new 
kinds of [security] risks and prevent Europe from sliding back”.  
 
270 In a speech in Rome, Wörner stated that “we all wish that diplomatic means alone would succeed. But 
diplomacy needs to be backed up with a determinatio to use force if it is to be credible…As Frederick the
Great used to say: Diplomacy without the sword is like music without instruments” (Speech at the Centro 
Alti Studi Difese, Rome, May 10, 1993. Quoted in Hendrickson 2004, 515). 
 
271 Interview in SZ, quoted in Duffield 1998, 339 (footnotes). Wörner also issued an official request for 
military assistance in July 1992 to monitor the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro (Lantis 2002a, 89). 
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the WEU during the time of the Petersberg Declaration, also promoted greater 
international engagement of the Federal Republic within his own party.272 Hans 
Koschnick from the SPD who served as EU Administrator in Mostar implored fellow 
party members to not remain passive as troops from allied countries incurred 
casualties.273   
 The requests coming from national leaders, heads of important security 
organizations and chief negotiators in Bosnia as well as from Germans involved in 
international security organizations created significant social pressure on Grman elites to 
support military operations in Bosnia unless they risked being seen as unreliable partners. 
As such, the requests coming from important actors and over a significant period of time
constituted a kind of socialization process aimed at changing German foreign policy 
behavior. Allied leaders reminded Germany of its responsibilities on the basis of the 
country’s extraordinary capabilities within the system. To further increase social 
pressure, they treated Germany as if it had already embraced the desired role.274 
 
Role Conceptions and Contestation 
 
 The foreign policy challenges of the Bosnian Civil War strongly underscored the 
conflict between external role expectations and the domestic debate about what that role 
and its conduct should be given the strong desire to remain true to the civilian power role 
                                                
272 Soell had opposed a policy of neutrality towards Yugoslavia. He had called for a European security 
order and the creation of safe areas in Bosnia at a time when many SPD members were not willing to 
follow that course (Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst 48/124, July 5, 1993, 1-2).  
 
273 Olaf Opitz, “Scharpings Schlingerkurs”, Focus, January 16, 1995, 32-33. 
 
274 Wendt uses the term ‘altercasting’, to denote a social process by which one actor induces another actor 
to take on a new identity by treating that actor as if it already had that identity (1999, 326-332). 
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conceptions that had characterized the country since World War II. Conservative elites 
promoted the adaptation of role behavior towards that of a ‘normal’ great power. A 
normal state was perceived as one that accepted its “natural role in the great dist ibution 
of capabilities dutifully and rationally” (Bach 1999, 78). Normal states had the rig t to 
autonomously develop their national interests which they were free to pursue and 
maintain through a variety of means including the use of force.275 Normal states were 
characterized by national pride and ‘healthy’ patriotism (Kohl, PB 12/5, January 30, 
1991, 90). Conservative and liberal role promoters presented Germany as a great power 
in a new context where power was freed from its traditional association with brutality and 
arbitrariness (Willkür) and instead was seen as logically associated with actor 
responsibility (Bach 1999, 79). The normalization of Germany’s role behavior was 
promoted as necessary for the country to remain a predictable and reliable al y. In 
Kinkel’s words: “by contributing to the international peace force, Germany has gained a 
degree of normality…Germany is practicing responsibility and joint responsibility” (PB 
13/76, December 6, 1995, 6650). CDU foreign policy spokesperson Lamers wrote in 
April 1991 that if Germany “were to act obliviously to her power this would be 
irresponsible and raise mistrust, and that Germany, without forgetting history, must move 
to being as normal as possible”.276 In 1996, Defense Minister Rühe would express his 
personal satisfaction over the fact that the country had given up   
 Germany’s political and military special role which Germany had played for half 
 a century due to its history; the later also serving as pretext for a policyafter 
                                                
275 An example of normal state behavior in this conception would be the tendency of the United States to 
proclaim strategic interests in the form of doctrines about its national interests in other parts of the world.  
 
276 Lamers (1991), quoted in Longhurst (2004, 62). 
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 unification which neither matched the realities of world politics, nor Germany’s 
 new position and increased weight.277 
 
In addition to invoking position and ‘weight’ within the system, conservatives also 
supported the argument of role adaptation through the notion of demonstrating solidarity 
with the “Euro-Atlantic community of shared values with a common fate”278 Membership 
in that community was seen as coming with obligations. During the first IFORdebate in 
November 1995, CSU politician Theo Waigel reminded politicians that “for more than 
four decades, the freedom and peace of our country has been protected by our NATO 
friends”.279 Adopting the use of force as expected by friends and allies was presented as a 
way to preserve the traditional role based on the values of reliability, predictability and 
calculability. Not showing responsibility would risk diplomatic isolation through the 
divergence from expected role behavior. In effect, Germany would again be playing a 
‘special’ role which had to be prevented at all costs (Kohl 2007, 569).280  
 Along with solidarity, status considerations within the alliance also were 
important for conservatives with Defense Minister Rühe presenting German participation 
as a necessity lest the country risk compromising its position within the alliance or cause 
the alliance itself to fail281 and the chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group 
                                                
277 Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik 3 (March 1997), 48. 
 
278 Kohl, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bundeswehr White Paper 1994, 
http://www.resdal.org.ar/Archivo/d0000066.htm (accessed January 10, 2009). 
 
279 In German: “Vergessen wir nicht: Seit über vier Jahrzehnten schützen unsere Freunde in der NATO die 
Freiheit and den Frieden unseres Landes” (Waigel, PB 13/74, November 30, 1995, 6654). 
 
280 Practically all parliamentary elites were in agreem nt on preventing diplomatic isolation with the 
exception of members from the reformed communist party.  PDS members rejected the need for Western 
integration including NATO membership and had even argued for relinquishing NATO membership.  
 
281 DPA, January 20, 1993, quoted in Duffield 1998, 197. 
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Schäuble arguing that Germany “would jeopardize its future and opportunities… if it was
unable to show itself to be a reliable friend, partner and ally”.282 Newly elected President 
Roman Herzog, former chief justice of the constitutional court, presented a similar 
argument for increasing German responsibilities in a more insecure world in March 
1995.283     
In his widely quoted and discussed speech on ‘the basic outlines of German 
Foreign Policy’, President Herzog rejected Fukuyama’s optimistic statement about the 
end of history and the rise of a liberal world order and instead, viewed the changes in the 
international environment as having brought about greater uncertainty. Enumerating 
security concerns such as “population explosion, climate change, poverty-induced 
migration, atomic smuggling, drug trafficking, fundamentalism of all shades, genocide, 
[and] the disintegration of domestic order”, the President viewed the evolving system a  
entailing greater security risks than that of the era of deterrence (Herzog 1998, 26). In 
response to greater uncertainty, the President advocated an active, involved and glob l 
role for Germany. Invoking traditional key values such as responsibility and solidarity he 
stated:   
                                                
282 In German: “Deswegen würden wir unsere eigene Zukunft, nsere Möglichkeiten angesichts aller 
Umstände and aller denkbaren Entwicklungen und Gefährdungen…gefährden, wenn wir uns nicht in der 
Lage sehen wurden, auch verläβliche Freunde, Partner, Verbündete zu sein” (Schäuble 1995, PB 13/48, 
June 30, 1995, 3970). 
 
283 Speeches and statements by German Presidents constitute strong indicators of German role conceptions. 
The institution of the Federal Presidency is one of primarily symbolic importance. Presidents act above the 
fray of party politics – seeking to promote unity by seeking to develop a national consensus on important 
issues. In foreign policy, Presidents are free to engage abstract ideas about the course of foreign policy. In 
setting the national agenda, they are able to directly influence the range of foreign policy options and, 
among other courses of action, suggest reorientatios.  This speech is from  March 13, 1995, given to the 
German Society for Foreign Affairs.  
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We have finished being a free rider284; Germany is now a part of the concert of 
the great democracies, whether it wants to be or not, and if any one of these 
democracies stands back, it inevitably not only damages the others, but ultimately 
itself, as well (Herzog 1998, 27).  
 
Further acknowledging special role-related responsibilities arising from the 
changed nature of the structure of the international system, Herzog stated that “the quality 
of our commitment must accord with our greater weight, for otherwise we will no longer 
be taken seriously in the world in the long run (Ibid. 29). The statement’s reference to the 
national interest as being taken seriously also indicates a strong desire to for qual status 
and prestige.285  Further pursuing this point, Herzog stated that “German interests and 
Germany’s share of responsibility for the world community thus largely coincide. And if 
we do not wish to be at the mercy of developments in world politics, we will have to play 
an active role in global domestic policy” (Ibid., 33). 
An important element in Herzog’s speech was the implicit challenge to the 
civilian power role when Herzog stated that “the checkbook does not always sufficeand 
that service at the risk of one’s life may one day be called for” (Ibid.). The President is 
clear that the appreciation of the efficacy of force is to be seen in the context f 
multilateral institutions such as NATO and in the interest of international peace and only 
as last resort after moral and economic means of influence had been exhausted (Ibid. 29). 
                                                
284 The President used the terminology of ‘the end of riding on the car step’ (Ende des Trittbrettfahrens) 
which roughly translates into free riding but also indicates the desire to be in the car with all respon ibilities 
including the right to steer the car. 
 
285 Interestingly enough, Herzog (1998, 29) states that “neither the deployment of the Bundeswehr, nor a 
seat in the Security Council, should be status issue  for Germany. We must focus on the substance of the 
problems alone”. Here, Herzog is making instrumental use of a normative argument. Not status-seeking is 
the goal but contributing to the resolution of problems arising from the new structure of international 
politics. It is reasonable to assume that status and prestige do represent important objectives in addition to 
contributing to the resolution of problems.  
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Elsewhere, he had insisted that the central foreign policy parameters of the B nn 
Republic, defined as “moderation in style, predictability, preparedness for dial gue, and 
readiness for compromise, would not change under the Berlin Republic” (Ibid. 33). In 
conjunction with other passages however, in which the benefits of hard power are 
acknowledged we can infer him to have indicated a preference for the normalization of 
foreign policy.286 Conservative positions on normalization were shared to a considerable 
extent by their liberal-democratic coalition partners.  
FDP politicians continued to cling to the rejection of force that was part of the 
traditional civilian power role and therefore insisted on legal clarification of the issue of 
Bundeswehr participation. However, party leaders including Foreign Minister Kinkel 
fully accepted the conservative argument of increasing responsibility as part of the 
Germany’s new role obligations. During the summer of 1992, Kinkel criticized the 
traditional German role, stating that the country could no longer behave like “an impotent 
dwarf”.287 In the minister’s situational brief on Yugoslavia presented to parliament on 
July 22, Kinkel argued that “in a world with an urgent need for international action, a 
constructive and active German contribution is required as well…the international 
political responsibility of the Federal Republic has grown since reunification”.288 Liberals 
also shared the conservative concern with status and reputation. For instance, Kinkel 
                                                
286 We need a foreign policy that lacks snarling and bluster, but also one that is not tensely self-consci us 
either (Herzog 1998, 33). 
  
287 Kinkel interview in Die Zeit, July 17, 1992. 
 
288 In German: “In dieser Lage, da alle Welt einen drigenden internationalen Handlungsbedarf sieht, ist 
auch ein konstruktiver und aktiver deutscher Beitrag gefordert...Die internationale politische 
Verantwortung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland is seit der Wiedervereinigung gewachsen...Dies gilt 
namentlich...die in der UN-Charta angelegten Instrumente kollektiver Friedenssicherung nach Kräften zu 
unterstützen” (Kinkel, PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8609). 
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linked reliability to equality in status by stating that “we must and want to be a reliable 
and equal (vollwärtiger) European and transatlantic partner in the area of maintaining 
peace” (PB 13/74, November 30, 1995, 6426). A frequently-used argumentative concept 
employed by both conservatives and liberals alike was teleological. In their view, 
German was ready to play a new role because the country had “matured enough to be 
able to take on her natural responsibilities in upholding international law” (Gerhardt, PB 
13/74, November 30, 1995, 6441).  
Acceptance of the need for role adaptation as promoted by the conservatives 
while adhering to the party’s long-standing support for antimilitarism produced 
considerable role conflict within the party and tensions with the conservatives. Th  
AWACS controversy in April 1993 is a good case in point. Here, the FDP was not 
prepared to allow German crews to remain on NATO planes even though Kinkel had 
promised UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in January that Germany would start to 
play a greater role in peacekeeping missions (Lantis 2002a, 93). The inconsistency of the 
position made it difficult to maintain, particularly when the CDU/CSU began to win the 
judicial battle at the Constitutional Court which first allowed German participation in 
AWACs missions and in July 1994, rendered a defining ruling that allowed for ‘out-of-
area’ missions of the NATO, WEU as well as peacekeeping missions of the UN. 
Argumentative inconsistency also exposed the FDP to criticism from their conservative 
coalition partners. For instance, CSU chairperson Waigel publicly blasted the liberal 
democrats over their AWACs stance, calling them ‘whiners’ and that “the FDP is always 
like that”.289 In short, FDP cabinet members who opposed the use of force were 
                                                
289 “AWACS-Streit: FDP Politiker für Koalitionsausstieg”, Bild, April 5, 1993, 1. 
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nonetheless susceptible to the argument of role normalization made by conservative lites 
because of their willingness to accept the need for a more active role after the end of the 
Cold War.290 Not consenting to one while promoting the other undermined the party’s 
public credibility and reliability within the coalition.  
SPD politicians generally opposed the modification of the country’s stance on the 
use of force. Humanitarian mission were seen as only acceptable option. Rejecting the 
use of force as adequate means to address conflict, party whip Klose argued during the 
debate on German naval and aerial participation in the Adriatic Sea in July 1992 that 
“military deployment…will most likely lead to even more bloodshed than that that we 
have to witness daily on television”.291 The Tornado deployment debate in July 1995 saw 
Rudolph Scharping arguing that “a military solution to the conflict in Bosnia cannot be 
achieved” (PB 13/46, June 28, 1995, 3950). Invoking elements of the civilian power role 
conception, he goes on to argue that the ongoing German humanitarian efforts in Bosnia 
create a “more preferable image of Germany as a country that is peaceful and concerned, 
characterized by assistance-rendering and human compassion” (Ibid).  In essence, Social 
Democrats viewed Germany as being fundamentally unable to contribute to armed
                                                                                                                                                 
 
290 Former Foreign Minister Genscher (1998, 521) reflects on Yugoslavia by stating that “from the very 
beginning German policy set the prohibition of the us  of armed force to solve political issues as an 
important criterion….One of the essential lessons to be learned from the course of events in Yugoslavia 
must be the continued renunciation of force…Because the debate on justifiable and unjustifiable aggression 
results in old patterns of behavior, renunciation of force must remain the unalterable basis for peaceful 
coexistence in Europe.” Written at the time that the Bosnian Civil war should have made apparent the 
drawbacks of antimilitarism in deterring actors committed to policies of massive human rights violations, 
the statement indicates the strength of the cultural commitment to non-violence.  
 
291 In German: “Ein Kampfeinsatz im ehemaligen Jugoslawien würde mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit zu 
einem noch gröβeren Blutbad führen als jenem, das wir Tag für Tag im Fernsehen mit ansehen müssen” 
(Klose, PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8614). 
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peacekeeping missions because of its militant past.292 Both Klose and Scharping were 
attempting to counter the government’s argumentative scheme based on the country’s 
increased international responsibility by proposing the need to remain true to the 
traditional civilian role and emphasizing that anything else would damage the reputation 
of the Federal Republic.293 Thus, they resisted the government’s intention to adapt role 
behavior through the inclusion of the use of force by trying to rhetorically link 
antimilitarism to reliability and predictability and by denying the nature of external 
expectations. For instance, Günter Verheugen, reacting to Karl Lamers’ (CDU) argument 
that AWACS participation was required to maintain Germany’s reputation as reli ble 
NATO alliance partner in the charged debate on German responsibilities in March 1993, 
argued that NATO as defensive alliance should have no business conducting out-of-area 
interventions and that the organization’s objectives should not trump the constitution.294 
Almost stubbornly, the SPD politician went on to question the importance and validity of 
foreign role expectations by claiming that the government had ulterior motives: 
You … continue to tell us that the whole world is just waiting for the time that 
the Germans finally send soldiers to military confrontations ... why don’t you 
finally provide us with an example of a government that demands that the 
                                                
292 The government’s desire to deploy the Bundeswehr for peacekeeping missions in Yugoslavia was seen 
as tarnishing the international reputation of the country and further, states that the majority of Germans are 
against a new role for Germany out of a sense of responsibility for the recent past. Sozialdemokratischer 
Pressedienst, November 30, 1991 (http://library.fes.de/cgi-bin/d gibert.pl?id=022984&dok=44/022984, 
accessed on January 24, 2009). 
 
293 For instance, Klose quoted the comments of the Milano newspaper Il Giorno that viewed Germany’s 
participation in the Adriatic Sea as an indication of the country’s return as military power (Klose, PB
12/101, July 22, 1992, 8617). 
 
294 In German: “Und kommen Sie uns bitte nicht mit Bündnisverpflichtungen! Erstens steht auch das 
Bündnis nicht über der Verfassung, und zweitens ist die NATO ein kollektives Verteidigungsbündnis. Sie 
is kein Interventionsinstrument, nicht aus eigenen R cht und auch nicht im Auftrag der UNO. Ob die 
NATO bei der Erfüllung von Mandaten der Vereinigten Nationen eine Rolle spielen kann oder soll, ist eine 
ganz schwierige Frage” (Verheugen, PB 12/150, March 26, 1993, 12872). 
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Bundeswehr be send to military missions. I really would like to get to know 
this pressure.295   
 
The rhetorical differences between parliamentary elites masked a centr l point of 
agreement that made Social Democrats vulnerable to persuasion by role promoters. They, 
like members of the FDP, shared the perception that the international security 
environment had changed with the end of the Cold War and that some kind of a 
redefinition of role behavior was required. In Klose’s words:  
It is your prerogative … to want a new foreign and security policy. The world has 
changed, and the security situation today is different from the one three years 
ago…We are certainly prepared to help develop a new orientation through 
discourse.296  
 
Social Democrats also accepted another central aspect of the cabinet elite’s 
argumentative scheme–the “increased importance of the role of Germany and the special 
responsibility that arises from it” after reunification.297 Thus, Scharping, as leader of the 
opposition who opposed the deployment of German troops in Bosnia and who would 
hold on to the nonmilitary role of the country, nevertheless accepted the need for a 
greater role based on responsibility and that this responsibility was based on solidarity 
with NATO allies.298 Social democrats also shared the view that the country was ready 
                                                
295 In German: “Sie und alle möglichen Leute erzählen uns immer, in der ganzen Welt warte man nur 
darauf, daβ die Deutschen endlich Soldaten zu Kampfeinsatzen schicken. Nun, wir haben ja auch Kontakte 
in der Welt. Ich möchte, daβ Sie uns endlich einmal eine Regierung nennen, die verlangt, daβ die 
Bundeswehr an Kampfeinsätzen irgendwo in der Welt beteiligt wird. Ich möchte diesen Druck endlich 
einmal kennenlernen” (Verheugen, PB 12/150, March 26, 1993, 12873). 
 
296 In German: “Es ist Ihr gutes Recht...eine neue Auβen- und Sicherheitspolitik zu wollen. Die Welt hat 
sich verändert, und die Sicherheitslage ist heute and rs als vor drei Jahren...Wir sind durchaus bereit…um 
im Diskurs eine neue Orientierung zu gewinnen” (PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8618). 
 
297 In German: “Die gewachsene Bedeutung der Rolle Deutschlands und die damit verbundene besondere 
Verantwortung...” (Scharping 1995, PB 13/76, Decembr 6, 1995, 6637). 
 
298 “Mach kein’ Scheiβ”, Der Spiegel, August 14, 1995, 35. 
 
 232
take on a new role because it had matured and it had learned from history.299 Again, this 
undermined the position of elites who opposing role adaptation. Actors’ responsibilitie  
towards the collective are primarily defined by the collective–not the actors themselves. 
In effect, the social democrats were trying to link their behavioral preferenc s to past role 
expectations which conservatives elites exploited gleefully. During the AWACS debate, 
for instance, Verheugen’s critique of the government position encountered the telling 
outcry “you are standing still” from the conservatives who presented the need for change 
as a necessary response to current conditions while casting social democrats as being out 
of tune with the political realities that developed after the end of the Cold War.300 This 
argument generated substantial pressure on social democrats to change their position 
because the main elements in Germany’s role conception – reliability, ca culability and 
predictability–are subject to externally generated social expectations as is the appropriate 
behavior associated with these values. By not allowing role adaptation, social democrats 
were risking the country’s reputation and status within international society. Green party 
politicians, who had an even more restrictive view on the use of force, also encountered 
this dilemma. 
Germany’s Green Party had traditionally maintained a pacifist stance whi h ruled 
out foreign military deployments for any reason. Party leader Joschka Fischer strongly 
supported Germany’s traditional emphasis on antimilitarism by repeatedly emphasizing 
                                                
299 Verheugen (PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6666) and Schulte (PB 13/74, November 30, 1995, 6653). 
The metaphor of growing up had become an important element of the foreign policy discourse (Hellmann 
2004).  
 
300 In German: “Sie sind stehengeblieben” (PB 12/150, March 16, 1993, 12872). 
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his conviction that only political solutions can lead to peace.301 Fischer was clearly 
uncomfortable with the Tornado deployment in June 1995, critiquing it as a dangerous 
water-shed in German foreign policy in that German troops stood to be deployed outside 
of NATO areas with orders to shot.302 A few days before the Bundestag would decide on 
full participation in IFOR, the Green party congress would continue to rejectGerman 
participation in missions that involved the use of force. Green party members also did not 
share the pro-Western orientation maintained by conservatives and, to a lesser extent, the 
social democrats. NATO membership had been questioned by more radical members and 
international organizations were generally not viewed in solely positive ways because 
Greens considered the impact of superpower influence on organizational decision-making 
procedures and formulation of objectives. The party’s stance on pacifism and its cautious 
stance towards international organizations placed it outside the mainstream of lite 
thinking.  But the party was diverse and the realist wing constantly quarreled with the 
more radical elements. The escalation of violence and the turn to systematic genocde in 
Bosnia produced a major dilemma for the party in that the initially plausible ethical 
position on the rejection of force began to be viewed as morally unsustainable. The fall 
and international inaction over the fall of UN Safe Heavens Žepaand Srebrenica, in 
particular, severely damaged the credibility of the German peace mov ment. This 
allowed role promoters to challenge the position of the Green politician by maintaining 
                                                
301 Fischer, PB 13/48, June 30, 1995, 3972. 
 
302 In German: “Es geht um eine historische Zäsur in der deutschen Auβenpolitik. Die Zäsur besteht darin, 
daβ zum erstenmal seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs h ute mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit eine 
Mehrheit des Deutschen Bundestags beschlieβt, daβ deutsche Kampfverbände jenseits der NATO-
Bündnisgrenzen eingesetzt werden und den Auftrag haben, notfalls – ich muβ hier aus meiner Sicht 
hinzufügen: hoffentlich kommt es dazu nicht – auch zu schieβen. Das ist eine Zäsur, die wir fürchten...” 
(Fischer, PB 13/48, June 30, 1995, 3971). 
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that he, [Fischer], “lacks the ethical dimension of international responsibility and thereby 
a part of the capacity to fundamentally [re]orient German foreign policy, which is what 
this country needs”.303  
On the extreme left, Germany’s reformed communist party also rejected the 
deployment of armed forces outside of German borders. Party leader Gysi argued that 
Article 87, paragraph 87 of the Basic Law clearly limited the use of forcet  s lf-
defense.304 Recognizing that the growing international engagement of the Bundeswehr 
through humanitarian missions was part of the government’s strategy to promote a new 
role for the country, Gysi added his conviction that  
we are witnessing a process by which we are getting used little by little (slice-by 
slice) to the international deployment of the Bundeswehr and the militarization of 
foreign policy. We are supposed to get used to the fact … that the great power 
role of Germany requires support through military missions.305  
 
Other parliamentarians on the left added that “we have said after the war: Never, never do 
we want to carry weapons, never, never do we want war, let those at the top fight it out 
along, we simply will not participate”.306 The rejection of military forces was also 
revealed in statements like “history teaches us that the attempt to defend peace with 
violent means is accompanied by streams of blood…It is historically prudent to prom te 
                                                
303 In German: “…Ihnen im Kern die ethische Dimension internationaler Verantwortung and damit ein 
Stück Fähigkeit zur Grundorientierung der deutschen Auβenpolitik fehlt, die diese Land braucht” 
(Gerhardt, PB 13/74,  November 30, 1995, 6441). 
 
304 In German: “Auβer zur Verteidigung dürfen die Streitkräfte nur eingesetzt werden, soweit dieses 
Grundgesetz es ausdrücklich zuläβt“ (Gysi, PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8628). 
 
305 Gysi, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6647. 
 
306 In German: “Wir haben damals nach dem Krieg gesagt: Nie, nie wollen wir Waffen tragen, nie, nie 
wollen wir wieder Krieg, laβt doch die oben sich alleine schlagen, wir machen einfach nicht mehr mit” 
(Heuer, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6672). 
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non-violent options…”.307 The communist opposition also tried to present the argument 
of ulterior motives behind the reorientation effort by the government: “I fear that we will 
find new justifications for such actions … it has already been mentioned today 
that…[security] policy is about access to global markets and resources”.308 The rhetorical 
support for antimilitarism notwithstanding, the party’s political isolation within he 
Bundestag as well as the electoral precluded it from having any significant influence on 
the process of role adaptation.    
The rhetorical exchanges during the Bosnian Civil show parliamentary elites 
engaged in persuasive attempts to adapt role behavior. In essence, both role promoters 
and those resisting adaptation attempted to express their preferences for foreign policy 
behavior on the basis of a socially acceptable logic of appropriateness linked to different 
elements of the country’s role conception. Conservatives and Liberal-Democrats 
presented the use of force as being within the existing framework of the role concepti  
by emphasizing reliability and solidarity as defined by external expectations. SPD and 
Alliance 90/Green politicians viewed antimilitarism as integral part of ole behavior that 
could not be changed.  
The presence of external expectations serving as guidelines for appropriate 
foreign policy behavior strongly supported the agents intend on role adaptation. 
                                                
307 In German: “Die Geschichte uns lehrt, das der Versuch, Frieden mit gewaltsamen Mitteln zu 
verteidigen, davon begleitet ist, daβ Ströme von Blut geflossen sind...Diese gewaltsamen Mittel, im 
Übermaβ angehauft, haben zu Unterdrückung, zu entsetzlich Völkermorden und Kriegen geführt...Es ist 
historisch angesagt, gewaltfreie Optionen zu fördern und als Mittel der Politik einzusetzen” (Nickels, PB 
13/76, December 6, 1995, 6642-43). 
 
308 In German: “Ich fürchte, daβ wir immer neue und immer andere Begründungen fur solche Aktionen 
finden werden...Es ist heute schon darauf hingewiesen worden, daβ...[security policy] gehe um den Zugang 
zu Märkten und Rohstoffen in der Welt” (Nachtwei, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6672-3). 
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Opponents of adaptation congruent with external standards could be shamed because they 
risked central elements of the role conception including reliability and calculability. They 
could be accused of risking the all-important relationship with other NATO members 
within the alliance as part of the membership within a community that shared the 
democratic values of Western civilization (Breuer, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6659). 
Worse, opponents of adaptation could be cast as advocating a special role that risked 
policy singularity. This cast the position of the opposition as lying outside of the socially 
acceptable elite consensus intend on avoiding the country’s isolation for fear of its own 
past identity. The intensification of violence in Bosnia allowed for the moral arguments 
supporting the strong antimilitarism of the traditional role to be turned on their head.  
Inaction was portrayed as morally inferior and tantamount to aiding the objectives of the 
perpetrators of human rights violations. To sum up, the debates show that elites 
promoting role adaptation leading to security policy reorientation produced a more 
effective argument for their desire to embrace the use of force because this position could 
be externally validated by foreign role expectations based on a shared understanding of 
appropriate behavior among NATO members responding to the new security 
environment. Thus, a ‘persuasive argument’ was one that involved adapting role behavior 
to role conceptions after the Cold War even if that meant violating antimilitarism as core 
element of German strategic culture since 1945. 
 
The Domestic Concerns of Parliamentary Elites 
 
 The debate about adjusting the country’s role behavior taking place among 
parliamentary elites interlinked with important concerns at the time. Role adaptation 
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towards normal great power conduct helped parliamentary elites address a number of 
critically important issues. For conservative elites, the primary issue had been federal 
expenses and the dramatic influx of political and economic refugees which roughly 
coincided with reunification. Requests for asylum reached a preliminary peak in 1992 at 
which point the number of refugees from Yugoslavia reached an estimated 500,000. 
Social democrats and Alliance 90/Greens were concerned with regaining co trol over the 
government. The SPD had been out of power since Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 
1982. The Alliance 90/Greens, after experiencing a promising run between 1982 and 
1987, incurred a devastating defeat at the polls in 1990. In search of a formula for 
regaining power, both opposition parties were struggling with the public image of being 
unfit to govern. Their stance on the use of force would turn out to be an important 
element in their quest to be seen as trustworthy by the electorate. 
 An important domestic issue occupying parliamentary elites during the Bosnian 
Civil war was that of asylum reform. Since the end of World War II, Germany h d 
maintained one of the most liberal asylum laws among Western democratic states. The 
willingness to take in people who were escaping persecution was due to a concern with 
human rights born from the barbarism of the Nazi regime. The openness served to 
differentiate the Federal Republic from its inhumane predecessors. It was also unusual 
when compared with asylum policies of other states which tended to be far more 
restrictive. As such, the liberal asylum provision was part of the traditional rle 
conception that had emerged after World War II. Support for openness and the 
willingness to absorb asylum seekers dropped dramatically after the end of the Cold War 
when the rise of global instability coupled with the openness of borders created a refugee 
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problem of hitherto unseen proportions. At its peak in 1992, Germany received 430,000 
applications for asylum. The severity of the problem was exacerbated by Germany’s 
generous welfare provisions, reunification costs and an outdated citizenship law based on 
the principle of jus sanguinis or right of blood which made the assimilation of foreign 
citizens difficult and prolonged their existence in the unproductive and socially 
demeaning status of an asylum seeker.309 The civil war in Yugoslavia significantly added 
to the severity of the refugee problem with Germany taking in the majority of displaced 
persons (see Map 2). The influx of foreigners created considerable costs for Germany. It 
also fuelled right-wing violence against foreigners which reached an all time high 
between 1992 and 1993 (Marshall 2001, 160).   




(Source: United Nations Environment Programme) 
 
                                                
309 The principle of jus sanguinis (Right of Blood) establishes membership in the natio l group on the 
basis of cultural or genetic affiliation with the nation while Jus Soli (Right of Territory) creates such 
membership through affiliation with the state, its territory and adherence to its laws.  The Citizen Act of 




 To conservatives, immigration and asylum issues were of paramount importance. 
Party members had for many years supported conceptions of citizenship based on the 
principle of jus sanguinis. This resonated with the population of a country that had 
traditionally not viewed itself as an immigrant nation. Party leaders had concluded that a 
firm stance on the “foreigner issue would stave off electoral gains by the extrem  right” 
(Marshall 2001, 145). With its opposing stance emphasizing the open nature of the nation 
in line with the unlimited constitutional status of asylum, the SPD had repeatedly pai  an 
electoral price. Under the impact of the growing resonance of the issue with the electorate 
during the early 1990s, conservatives began to vehemently push for changes 
constitution’s asylum provisions. Role normalization supported the resolution of the 
problem of immigration through constitutional changes limiting asylum. As a ‘normal’ 
state Germany would be allowed to assert its national interests more prominently and the 
‘unique’ asylum provisions could be amended.  Institutional normalization offered the 
additional benefit of closing a chapter in German history. In effect, the historical burden 
of the country’s past could finally be left behind.  
 Conservatives promoted the change on the basis of responsibility and prudence. 
For instance, CDU/CSU chairperson Schäuble argued that Germany was in fact a ding 
and abetting perpetrators of ethnic cleansing by continuing to take in asylum eekers 
instead of precluding such population movements by making emigration to Germany 
more difficult.310 Conservatives also offered tangible solutions to the refugee crisis with 
Finance Minister Waigel pointing out that the country’s military contributions to the 
IFOR deployment and the peace thus created would allow some of the approximately 
                                                
310 PB 12/101, July 22, 1992, 8620. 
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400,000 Balkan refugees to return home (PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6655). Thus, the 
conservative effort to promote role adjustment to include the use of force complemented 
the interest of asylum reform because it allowed a break with past traditions. SPD 
politicians would eventually give in and a compromise was produced by the end of 1992.  
This involved the tightening of asylum laws by rejecting applicants who had passed 
through adjoining ‘safe’ countries, by establishing tougher standards in the definition of 
safe and unsafe countries and by introducing a fast-track return procedure. While the 
issue of asylum reform was on the minds of conservatives to address the refugee problem
while shoring up support amongst some voting groups, members of the opposition were 
struggling to increase prospects for gaining government control. Increasingly, the stance 
on role obligations in the new security environment would become intertwined with 
electoral prospects because it influenced both public views of being fit to govern 
(Regierungsfähigkeit) and the viability of parties as coalition partners.   
 Social Democrats had been out of power since 1982. The losses during the 
reunification election of 1990 had been substantial and unexpected. The election of 1994 
again ended in defeat.  The early 1990s were important years for reorientation as the 
party sought new leadership and redefined its stance on important issues. The SPD’s 
position on the use of force would turn out to be of crucial importance. A major problem 
for the party was its contradictory stance on the future role of Germany which expressed 
itself both in a desire to take on greater responsibility through a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council while trying to maintain the special role of a civilizng influence in 
world politics. This ideational conflict was taken up by traditionalist and pragmatist 
groups who competed over control within the party.  
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 Leaders of the left wing including Oskar Lafontaine and Heidemarie Wieczor k-
Zeul lay claim to the party’s pacifist traditions in support of the pure civilian power role 
conceptions.  Only the deployment of humanitarian and logistical troops was viewed as 
appropriate and as late as June 1995, Lafontaine claimed that he would rigorously enforce
the party’s official position against non-compliant party members. 311 Initially, support 
for the antimilitarist position within the party was very strong. The Bremen Program of 
1991, while accepting a greater role for Germany, proposed strict limitations on 
Bundeswehr use for blue helmet missions. The use of force through the acceptance of 
combat missions continued to be ruled out categorically and participation in the rapid 
intervention tasks as outlined by the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 was 
rejected. A special meeting of party leaders convened by moderate Björn Engholm in 
August of 1992 ended on an agreement on Bu deswehr participation under UN auspices 
that was again highly restrictive in nature (Duffield 1998, 202). The principle elements of 
the SPD Sofortprogramm reveal that Social Democrats wanted to influence international 
relations positively through support of international organizations but saw Germany’s 
appropriate role as providing civilian rather than military contributions to interna ional 
security.312 
 Moderate party leaders were concerned that the strict insistence on Germany’s 
traditional role and the emphasis on maintaining the country’s civilizing impact on world 
politics would harm the party’s reputation and hence its ability to regain governmental 
                                                
311 “Selbst Geleimt”, Der Spiegel, June 19, 1995, 37. 
 
312 SPD Sofortprogramm, Part IV, “Redefining Germany’s Role in the Community of Nations”, in German: 
“Deutschlands Rolle in der Völkergemeinschaft neu bstimmen”. SPD Sofortprogramm, August 24, 1992, 
http://www.glasnost.de/db/DokZeit/92asylpeberg.html (accessed February 8, 2009). 
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control. The ‘separate but equal’ position by which German could remove itself from 
military responsibility to serve a ‘higher cause’ and yet remain equal in status with other 
powers was viewed as unrealistic. Also considered unrealistic was the attempt o develop 
a precise distinction between humanitarian and combat missions in peacekeeping 
operations. The party’s attempts to distinguish one from the other through a series of 
briefs and declarations only undermined the party’s credibility in the eyes of the public. 
The fact that the party position advocated the pursuit of a permanent seat on the UNSC 
while ruling out military contributions further increased the problem of credibility. 313 It 
also undermined the professed goal of “strengthening the UN and actively help shape 
it” 314 by jeopardizing the international status of the Federal Republic. In light of t e move 
towards military missions, the maintenance of a pure civilian power role concption 
would increase the possibility of policy singularity315 and make Germany susceptible to 
arguments from alliance partners charging unfairness: The soldiers of other countries 
would die in faraway places while Germans would help them get there and carry the 
dead. Without equality through full participation in combat missions, equal diplomatic 
                                                
313 For instance, after an extraordinary congress in Bo n in November 1992, the party maintained the rather 
nonsensical position that Germany would be able to contribute to between 90 and 95 percent of all possible 
UN missions (Duffield 1998, 203).  
 
314 SPD Sofortprogramm,  August 24, 1992, Preamble, art. 47, 
http://www.glasnost.de/db/DokZeit/92asylpeberg.html (accessed February 8, 2009). 
 
315 Vice Chairperson of the SPD Lafontaine referred to the supporters of troop deployment within the ranks 
of the SPD as ‘Kinkelchen’ in reference to Foreign Mi ister Kinkel support for foreign missions. He 
viewed increased responsibility after the Cold War as involving a reduction in weapons exports to areas 
outside of NATO areas. He rejected the interpretation of President Herzog’s ‘Trittbrettfahrer’ speech 
(Interview in Der Spiegel, March 20, 1995, 22-25).  
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status for the country could not be accomplished. For these reasons, Hans-Ulrich Klose, 
for instance, thought that “the Bremen platform makes us look ridiculous”.316  
 The party’s apparent inability to win public confidence and electoral support 
became a major concern for moderate party leaders including Rudolf Scharping, Hans-
Ulrich Klose, Norbert Gansel and Karsten Voigt. Chancellor Kohl’s coalition between 
CDU/CDU and FDP had won the 1994 federal elections only narrowly but by early fall 
1995, surveys again showed poor results for the SPD. Party support was at 28 percent and 
with only 26 percent in Berlin which spelled trouble for the October election (Der 
Spiegel, September 10, 1995). 
 Under the impact of external expectations, solidifying rapid reaction doctrines and 
the violence in Bosnia, the pragmatic position of the moderates continued to gain tractio
throughout 1995 even under party leader Scharping’s notoriously indecisive leadership 
style.317 In early 1995, Scharping, who was also concerned about the growing influence 
of contender for leadership Gerhard Schröder, had appealed to party members to suppor 
the reorientation of foreign policy principles to be able to honor German alliance 
obligations towards NATO.318 Foreign policy expert Norbert Gansel supported the 
deployment of combat troops “because…the lives of human beings in the former 
Yugoslavia, the possibility for peace, strengthening the capabilities of the UN, 
                                                
316 FAZ, July 1992, 1-2, quoted in Duffield (1998, 202). 
 
317 Rudolph Scharping was widely considered to be an ineffective leader. Der Spiegel wrote about him that
“behind his back, the perception that he is the wrong man at the wrong time is gaining in strength” 
(“Demütigungen ohne Ende”, Der Spiegel, October 9, 1995, 22-23).  
 
318 “Mach kein’ Scheiβ”, Der Spiegel, August 14, 1995, 35. 
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international solidarity, [were]…higher goods”.319 By June 1995, about a quarter of the 
SPD parliamentarians broke with party discipline by supporting the deployment of 
Tornado jets (Ramet and Coffin 2001, 54). By the time of the Dayton Agreement, party 
support had decisively shifted towards the pragmatists. Last attempts to at least amend 
the developing security course in line with civilian power conceptions by placing 
restrictions on the potential use of the deployed Tornado fighter jets were defeate  as 
well when moderate party leaders like Verheugen pleaded with potential dissenter  tha  
‘technicalities’ should not influence the party’s decision to support the deployment.320 In 
the eyes of the moderates it was essential that “Germany contribute military to the 
protection of peace in Bosnia as had other allied states” (Ibid.). The SPD’s credibility 
problem that arose from to the principled rejection of the use of force similarly affected 
the Alliance 90/Green Party and hampered both its electoral chances as well as its ability 
to be considered as coalition partner. This prompted attempts to achieve 
Regierungsfähigkeit by settling the differences between traditionalists and pragmatists 
within the party. 
 With its categorical anti-war stance born out of the ideological traditions of the 
European Left, the Alliance90/Greens Party had the most restrictive positions on the use 
of force among the parties perceived as capable of partaking in governance. Green Party 
Congresses throughout the early 1990s found most delegates supporting non-violent 
means to address the Bosnian Civil War (Der Spiegel, August 7, 1995, 32-33a). The 
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320 351 parliamentarians voted against this motion while 207 supported it with 57 abstentions. Rüdiger 
Moniac, Die Welt, December 1, 1995, http://www.welt.de/print-




historical burden, in particular in regards to Yugoslavia, was widely viewed as precluding 
the possibility of German military involving in the Balkans. However, the emergence of 
genocide in Bosnia helped change that stance and increasingly pitted the party’s 
pragmatist wing against that of the traditionalists.   
 By May 1995, party speaker Krista Sager admitted that a new perspective on 
foreign deployment was needed although the country’s history precluded German 
participation in a Yugoslavia mission. Other pragmatists or ‘realos’ included Hubert 
Kleinert and Joschka Fischer also began to question the logic of opposing combat 
missions in the face of genocide. The tragedy of Srebrenica became crucial in this 
regard.321 It exposed the dangers of pacifism and underscored the necessity to contribute 
militarily to international institutions to strengthen the commitment to prevent genocide. 
Fischer argued that “reality has changed since 1989. With the end of the Cold War, 
genocide has again become a reality in international politics”.322 This required that “even 
as pacifists [the Greens] will have to redefine themselves in a violent world.323 In the 
summer of 1995, Fischer wrote an open letter to his party calling for the military 
protection of the UN safe areas, arguing that “the left was in danger of losing its moral 
                                                
321 Admitting that he used to be opposed to interventions, voting against German participation in rapid 
reaction forces, Fischer went on to say that “the mass murder of Srebrenica was a turning point which 
compelled him to give his previous position and that e prevention of genocide requires military 
intervention” (Interview with Nicola Brüning and Olaf Opitz, “Bei Völkermord eingreifen”, Focus, 
November 27, 1995, 40). 
 
322 Genocide was not a phenomenon that first appeared aft r the Cold War. Nevertheless, it was Fischer’s 
perception that it had ‘reemerged’ and as such, the perception was important in influencing his decision to 
support the use of force to stop such processes (Interview with Nicola Brüning and Olaf Opitz, “Bei 
Völkermord eingreifen”, Focus, November 27, 1995, 40).   
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soul if it allowed the Balkan fascism its way”.324 The letter indicates the concern with 
moral consistency and represented a major shift in position on the use of force even 
though it did not explicitly advocate the deployment of German forces at that time. 
Another major concern for Fischer, shared by other prominent left-leaning intellectua s 
including Jürgen Habermas was “the inconsistency of sending only the soldiers of other 
nations to Bosnia [which] cannot be justified”.325 Accepting external expectations of role-
specific responsibilities for Germany, Fischer stated that “a country as large [in 
capabilities] as Germany has to make its contributions within UN parameters” (Focus, 
November 27, 1995, 40-42). Thus, crucial factors explaining the change in the pragmatist 
position were the acceptance of the view that the security environment had changed and 
that Germany had an obligation to militarily contribute to the resolution of international 
conflicts just as other countries were prepared to. However, the moral position was not 
the only consideration. 
 A major concern for Green Party Chairman Joschka Fischer, who at that time 
enjoyed the status of a political celebrity, was the attempt to shift party rinciples in order 
to position the party for future electoral gains and a coalition with the social democrats.326 
Garnering 7.3 percent of the vote, the Green Party had regained full parliamentary 
representation after the 1994 Bundestag elections. At the time that he wrote his open 
letter to the party promoting the use of force against genocide, Fischer was advised by a 
                                                
324 “Gefeiert oder gefoltert”, Der Spiegel, August 7, 1995, 32-33a. 
 
325 “Ein Abgrund von Trauer”, Der Spiegel, August 21, 1995, 34a-35a. 
 
326 During an interview with Der Spiegel, the interviewers hint at Fischer’s desire at programmatic 
reorientation to prepare the Greens for their firstgovernmental role. Fischer rejects that claim but admits 
that the issue would have to be resolved to allow for a potential Red-Green coalition in 1998 (“Das wäre 
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group of professors close to his party who recommended that the party abandon the 
radical pacifism to avoid being politically sidelined.327  
 Fischer’s concern with electoral viability clashed with the desire of many party 
members to maintain the party’s traditional stance on the categorical rejection of war and 
intervention.  Influential party members opposed to Fischer’s intended course chang 
used the popularity of the traditional stance on the use of force to shore up support within 
the party. Spokesperson Jürgen Trittin and Kerstin Müller, the party’s spokesperson of 
the parliamentary faction, coauthored a counterproposal to Fischer’s open letter in which 
they wrote that “saying yes to combat missions is not a passport to Regierungsfähigkeit 
but a declaration of bankruptcy for a pacifist party”.328 Rejecting intervention, Trittin 
warned Fischer and 98 other prominent Green politicians that German participation n 
international combat missions entailed an about-face of the party’s foreign and security 
program (Focus, November 27, 1995, 40-45). Invoking the traditional stance on the 
rejection of force, Trittin and Müller were able to regain leadership over party members 
who, just having been swayed by Fischer’s arguments, were reconsidering th ir position 
after new SPD leader Oskar Lafontaine, a declared opponent of the use of force had 
publicly rejected alliance solidarity as an argument for the use of force (Ibid.). They 
would prevail in the short run when the party voted to oppose both the deployment of 
Tornado jets in July and the deployment of Bundeswehr troops as part of IFOR 
operations in early December 1995.  But within the party, support for radical pacifism 
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(accessed April 2, 2009). 
 
 248
was eroding with a few party members already breaking discipline during the December 
vote. Views of the efficacy of force in international relations were being shifted and 
would prepare the Green Party for the embrace of a full UN and NATO mission spectrum 
during the years that followed. 
 Observers of German politics remarked in 1995 that in both the Alliance 
90/Greens and the Social Democratic parties, the desire to achieve party unity appeared 
to be a more important concern than the plight of Bosnia itself.329 The concern with 
public credibility trumped other issues and this required a common understanding upon 
which a new elite consensus could be socially constructed. In this process, the shared 
normative understandings of the post-Cold War security environment and the subsequent 
role expectations of Germany were crucial components as was the desire to continue to 
adhere to established values of reliability and calculability understood here as solidarity 
with other allies. Maintaining the country’s role required a shift in behavior in line with 
the new expectations. The norms provided a logical and socially attractive point of 
convergence of actor interests. Not supporting the Dayton peace through the use of forc  
was, in Kinkel’s words directed at potential dissenters within the ranks of all parties, to 
“act immorally” since France alone had already suffered 50 casualties nd about 300 
wounded.330 Defense Minister Rühe and Finance Minister Waigel argued similarly when
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they claimed that “those who do not help even though they could, act immorally and are 
guilty just the same”.331  
 For the opposition parties SPD and the Alliance 90/Greens, party unity was 
integrally linked to the pursuit of Regierungsfähigkeit. The relatively low levels of 
support for the SPD during the early 1990s necessitated the search for a viable coalition 
partner. The prospects for a coalition between SPD and the Alliance 90/Greens incr a ed 
as both parties reluctantly moved towards normalization on the use of force. External 
expectations of German role behavior thus established a logical point of convergence for 
cooperation between the two parties.  
 
Strategic Culture: Reticence and Antimilitarism 
 
 A series of RAND studies conducted between 1990 and 1994 show increased 
levels of public support for expanding NATO’s role after the Cold War to address the 
new security challenges (Asmus 1994, 34, Figure 6). In addition, large parts of the public, 
like the political elites, clearly accepted the normative expectation of an increased role of 
Germany in contributing to international peace and stability after reunification. From 
1990 to 1992, there were even some indicators to suggest that Germans were ready to 
embrace a more active role for their country with over half of the respondents supporting 
a more active international role (Figure 7). However, and perhaps due to the internat onal 
reaction to the assertive stance over the recognition of Croatia in 1992, there is a return to 
the traditional reticence of the culture in 1993.332   
                                                
331 Waigel, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6654. 
 
332 The declining support for UN missions in Bosnia throughout 1992 and 1993 indicated by other 
questions of the RAND survey indicates that even thoug  the violence in Bosnia ranked high on the list of 
 
Figure 6: Attitudes Toward Military Intervention
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 At the same time, the RAND findings confirmed the main elements of the 
country’s antimilitant culture and the persistence of political and psychological barriers to 
combat missions outside of Germany
perceived the country’s increased responsibilities after the Cold War on the basis of the 
traditional civilian power conception of the country’s role by favoring humanitarian 
responses and other types of non
Figure 8: Attitudes toward different Mission Types
 
Source: Asmus/RAND 1995, 42
 
 
                                                                            
concerns, it did not have the effect of prompting the general public to abandon its negative views on the
efficacy of force.  
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 Figure 7: Active versus Reserved Role
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Intervention for the sake of addressing human rights violations such as the ones 
witnessed on a massive scale in the former Yugoslavia was still rejected by a significant 
number of German citizens (Figure 6).  




Source: Asmus/RAND 1995, 43. 
 
 The findings supporting the predominance of the main elements of the traditional 
civilian power were confirmed by surveys about how the public prioritized foreign policy 
concerns. Here, ‘soft’ concerns including proliferation, the global environment and arms 
control dominated the goals of protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression and 
defending our allies’ security by a wide margin (Figure 10). Only about one out of five 
Germans (eighteen percent) considered the defense of allies a very important foreig  
policy goal which compared to nearly six out of ten Americans who were asked the same 
question (Asmus/Rand 1994, 64, Figure 10).  
 Overall, public opinion did not support the increased military engagement of the 
Bundeswehr. Increasing levels of violence in Bosnia and the massive human rights 
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violations were not widely understood to validate the efficacy of the use of force in 
international conflict resolution processes. If anything, increasing bloodshed, et nic 
cleansing and the repeated failure of international institutions to bring end to the c nflict 
seemed to cause more of a disillusionment with the use of force and with the utili y of 
multilateral peacekeeping interventions in general. In that regard, public opinion differed 
greatly from that of the elites.  
 As has been shown through the chronicling of pacifist positions on the part of the 
left, elites were concerned about the violence in Bosnia. They understood this violence in 
terms of the efficacy of the United Nations and they seemed to draw different conclusi s 
from the failures of UN missions in Bosnia and Somalia. While the public grew 
increasingly disenchanted with the ability of the UN to contribute to a lasting peace, 
elites seemed to grow more concerned with the need to support the UN which they began 
to perceive to be a function of Germany’s military contributions. In 1993, for instance,  
editorial in the Hamburg weekly Die Woche, read “I must…plead for an intervention in 
Bosnia. Pacifism per se can no longer exist…this would be a wonderful change of roles if 
we could do something to help the cause of peace”.333 Of course, the concern with United 
Nations effectiveness was a natural outgrowth of the value system of elites sinc  World 
War II which had mostly been characterized by an unusually strong commitment to 
multilateralism. The possibility of international institutions and multilateralism failing 





                                                
333 Lea Rosh, Die Woche (Hamburg), February 18, 1993, 2. 
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Conclusion: Explaining Compliance 
 
 During the three and a half year long civil war in Bosnia, German parliament ry 
elites were repeatedly forced to confront the country’s role obligations.  The increase in 
global trouble spots after the Cold War and the consistent expansion of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations transformed the generally acknowledged responsibilities of 
important system actors. The seemingly intractable situation in Bosnia greatly influenced 
the shared conceptions of a new security environment as well as the evolution of the role 
of the international institutions themselves. As UN and NATO involvement in Bosnia 
grew, Germany was repeatedly asked to contribute to the missions.   
 Initially, international and state actors showed a certain level of respect for the 
anti-militarist outlines of Germany’s unique strategic culture. International expectations 
of German military contributions increased as institutional adaptation to the new security 
environment culminated in the solidification of new strategies, mission types, force 
structures and subsequently, the articulation of new responsibilities of the member states. 
These responsibilities were based in part on internal role conceptions as well aexternal 
expectations. Germany, as great power was perceived to carry substantial responsibility 
for the maintenance of peace and stability. This responsibility was widely acknowledged 
among parliamentary elites as was the change in the security environment after the Cold 
War. Leaders of the SPD and the Green Party shared in the widespread acknowledgment 
of the changes in the security environment and the need for a reorientation of German 
foreign policy.334 Parliamentary elites from a wide political spectrum also accepted the 
                                                
334 Fischer saw genocide, ethnic war and fascism as reemerging phenomena after the Cold War, forcing him 
to reluctantly accept the use of force as last resort. See, for instance, his interview with Olaf Ihlau nd Paul 
Lersch, “Das ware blutiger Zynismus”, Der Spiegel, August 21, 1995, 27a.  
 254
need for greater German contributions after the reunification. Indicating the importance 
of these external expectations, Chancellor Kohl repeatedly supported security policy 
reorientation to meet the “expectations of the community of nations of a reunited 
Germany”335 and Defense Minister Rühe stated that “we don’t have the right to deny 
solidarity”.336 The July 1994 ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court which allowed for 
German participation in multilateral combat missions was also based on considerations of 
alliance solidarity.   
 While the concept of German responsibility enjoyed wide consensus among 
elites, disagreement existed over the nature of this responsibility with cabinet elites 
pursuing a normalization course and opposition elites holding on to the non-military 
civilian power conception. In the persuasion process between elites, foreign rol 
expectations played a crucial function. As standard of appropriate behavior, they 
legitimized the efforts of those individuals that sought the reorientation of security policy 
to include the use of force. Conversely, external expectations undermined attempts by 
opposition parties to maintain traditional role conceptions based on the civilizing 
influence of Germany as a unique state that had learned from history. Elite conceptions of 
their country’s role were also influenced by their view of the efficacy of force. 
 The extraordinary levels of violence in the Bosnian conflict undermined elite faith 
in international law and led to the growing acceptance of the use of force to stop 
determined adversaries. The deterrence value of the use of force was particularly 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
335 In German: “Die Erwartungen der Völkergemeinschaft an das wiedervereinte Deutschland…unseren 
Beitrag für die Sicherung des Friedens in Europe [zu] leisten” (Kohl, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6632). 
 
336 Der Spiegel 24/1995, 148-149a. 
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emphasized by conservatives including former President Richard von Weizsäcker and 
chairman of the CDU/CSU faction in parliament Wolfgang Schäuble.337 Conservative 
and liberal promoters of role adjustment also displayed a growing appreciation of he 
value of power and influence. These elements had long been taboo in the German 
political discourse after World War II.338 Role promoters linked influence to status and 
reputation. Although unwilling to contribute militarily, Germany had become a member 
of the Contact Group through its six month presidency of the European Council which 
fell in the time that the contact group was formed. After its presidency, it simply held on 
to its membership in the group, supported by the United States which probably saw it as  
counterweight to British and French interests which tended to favor Serbia. German elites 
enjoyed the equality in diplomatic status provided by its membership in the Contact 
Group and it allowed the country to participate in the discussion of central security 
questions in Europe.339 Germany’s need to participate militarily in Bosnia can be seen as 
logical outgrowth of the country’s membership in the group which conferred a social
                                                
337 Schäuble summed up his position with the words: “those not prepared to fight, will not preserve the 
peace”. In German: “Man darf nicht nur auf den guten Willen bauen. Die Menschen sind leider nicht so. 
[...] Wer nicht bereit ist, zu kämpfen, wird den Frieden nicht sichern”. Further explaining the logic of 
deterrence, Schäuble said that “this is about convincing anyone that the use of military violence will not 
pay off”. In German: “Es geht darum, jeden davon zu überzeugen, daβ sich der Einsatz militarischer 
Gewalt für ihn selbst nicht lohnen wird” (Schäuble, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6639). 
 
338 For instance, referring to the ability of the United States to broker the peace of Dayton, Foreign Minister 
Kinkel stated appreciatively “without doubt, it was the political and military engagement and power 
(Gewicht) of the United States that made the difference in achieving the current peace settlement” (Kinkel 
1995, PB 13/76, December 6, 1995, 6426). 
 
339 The journal Der Spiegel alludes to military involvement being the result of he government’s desire to 
not loose the ability to partake equally in decision  regarding European security within the Contact Group 




status which elites did not want to surrender.340 Focusing on reputation and invoking role 
terminology, Chancellor Kohl considered, in the Bundeswehr White Paper of 1994 that 
“the reliability and predictability of German defence and alliance policy are a major 
prerequisite for our ability to act on the international stage”.341  The desire for greater 
status also explains the growing support among elites for the campaign to acquire  
permanent seat in the UN Security Council which Chancellor Kohl had initially 
dismissed as unnecessary in early 1992.342 Increasingly, the achievement of the seat as a 
symbol of equal status and the ability to influence important decisions was een as a 
logical function of being able to participate in the organization’s full mission pectrum.343  
Unlike the European Union, which Germany had been able to shape through reflexive 
multilateralism, full equality within the UN Security Council could not be achieved 
without military contributions to peacekeeping missions.344 
Very important in explaining the policy shift towards the use of force was the 
change on the left which occurred after the human rights violations in Srebrenica when 
prominent politicians and intellectuals reluctantly endorsed the use of force. The 
                                                
340 Der Spiegel quotes a gloating British NATO diplomat: “Foreign policy in Europe is written by those 
who have the desire and the capability to act, Germany remains excluded from that game (“Dabeisein ist 
Alles”, Der Spiegel, June 26, 1995, 22-23a). 
 
341 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bundeswehr White Paper 1994, 
http://www.resdal.org.ar/Archivo/d0000066.htm (accessed January 10, 2009). 
 
342 John Tagliabue, “Kohl Seeks to Fend Off Criticism Of His Assertive German Politics”, NYT, January 
11, 1992. 
 
343 Der Spiegel quotes an unnamed member of the foreign ministry as insisting that “Germany has to make 
a significant contribution unless it wants to bury all hope of getting a permanent seat in the UNSC” 
(“Länger verheddern”, Der Spiegel, October 2, 1995, 36b-37a). 
 
344 The argument of reflexive multilateralism is based on the assumption that German federal and European 
institutions are very similar. The congruence of institutions explains the congruence of interests which, in 
turn, allows German foreign policy to be subtle, multilateral and consensus-oriented (See, for instance, 
Bulmer 1997).  
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genocide shook elite perceptions about the efficacy of international law and UN actions 
such as the establishment of safe havens. Politicians on the left reacted to the challenge to 
the capabilities of international institutions to guarantee human rights by embracing the 
more active German role. Individuals like Fischer saw German contributions to 
peacekeeping as necessary to protect human rights and to strengthen and extending the 
scope of global governance.345 In that way, the embrace of the use of force served to 
support the failing efforts of multilateral institutions which Germans had elped construct 
before and after the end of the Cold War. The moral argument for the use of force to 
protect human rights also weighed heavily in a culture still resonating with the impact of 
the Holocaust and the generational guilt generated by the failure of most Germans to 
resist the Nazi regime.  
 The Bosnian role episode thus supports important elements of the proposed model 
of foreign policy reorientation. Internal debates played out among elites within the 
context of continuous social pressure about contributing in line with the perceived 
increase in Germany’s capabilities after reunification. The case shows t at elites shared 
the understanding of increased German responsibility for global peace and stability as 
well as the need for a reorientation and engaged in a debate about the nature of 
appropriate behavior for the country’s new role. The debate was decided in favor of the 
group that managed to present its policy recommendations as closely matching the 
international expectations of the appropriate behavior of a great power supporting the 
system. Elites opposed to reorientation attempted to present an alternative ole model 
                                                
345 For instance, Kinkel declared in parliament that “The end of the East-West Conflict had freed the United 
Nations from decade-long paralysis. For the first tme, an opportunity presents itself to turn this 
organization…into the central guarantor of peace of humanity” (PB 12/151, April 21, 1993). 
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based on the traditional civil power conception in which responsibility within the new 
security environment was understood as resisting the power-political re-socialization of 
Germany’s foreign policy.346 The advocates of the traditional stance rejected the use of 
force as part of the civilian role perception and proposed that Germany play a special role 
in which the country’s capabilities were deployed in civilizing and humanitarian capacity. 
As such, responsibility was understood as rejecting the influence of the country’s natural 
capabilities that predisposed it to play the role of a normalized great power. This position 
was untenable because it clashed with the requirements imposed by the new security 
environment and the role-specific expectations this generated. As civilizing power, 
Germany would have played a special role that was not affirmed by the external 
environment which was pushing for Germany to embrace the use of force. The country’s 
foreign policy would no longer be reliable, predictable or calculable and this proposition 
was clearly unacceptable to a majority of parliamentary elites. In the words of Foreign 
Minister Kinkel: “[The only lesson from history can be]: Never again to leave the 
community of Western nations, never again special paths (Sonderwege), not even out of a 
sense of moral superiority…347 
Germany’s traditional role conception that eschewed the pursuit of openly 
nationalist interests, also inhibited the resolution of major domestic issues foremost of 
which was that of asylum reform. Throughout the 1990s, pressure was building on SPD 
politicians who had generally supported liberal asylum policies, to agree to masures that 
                                                
346 This a phrase used in title of an article written by Hellmann who proposed that Germany pursue the 
alternative course of ‘offensive idealism’ (Hellmann 2004). 
 
347 Kinkel 1995, Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 916, as quoted in Bach (1999, 142). 
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would reduce the massive influx of asylum-seekers. Role normalization allowed fr the 
changes in the asylum law to be pursued within the framework of appropriate behavior as 
conceptualized under the role of a great power. A normalized great power had the right to 
pursue its national interests, even at the cost of its neighbors or the detrimental evolution 
of global standards. Politicians in the United Kingdom, France or the United States
certainly reserved for themselves the right to shape asylum policy in a wayconducive to 
their own national interests.  
Social Democrats had for years struggled with the right concept providing for 
their return to power. Party leaders had effectively played on antimilitarist endencies of 
the public to win regional elections but throughout the early 1990s, public support was 
declining, particularly as the SPD appeared increasingly out of touch with the new 
foreign policy agenda. The party platform was anachronistic and inconsistent. It 
emphasized a desire to partake in reshaping the world as indicated by the support of the 
quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council yet tied greater participation to 
reservations about the use of force. Social Democrats appeared as unreliable and unfit to 
rule. Diametrically opposed positions on the use of force within the party held by 
moderates and traditionalists undermined party unity. The concept of role normalization 
promised the reestablishment of party unity as a first step towards a consistent and viable 
party platform enjoying widespread electoral support. Moreover, the reorientation of 
party principles produced a principled basis on which Social Democrats and Alliance 
90/Greens could be welded together in a Red-Green coalition. Within the Alliance 
90/Greens, similar problems of discord were addressed by pragmatic leaders like Fischer 
who steadily gained influence given the party’s desire for power and its increasing 
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attractiveness to the ailing Social Democratic Party. The parties’ slow move to 
accommodate the normative context created by external expectations allowed for the 
fusion of interests between domestic actors.  It also explains why the Red-Gre n 
coalition, when it eventually did take power in 1998, did not miss a beat but would 
commit German fighter jets to the first military combat since World WarII during the 
Kosovo Crisis in 1999. Thus, the normative canvas established by role expectations 
converged with important interest of the principal actors on the domestic level to allow 
for the reorientation of foreign policy.  
All that remained was to convince the general public of the necessity to embrace 
the use of force and accept the possibility of casualties in faraway lands for reas ns not 
directly related to territorial security. The German public remained stubbornly 
antimilitaristic throughout the entire period of reorientation. Parliamentary elites appealed 
to alliance solidarity. They consistently invoked the argument of greater responsibility 
and the need to support human rights which found resonance within the public. They also 
conjured up the specter of political isolation. However, they were ultimately unsuccessful 
in persuading the public and antimilitarism would remain as powerful constraint on elite 
actions to the present day. Germany had started to contribute to combat missions but 
contentious public and parliamentary debates accompanying each deployment sinc  



















 This dissertation asked the question of what caused Germany to reorient its 
security policy by embracing the use of force during the mid-1990s. Foreign policy
reorientation was defined as a noticeable departure from a state’s centralpolicy stance. In 
the case of German security policy, this central stance was the rejection of he use of 
force for non-defensive missions outside of German territory. Explaining changes i  the 
policy stance on the use of force was particularly significant in Germany because of 
constraints on elite action imposed by strong antimilitarism in strategic culture which 
predisposed elites and public to oppose reorientation. Strategic culture also should have 
rendered the actions of role promoters seeking a change in the stance of the use of force 
as inappropriate social behavior while empowering individuals, groups and institutions 
standing for the preservation of the traditional policy orientation. The investigation of the 
puzzle of German security policy reorientation offers insights on three central questions 
in foreign policy analysis: The question of whether internal or external variables explain 
state foreign policy, the utility of the concept of strategic culture and the egree of elite 
autonomy in the realm of foreign policy-making. This final chapter will provide a brief
restatement of the theory, followed by the presentation of the findings of the dissertation. 
Contributions to knowledge in the fields of international relations and foreign policy 
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analysis are addressed next with particular attention devoted to the central questions 
above. I close by making suggestions for further research. 
 
Restating the Theory 
 
 This dissertation employed cultural variables to explain security policy 
reorientation in Germany during the mid-1990s. The relevance of social and ideational 
variables had been suggested both by the social terminology appearing in the elte 
discourse as well as the many claims of scholars and foreign observers that Germ ny 
changed course as a result of outside pressure and demands. The focus on ideational 
variables and processes of socialization enabled the study to contribute to the ongoing
constructivist debate on the significance of norms, values and identity in determining the 
foreign policy behavior of states. An important secondary objective was to gain aclearer 
understanding of social processes of persuasion occurring between leadersof states and 
international organizations on one hand and among parliamentary elites within domestic 
politics on the other. The central cultural concept used to investigate the process of 
German security policy reorientation was that of a social role applied to states within 
international society.  
 The international environment constitutes a cultural environment characterized by 
shared security understandings, norms and behavioral expectations of important member
states. The social environment under investigation was that of the early post-Cold War 
era with specific focus on shared understandings of new security threats and necessary 
responses by international organizations. Within the environment, the concept of role 
encapsulates the understanding of a member’s status and behavioral obligations. State 
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roles within the social environment guide the policy preferences of political elites by 
providing conceptual maps for decision-making. These ‘cognitive maps’ of appropriate 
state conduct held by decision-makers are called role conceptions.  
 As normative standards in the early post-Cold War environment changed and 
member obligations became more concrete, Germany was perceived to have special 
responsibilities for the maintenance of global peace and stability because it po sessed the 
wherewithal of a great power. Within the context of an altered threat and respons 
perception after the Cold War, these responsibilities could only be met through the abili y 
to deploy the Bundeswehr in combat missions outside of the country’s territory. Since 
Germany’s traditional role conception of a civilian power had specifically ruled out such 
behavior as inappropriate, socialization took place to adjust role behavior. Socialization 
of the Federal Republic to contribute forces to multilateral peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement missions occurred through role adjustment processes during which domestic 
actors reacted to external pressure by promoting the role suggested by international 
society.    
 Role adaptation occurs through role episodes which are message-sending 
processes during which role senders convey community expectations of behavior to a 
focal actor. This role pressure is designed to make an actor adapt role behavior in line 
with expectations as based on socially appropriate standards of behavior. By cmpl ing, 
an actor not only validates the norm generating the expectation but adds to its strength 
and diffusion throughout the environment. Alternatively, non-compliance may involve 
challenges to role senders and system norms and force the adjustment of expectations and 
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norms, respectively. Thus, the responses of focal actors also have effects on role senders 
and the normative context that generated their behavioral expectations.   
 Within the domestic environment of the state actor, groups and individuals may 
promote the role expectations from the international environment through a range of 
strategies designed to persuade others. The primary means of persuasion investigated in 
this dissertation was social persuasion through effective argumentation and speech acts in 
the social environment created between Germany’s parliamentary elites. W hin this 
environment, conservative elites acted as role entrepreneurs by persuading polit cians 
from opposition parties that the maintenance of the role conception as reliable ally and 
supporter of Western values necessitated a reorientation of behavior towards the 
acceptance of the use of force in missions beyond German territory. Shared elem nts of 
the elite role conceptions and generally accepted threat perceptions allowed role 
entrepreneurs to successfully present their case for reorientation. Role entrepreneurs also 
used the two important organizational platforms under their control–the government and 
the Bundeswehr–to promote and lock-in desired changes by incrementally committing 
Germany to the desired behavioral parameters. These high-profile commitments made 
maintenance of the traditional stance rejecting foreign involvement more difficult as 
foreign involvement began to assume the mantle of normalcy. Growing Bu deswehr 
capabilities and experience also served to undermine the opposition’s argument that 
Germany’s armed forces were both unprepared and unsuitable for the military tasks 
expected of them. Moreover, by consenting to humanitarian missions, the opposition 
found itself in a social trap from which it ultimately could not extricate its lf without 
significant reputational losses to parties and the country within international society. 
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External expectations and internal persuasion processes unfolded differently in ach one 
of the considered role episodes. 
 
Findings: Role Episodes from 1990 to 1995 
 
The Persian Gulf War 
 
 The Persian Gulf War role episode between the fall of 1990 and spring 1991 is 
considered the first major crisis of the post-Cold War era. Iraq’s invasion and annexation 
of Kuwait prompted a military response led by the United States and thirty-one other 
states many of which sent combat units that saw action in the conflict. In insisting on the 
territorial integrity of Kuwait, the international community chose to uphold norms of 
sovereignty with human rights coming in as secondary consideration when allegations of 
massive violations became known. The United States and the UN formally and 
informally requested military assistance from Germany. The German government turned 
down the request and supported coalition efforts through ‘checkbook’ diplomacy. 
Germany also honored Turkey’s request for military support when that country invoked 
the solidarity provisions of the NATO treaty but only after considerable and co tentious 
domestic debate. Parliamentary elites reacted to the international crisis in ways consistent 
with the behavior of a civilian power. They turned down requests for military assistance 
and supported mediation efforts through the United Nations. They also supported 
sanctions against Iraq to force compliance with UN resolution 660 and were willing to 
dispatch naval units to the Mediterranean to relieve coalition forces naval units once 
hostilities ceased. Thus, Germany reacted to international expectations of militarily 
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contributing to the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty by partially complying. How do 
role conceptions and elite concerns explain this foreign policy action? 
 The Persian Gulf War occurred at a time of extraordinary political transitions. 
Global perceptions of new security threats and necessary responses were only just 
beginning to develop into a firm social system of state roles and behavioral expectations. 
This created ambiguity about the appropriate course of action to address the invasion of 
Kuwait. Strategic interests in the Gulf region were important reasons for the United 
States, France and the United Kingdom to act decisively. Having the role concepti  of a 
civilian power, Germany’s elites were unaccustomed to the idea of national or strategic 
interests and the open articulation of such concerns was considered inappropriate. 
Indirect strategic interest existed in the form of concerns with guaranteeing oil supplies 
and maintaining international law but these did not significantly affect elite discourse. 
Opposition elites also suspected that the national interests of major powers rath  th n a 
concern for international security constituted the core of the motives for the liberation of 
Kuwait. The absence of direct interests in the region and strong antimilitarism in strategic 
culture imposed strong restraints on elite actions.  
Conservative elites pursued role normalization at this early time. They wer  
willing to act as role entrepreneurs by honoring external expectations but quickly realized 
the futility of their actions given the absence of elite and public support for role 
adaptation. Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Greens had been able to successfully 
exploit antimilitarism during the January 1991 elections in Hessen. The lost election sent 
a clear message of the potential electoral costs of behavioral adaptation a  that time. Role 
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adaptation also threatened consensus within the coalition which could best be preserved 
through the traditional role behavior.  
 Maintaining the civilian role also served the paramount foreign policy objective 
of negotiating the Two-Plus-Four Agreement leading to full sovereignty. Concerns about 
renewed German power and strategic interests existed in many European cait ls. The 
Gulf War also created stresses for US-Soviet relations as Moscow was asked to abandon 
a traditional ally in the region. Acting out the civilian power role that the country had 
played throughout the Cold War era solved a number of problems for parliamentary 
elites. Elites were able to ease fears about the increasing power of thei country after 
reunification by reaffirming the traditional antimilitarism. The renunciation of weapons 
of mass destruction, reductions in troop size, and the intensified commitment to 
multilateral institutions all fall within the behavioral pattern of the civilian power. 
Maintaining the traditional role also allowed Germany to act as mediator between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.   
 In sum, partial compliance as based on pure civilian power role behavior 
represented a logical point of interest convergence between elites. It also en bled elites to 
successfully achieve the most important national objective since World War II–that of 
achieving reunification and full sovereignty–during a major international crisis w th the 
potential for profound diplomatic disagreements between the quadripartite owers. 
German elites catered to the expectations of important state actors in luding the United 
Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union that were concerned that sovereignty would 
increase German power and unilateral behavior while partially rejecting demands of the 
United States and the United Nations. The rejection is considered partial because German 
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contributions to alliance efforts were not insignificant and indicate that elites were 
susceptible to external pressure.  
Figure 11: Persian Gulf War Role Episode: Expectations, Elite Interests and Role Performance  
 
 The Persian Gulf War represents the beginning of the process of role adaptation 
through external socialization. Germany’s mixture of haphazard and belated foreign 
policy responses to the crisis and the internal debates indicated a high level of ind cision 
and ambiguity among parliamentary elites about the role that Germany was expected to 
play after the Cold War. The traditional role was one of a reliable and calculable ally. The 
intense criticism the country faced over the rejection of the use of force indiate  that this 
role in international society could not be maintained through behavior based on a pure 
civilian power conception. Germany had followed the old script in a new play. Foreign 
demands and criticism initiated the search for the appropriate script given altered security 
circumstances.  
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Unilateralism in Yugoslavia 
 
 This role episode took place between the fall 1991 and the spring of 1992. It 
represents an example of an actor’s maladaptive response generated primarily by internal 
factors. International structures including standards and institutions were as yet 
underdetermined within a transitioning social environment. The establishment of a 
consensus on humanitarian intervention was hampered by the general adherence to the 
principle of state sovereignty which had served to protect the uneasy peace between the 
superpowers during the Cold War. But sovereignty norms were being challenged by th  
new realities marked by the internal insecurities arising from the rapid disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The underdeveloped nature of the international 
consensus on state recognition produced mixed external messages which allowed for 
domestic factors and micro-level interests to drive German foreign policy during this 
episode. Public opinion indicated a profound concern with the horrors of the escalating 
civil war together with the demand for some kind of governmental action. Influential 
media in print and television heightened the saliency of the issue and quickly began to 
suggest recognition as solution. Croatian nationalism, the advanced degree of political
organization that characterized the Croat immigrant community in Germany and religious 
affinities of that group with the Bavarian CSU may also have been contributing factors.   
 Pressed by public sentiment, elites seized the opportunity for electoral gains as 
they dropped their initial reservations about recognition and began to bandwagon on the 
pro-recognition train. Politicians from the Alliance 90/Green Party were crucial in setting 
both course and tone on recognition. At the time, the parliamentary faction was run by 
activists from the former East Germany, who had transformed the authoritarian system of 
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their country through a successful campaign centered on civil rights issues. These 
politicians brought with them a profound distaste for totalitarian systems and a principled 
emphasis on human rights standards. The West German Greens were reeling from their 
worst electoral showing in the party’s short history with moderate leaders lik  Joschka 
Fischer decisively moving the platform towards the center. Among the changes was a 
renewed focus on core issues which included the support for peaceful self-determination 
and civil rights. Not to be outdone by the smaller party, most conservative and social 
democratic elites quickly followed pace.   
 Backed by broad electoral and parliamentary support, cabinet elites aggressively 
constructed a European coalition in favor of self-determination even though the 
experienced Foreign Minister Genscher should have understood the dangers of setting a 
diplomatic precedent for states struggling with ethnic diversity including Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The unilateral policy stance also undercut the effectiveness of ongoing 
negotiations in Croatia. Without recognition as incentive, negotiators like Lord 
Carrington or special UN envoy Cyrus Vance had little in the form of diplomatic leverage 
to force Croatia to protect the minority rights of its Serb citizens which insiders suggest 
was a major reason for the escalation of interethnic hostilities in Croatia and other parts 












Figure 12: Role Expectations, Perceptions and Performance during the Recognition Role Episode 
 
 Germany’s aggressive foreign policy stance leading to the unilateral recognition 
was met by widespread criticism from abroad. International criticism was particularly 
effective because it frequently involved the accusation that Germany was redeveloping its 
great power role by reasserting its historical sphere of interest in the Balkans. Germany’s 
policy singularity had exposed it to the threat of social isolation from its reference group 
of Western democracies. German elites were faced with the prospect of having their 
country play a special role that was not affirmed by international society. The prospect of 
isolation was unacceptable to policy-makers who drew the important lesson that their 
country would have to develop a different type of role in order to be accepted–a role that 
would have to be in compliance with international expectations. Nevertheless, in 
challenging Yugoslav sovereignty and supporting norms of self-determination, Germany 
may actually have contributed towards the establishment of growing consensus 
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supporting norms of humanitarian intervention within European security organizations 
after the Cold War. Soon, international support for the norm of sovereignty and non-
interference would be challenged by the fast-paced dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Attempts to keep Yugoslavia together appeared increasingly out of sync not just with the 
escalating levels of violence but the normative structure of the Cold War which had 
emphasized the inviolability of borders and state sovereignty in Europe. Since the 
recognition episode also taught German elites a lesson on the limits of non-military 
diplomacy towards determined and ‘uncivilized’ adversaries, the episode may be 
regarded as an important milestone in Germany’s eventual adoption of the use of forc  
over Bosnia. Overall, German elites grabbed the mantle of a greater role for th  country 
without knowing how to act or understand that their country lacked the institutional 
capacity to act out the role. The result was a rather awkward performance. 
 
The Bosnian Civil War 
 
 The Civil War in Bosnia between the summer 1992 and November 1995 
represented the final episode in Germany’s role adaptation process. In what really 
constituted a series of smaller episodes, parliamentary elites were pressured repeatedly to 
contribute militarily as the conflict produced challenge after challenge for international 
organizations after the Cold War. During this episode, security organizations including 
NATO, the UN, the EU and the WEU moved decisively towards rapid reaction doctrines 
and force structures designed to address instability as part of a general recognition that 
the international security environment had become more volatile, unpredictable and that 
threats increasingly emanated from processes internal to states. Events in Bosnia 
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profoundly influenced the development of organizational threat perceptions, doctrines 
and capabilities. German elites were intricately involved in this process of in titutional 
adaptation which increased the pressure on Germany to change its civilian power role to 
contribute equally to the missions by embracing the use of force. The solidificat on of 
security norms increased the social impact of foreign expectations, especially since 
German elites had contributed to the formulation of the norms through their participation 
in international security organizations. Elites had a major interest in maintaining nd 
extending the capabilities of the organizations they had helped develop. In addition, they 
developed a liking for the increase in international status that joint responsibility in 
diplomacy including participation in the Contact Group and IFOR bestowed upon their 
country. But elite interest was not just motivated by instrumental logic. Actors who 
participate in the formulation of group standards risk their reputation within the group if 
they do not comply with those standards of behavior. Even if their interests should 
change, they are caught in a social trap of obligations which makes defection lss likely. 
German elites found themselves in exactly such a position when the United Nations and 
NATO began facing determined resistance by domestic actors who committed blatant 















Figure 13: Role Expectations, Perceptions and Performance during the Bosnian Civil War  
 
 At the micro-level, parliamentary elites struggled with Regierungsfähigkeit or 
electoral viability during the federal elections of 1994 and regional elections before and 
after. Conservative parliamentary elites of the CDU/CSU had pursued the country’s role 
normalization since 1990. But this course did not enjoy a parliamentary consensus and 
produced repeated friction within the CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition. Under the 
constant pressure generated by external role expectations, the old role of the civilian 
power with its restrictive views on the use of force began to be perceived as inappropri te 
political position; particularly, since most party leaders shared the threat perceptions and 
were concerned about the effectiveness of international security organizations. The 
position that Germany would be an equal partner in global peace and stability by 
avoiding contributions to combat missions became unsustainable. Thus, throughout 1994 
and 1995, leaders from the SPD and the Alliance90/Greens began to reluctantly embrace 
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the use of force. As they increasingly began to accept the argument that a gre power 
like Germany could not exclude itself from participating militarily without being 
irresponsible, they moved closer towards one another in anticipation of the Red-Green 
coalition that would take power in 1998. Thus, external pressure made elite interests 
coalesce around Germany’s new role conception. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
 The findings of the dissertation support the original model. Role entrepreneurs 
used a variety of strategies to force role adaptation. The persuasive power of role 
entrepreneurs increased as external demands intensified on the basis of firmed up 
intervention standards after 1992. Even though Germany embraced the use of force, its 
strategic culture remained characterized by the central value of antimilitar sm throughout 
the investigated period. Thus, the time lag between the creation of normative standards 
and compliance can be explained through constraints imposed by the culture which 
reduced the resonance of the external norms. Politicians from the FDP and SPD would 
continue to interpret the German constitution in ways prohibiting the use of force until 
the ruling of the Constitutional Court in July 1994.  
 In terms of role conceptions held by elites, the study finds that Germany remained 
a civilian power in each episode. However, variations of the civilian power role were 
detected: During the Persian Gulf War, Germany shows diplomatic reticence, financial 
support and eschewing of military force as central aspects of behavior. During the 
recognition episode, diplomatic leadership and support for Croatia and Slovenia and 
eschewing of military force are the defining characteristics. Finally during the Bosnian 
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Civil War, leadership and military force exhibit policy behavior. The variations are 
tentatively called pacifist, assertive and militant civilian power roles. The adjustment in 
role behavior indicates that German elites first took on greater leadership functions as 
demanded and then added the use of military force. The fact that use of force was 
embraced in spite of antimilitarism in strategic culture suggests that leadership functions 
in international society are associated with the ability to deploy military force and that 
German elites learned this during the early 1990s. Several important findings pertain to 
the civilian power concept.    
 Maull (1990) has suggested that civilian powers mainly rely on non-military 
means to resolve differences in international relations but will deploy military force in 
multilateral fashion to uphold international law. This means that German actions duri g 
the Persian Gulf War may have been indicative of an incompletely developed civilian 
power role which explains the pressure to adjust through the inclusion of the use force. 
This also suggests that Germany developed a more stable role during the mid 1990s and 
that no further behavioral changes are to be expected. This is confirmed by foreign policy 
behavior since reorientation. Germany has not taken on the full mantle of a normal great 
power. In other words, normalization occurred but within the contours of the civilian 












Table 5: Summary of Case Study Findings 
 
 Persian Gulf War Unilateral Recognition Bosnian Civil War 
Behavioral 
Expectations 














CDU/CSU politicians  
 
FDP politicians (not 
Genscher) 
Foreign Ministry  
Green politicians   
CDU/CSU politicians 
SPD pragmatists 
Green ‘realos’  
Domestic Concerns Electoral Viability  
Two-Plus-Four Treaty 
Electoral Viability  Electoral Viability 
Maintaining Party Unity 
Dominant Strategic 
Culture Value(s) 





Role Expectation Reliable Ally Reliable Ally Reliable Ally 
Role Behavior Diplomatic Reticence 









Militant Civilian Power 
 
 Role adaptation occurred on the basis of structural as well as symbolic 
interactionist processes. Parliamentary elites were subjected to external expectations that 
were based on Germany’s social position as great power within the system. However, 
elites attempted to maintain as much of the original role behavior as possible which 
indicates the presence of a ‘state identity’ defined by the parameters of st ategic culture. 
Role performance was a function of German responses to structural guidelines as w ll as 
a desire to interpret and shape these guidelines as symbolic interactionist role theory 
would suggest.   
 
Contributions to Knowledge 
 
International Socialization and Domestic Resonance 
 
 The primary objective of this study was to test the usefulness of a cultural model 
in explaining processes of foreign policy formulation. Of particular interest wa  the 
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question of whether cultural models which are routinely employed to explain stable
political conditions may also be utilized to explain political conditions undergoing 
transformation. The central cultural concept used was that of the role concepti  and the 
reorientation of German foreign policy therefore is conceptualized as a function of a role 
adjustment process. Role conceptions were defined as elite understandings about their 
country’s appropriate function and behavioral obligations within international society. 
Changes in role conceptions allow for different policy options. In response to foreign 
pressure, German elites adapted role conceptions and were able to embrace the use of 
military force in support of peace enforcement missions. The broad cultural model was 
combined with an investigation of the micro-interests of sub-state actors to bridge the 
divide between reflective and rational approaches as well as provide greater clari y on the 
relationship between agents and structures. Thus, an important corollary puzzle 
investigated here was the relationship between role expectations and the micro-level 
interests of parliamentary elites including the process by which elites contribute to the 
evolution of social environments through role performance, role avoidance or role 
challenges.  I proposed that a combination of insights culled from role theory, norm 
diffusion literature, strategic culture and foreign policy analysis would generate insights 
on the important phenomenon of foreign policy reorientation. What can be learned about 
the proposed relationship between external socialization, the domestic web of constraint 
imposed by strategic culture, institutions and public opinion and how do the findings 
relate to the study of foreign policy analysis? 
 The three case studies covering the time period 1990-1995 produced findings that 
were consistent with the original theoretical expectations. The impact of foreign 
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expectations on German foreign policy reorientation is evident throughout the 
investigated time period as German elites could be shown to have been acutely and 
consistently aware of the demands generated by global and regional security 
organizations and national actors from the external environment. The speculations made 
by researchers about German foreign policy being affected by outside demands are 
shown to have been correct. Over the covered time period, conservative elites acted as 
norm entrepreneurs for the use of force by repeatedly reminding other parliamentary 
elites of German obligations towards the alliance and by holding out the specter of 
political isolation should German fail to fulfill its responsibilities towards the Western 
value community. As the model predicted, the power of conservative elites to act as norm 
entrepreneurs by persuading others to accept the use of force outside of German territory 
increased as post-Cold War understandings of necessary doctrines and military response 
mechanisms as well as the contributions of individual actors towards the maintenance of 
peace and stability solidified into an increasingly more established regime. Thus, the first 
role episode of the Persian Gulf War finds conservatives attempting to comply with 
foreign expectations but ultimately failing to convince their coalition partners from the 
FDP and the left-of-center politicians that German military contributions t the effort to 
liberate Kuwait were necessary. Conservative elites backed down and compensated with 
‘checkbook diplomacy’ through which they validated the external demands. In addition, 
they promised that they would pursue the internal changes necessary to be able to comply 
with future demands for German contributions. By the end of the Bosnian Civil War 
episode, the power of conservatives to change policy had grown considerably. 
International norms supporting intervention and rapid reaction doctrines had been 
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established by UN, NATO and the European Union. Understandings of a more volatile 
security environment had replaced the initial euphoria surrounding the end of the Cold 
War with the violence in Yugoslavia constituting an important series of learning events. 
FDP politicians including foreign ministers Genscher and Kinkel had already moved 
towards a more assertive policy orientation during the recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia during which Germany’s rejection of military force had been shown to have 
been a major limitation on effective diplomacy. During the Bosnian role episode, 
international pressure on German elites to comply with solidifying humanitari  
intervention norms intensified. The last holdout against role adaptation, politicians from 
the Social Democratic Party and the Alliance 90/Greens, caved in as concerns over 
human rights violations, the efficacy of multilateral peacekeeping operations to address 
regional instabilities and Germany’s diplomatic isolation coalesced with electoral 
interests. The combination of external expectations and electoral interests st ongly 
supported policy normalization as a means to rebuild public confidence in the ability of 
Social Democrats and Greens to assume governmental control in post-unification 
Germany.  
 To sum up, role behavior pressure was greatest on German elites when threat 
perceptions and normative expectations of national actor contributions had solidified into 
institutional guidelines and doctrines such as the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks from 1992. As 
such, the social environment exerted its greatest pressure between 1992-1995 with 
noticeable effects on elite debates and subsequent changes in foreign policy behavior.  
The logical conclusion is that the effectiveness of role socialization through group
expectations tends to increase when normative standards emanating from the external
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environment are clear, consistent, and unchallenged. An important finding in regards to 
the existence of unclear norms and variation in the degree of actor compliance ertains to 
the effect of dyadic relations.  
 As intermediate variable, dyadic relations increase the complexity of the 
expectations generated within the social environment. This is particularly noticeable 
when the expectations of important states within the group exerting pressure on the focal 
actor are still based on older role conceptions. For instance, during the Persian Gulf War, 
French, British and Soviet foreign policy circles showed profound apprehension about 
German power after reunification while the United States and the UN already insisted 
that Germany contribute in line with its capabilities. In essence, Germany w s exposed to 
two mutually exclusive roles expectations and elites showed great policy ambiguity as 
they tried to meet divergent expectations of the role of a predictable and reliable st te. 
During this time, regional security organizations which could have offered an 
authoritative role definition were still undergoing redevelopment processes and could not 
offer a clear social definition of what constituted appropriate behavior. Towards the end 
of the Bosnian role episode in 1994, role expectations and obligations were more clearly 
defined. The social ‘noise’ created by dyadic relations gave way to a clear group message 
on appropriate great power contributions to international peace and stability.  
 
Culture, Institutions and Public Opinion 
 
 During the time period covered by the investigated role episodes, German 
strategic culture remained consistently antimilitant. Elites remained hesitant to deploy 
force outside of German territory and eventual compliance with external demn s to 
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contribute forces came only after much soul-searching. Once the Bundeswehr was 
committed to supporting peacekeeping activities in Bosnia after the Dayton Acc rds, care 
was taken to deploy forces in areas least likely to see conflict. The trend to seek ut the 
least dangerous areas for troop deployment continues to this day. Public opinion also 
remained largely pacifist during the studied cases. The detailed RAND studies covering 
the period 1990-1994 analyzed by Asmus (1992; 1994; 1995) indicate minor increases in 
support levels for a more assertive role for Germany. But public opinion clearly continues 
to favor multilateralism and activities centered on peaceful contributions to the
maintenance of international peace and stability. As such, the set of values that 
characterizes strategic culture since World War II can be said to have remained largely 
intact after reunification. The fact that elites were able to change security policy in spite 
of cultural constraints has important ramifications for the research paradigm of strategic 
culture. 
 Strategic culture should be understood as a dependent or intermediate rather than 
independent variable. Many scholars who emphasize the independent effect of strategic 
culture have viewed Germany’s resistance to become a ‘like unit’ under anarchy as a 
function of the persistence of the value of antimilitarism.348 German elites certainly 
resisted pressure to conform to external expectations by invoking their country’s 
antimilitant institutions and culture. But the existence of a cultural and institutional web 
of constraint on the use of force did not prevent political elites from reorienting their 
country’s stance on the use of force in response to external stimuli. An emphasis on 
strategic culture as independent variable would not necessarily have suggested th  change 
                                                
348 See, for instance, Berger (1998) or Duffield (1999). 
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in security policy. The interaction between the external and internal normative contexts is 
crucial for understanding the reorientation. In changing security policy, elites did not 
ignore cultural values but chose to reinterpret them. The values of predictability nd 
calculability remained very important to elites as indicated by the continual rhetoric of 
alliance solidarity. As the nature of alliance solidarity and corresponding behavioral 
expectations changed, so did the views of German elites about the necessity of 
contributing militarily. In addition, strategic culture did influence the nature of 
compliance with external demands. Military force was deployed but with the attachment 
of important qualifications to minimize exposure to combat. Thus, Germany’s 
antimilitant web of constraint continues to persist and influence German security policy 
in important ways by delimiting the scope of elite action. The cultural and institutional 
context will delay and possibly prevent the full development of a ‘normal’ greatpower 
role as predicted by realist scholars. A nonassertive diplomatic style and a strong 
preference for multilateralism will continue to characterize German foreign policy in the 
foreseeable future. In sum, the findings of studies on German strategic culture are 
generally confirmed here with the important caveat that an understanding of elite fore gn 
policy preferences requires both cultural analysis and a consideration of the normative 
context of the external environment.  
 On a final note on institutional research paradigms, the findings of the dissertation 
are also supporting key assumptions of the approach of historical institutionalism in 
comparative politics. On the question of the relationship between agents and structure, 
historical institutionalists generally assume a mutual constitution of act r preferences and 
institutions and an equally interactive process between institutions and culture (Spehn 
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2006, 195). Thresh-hold events and path-dependencies are important components of this 
view of the impact of institutions in which agents possess partial autonomy from 
structures, varying amounts of power and somewhat independent preferences. This 
explains their desire and ability to transform institutions during critical times.  
 The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new security environment 
represented a critical juncture which forced elites to redirect security policy during the 
1990s.  Elites reinterpreted the country’s antimilitant constitution on the basis of all ance 
solidarity and began to reorganize the Bundeswehr to allow for deployment in missions 
outside of German territory. Throughout the process of reorientation, individuals adapted 
institutions and interpreted central values according to their own instrumental designs but 
generally guided by the limitations imposed by the broader strategic culture that 
enveloped all decision-making. The important lesson for historical institutionalism is that 
external normative elements may influence domestic interest formation in establishing an 
acceptable convergence point for elite interests. Thus, the design of domestic institutions 
is significantly affected by elite interactions with the external enviro ment. 
 
Internal and External Factors in Foreign Policy Formulation 
 
 Micro-level interests of elites constitute another important intermediate variable. 
Domestic contexts, institutions and actors have long been recognized as important 
variables in explaining variations in norm diffusion. This study adds to the tradition that 
finds internal actors pursuing both instrumental and normative interests with the 
likelihood of norm adoption increasing when the two are congruent. Between 1990 and 
1995, German elites strongly contributed to the evolution of institutional capacities fter 
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the Cold War. Even committed pacifists including Fischer began to act when they saw 
the survival and effectiveness of those institutions threatened over the conflicts i  
Yugoslavia. Shared threat perceptions, humanitarian intervention norms and concern over 
institutional effectiveness came together in a powerful mix driving role adapt tion. What 
is novel here is that elite concerns like electoral interests may also be relatively unrelated 
to the international normative expectations. Yet the norm may still function as a logical 
point of interest convergence between the positions of parliamentary elites. Interest 
convergence points are also influenced by central values derived from strategic culture.  
These establish general parameters of acceptable conduct. As such, elite decision-making 
logic is determined by both instrumental as well as social considerations. Germany’s role 
shift towards the incorporation of the use of force was facilitated by the emphasis on the 
value of multilateralism and the avoidance of political isolation. The relevance of 
strategic culture in determining convergence points may indicate that effective role 
adaptation requires congruence between external normative expectations and at le st one 
central tenet of strategic culture. This confirms a hypothesis by Cortell and Davis (2000) 
that domestic salience through cultural match increases the likelihood of norm adoption.   
This study finds significant evidence for the initial proposition that Germany as 
focal actor adopted a new role understanding through the process of socialization. 
Without external socialization, strategic culture probably would have predisposed 
Germany to adhere to the traditional civilian power role conception. An important puzzle 
in the constructivism research agenda remains the process of norm diffusion between 
states. This requires a focus on the interaction between external demands, domestic actor  
and processes of norm adaptation. This study has focused on persuasion processes 
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between political elites. Persuasion occurred between leaders of foreign states and heads 
of organizations on one hand and German political elites on the other. Persuasion 
processes also took place among parliamentary elites.   
At the systemic level, Germany’s political elites indicated through discursive 
statements, public announcements and interviews that they were concerned about how 
their country’s role behavior was evaluated abroad. Elites complied with external 
expectations as they became supported by clear and consistent international security 
doctrines. The terminology ‘partners’, ‘allies’ and ‘Western value community’ appeared 
in conjunction with perceived role obligations of having to demonstrate solidarity and 
responsibility. The importance of the social reference group of Western states also 
appeared in the discourse associated with status considerations which acted as positive 
reinforcement for role adaptation. Here the consensus shifted from the referenc  to the 
smaller states in Europe to great or middle power although the status objective frquently 
was presented in the language of obligations. In other words, German elites were 
concerned about their standing and influence within the group of great powers. The desire 
to maintain both status and avoid shame through compliance got stronger throughout the 
early 1990s.  
The evidence shows that socialization between governmental elites takes place 
routinely, that it may affect foreign policy outcomes and that even security polic as 
preeminent domain of the state is not immune to external socialization. This refutes 
realist perspectives which view socialization as a type of natural selection process. Policy 
adaptation in security issues may occur because states adjust to social expectations of 
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appropriate foreign policy conduct. This suggests that Germany is normalizing, but for 
social rather than competitive reasons. Germany continues to confound realism. 
At the domestic level, parliamentary elites engaged in attempts aimed at political 
persuasion. Conservative elites invoked elements of the traditional role concepti to 
affect a change in security policy. Thus, they emphasized responsibility, solidarity, and 
the idea of Germany having reaching maturity to rhetorically persuade opposition elites 
that maintaining the old role required the change of behavior. Social Democrats and 
Greens invoked a very different role conception in which they viewed the renunciation of 
international violence as central element of a special role for Germany. The  understood 
responsibility in a wider sense as Germany’s obligation to help establish a more civil 
world order in which the use of force was systematically abolished and differences were 
settled through law-based procedures. Germany’s past was viewed as obligating the 
country to reject any behavior that resembled great power politics. Even international 
organizations were suspect if they appeared to be used for that purpose. The moral 
conviction of opposition elites that Germany should continue to play the special role of a 
civilizing country in world politics, a role somewhat comparable to the mediator role 
played by Sweden, was untenable given external expectations. Given these expectations, 
a civilizing role for a great power with alliance obligations would have been abnormal. 
Such a special role would have carried the risk of political isolation from the reference 
group of Western allies. The prevention of Germany’s isolation served as ‘preferred 
premise’ among parliamentary elites.349 The existence of this preferred premise allowed 
                                                
349 Greenhalgh and Russell (2005) argue that policy debates tend to start with premises shared by actors 
which are the product of values, value hierarchies and preferences of one abstraction over another.  
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conservative elites to act as norm entrepreneurs by connecting foreign expectations of 
military engagement with their desire for normalization and present policy reorientation 
as way of forestalling the threat of diplomatic isolation.  
Public policy is made of language and argumentation is central to understanding 
political processes. “Argumentation is the key process through which citizens and 
policymakers arrive at moral judgments and policy choices. … Each participant [in 
policy debates] is encouraged to adjust his view of reality, and even to change his values, 
as a result of the process of reciprocal persuasion” (Majone 1989, 8). The main 
argumentation scheme used by role entrepreneurs was that of association. Association 
combines elements that were previously regarded as being separate through metaphor or 
analogy (Greenhalgh and Russell 2005, 36). Economic power and use of force had been 
regarded as separate and incompatible during the Cold War. The former behavior had 
been associated with the civilian role. The latter conduct had been viewed as part of a 
more assertive, great power role reminiscent of Germany’s role in thepast. During the 
out-of-area debates of the 1990s, role entrepreneurs argued for the merger of the tw  role 
conceptions under the heading of normalization. They emphasized necessity due to the 
transformed nature of the security environment and appropriateness due to external 
expectations. Conservative elites cleverly argued that security policy reorientation was 
required to preserve responsibility, calculability, predictability and solidarity–the key 
values of the traditional role conception. Without behavioral adaptation, so they argued, 
parliamentary elites would actually risk violating the central premises of the role their 
country had adopted after World War II. The argument became increasingly more 
convincing as the international agreement on addressing domestic instabilities through 
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out-of-area interventions became essentially uncontested. The moral position f pacifism 
defended by more radical opposition politicians became untenable when violence 
increased in the Yugoslav civil war and German inaction was increasingly perceived as 
tantamount to being a bystander to a crime. As external normative expectations bega  to 
trump the key value of antimilitarism among parliamentary elites, Germany’s role 
behavior was adapted to include the use of military force for peace enforcement missions.  
 
The Utility of Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
 Since the landmark study by Holsti (1970), roles in foreign policy analysis have 
repeatedly been viewed as useful concepts to understand, categorize and possibly predict 
the behavior of national actors. This has not been an easy undertaking and the initial 
development of rigid categories of roles based on functional assumptions within stable 
social environments failed to yield useful results. The theory used in this dissertation falls 
into the category of symbolic interactionism which assumes a more fluent situational 
context in which roles are established through a range of social processes including but 
not limited to negotiation, persuasion and affirmation. The focus on processes of social 
interaction–the role episode–allows us to view security policy reorientatio  s a type of 
social phenomena distinct from individual and group decision-making processes, the 
impact of organizational processes, bureaucratic politics or state-society networks. As a 
decidedly social account of foreign policy change, role episodes are useful in that they 
help uncover a process of change through social messages and responses. The focus on 
the process of change as social series of interlinked episodes emphasizes the overall 
connection between events through the shared understandings of elites. Socializati n 
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occurs through events but also through altered understandings which can be traced by 
considering the aftermaths of role episodes. In sum, foreign policy making ceases to be a 
series of haphazard events and responses but can be conceptualized as exhibiting 
significant continuity.  
 By conceptualizing states as social actors, role episodes and the focus on elite
conceptions contribute to the current constructivist research agenda in adding to our 
knowledge on processes of socialization and norm resonance. Role episodes add detail 
and depth to accounts of change and norm compliance. But the focus also exhibits 
limitations:  Material conditions such as the distribution of power within the international 
system influence actor decisions and those factors are considered only indirectly in the 
model in the form of perceptions of material capabilities. The straightforward focus on 
elites leaves out a range of other domestic factors that could potentially influence foreign 
policy formation. While an attempt has been made to include public opinion, this was 
done only indirectly with public opinion being considered sporadically when figuring in 
elite calculations of electoral interests. In addition, the public’s preferenc s were viewed 
as predetermined by strategic culture. The model also excluded other types of structural 
determinants at the domestic level including but not limited to state-society relation 
models suggested by Katzenstein, Risse-Kappen and others.  
 The main deficiency of the presented model of foreign policy reorientation is that 
it is characterized by relatively low levels of parsimony. The in-depth analysis of security 
policy reorientation through normative expectations at the international and the interest 
formation of elites at the domestic level produced a rich account that incorporated a 
number of important elements at different levels of analysis that are usually not 
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investigated in conjunction with one another. This combination yielded an account of 
change that has relatively limited applicability to other cases, times and countries. While 
this may appear as a disappointment to international relations theorists, scholars in 
foreign policy analysis have long learned to live with the dilemma. McClosky wrote in an 
early work about foreign policy analysis that its “inordinate complexity … is 
unquestionably its greatest shortcoming…” with the scholar “having to collect data about 
a great number of variables whose relative importance he can only guess at and whose 
influence he cannot easily measure in any event” (1962, 201). The presented model 
attempts to retain as much parsimony as is prudent while adhering to the need for an 
actor-specific orientation of the field as articulated by Alexander George (1993). As such, 
the emphasis on role episodes offers a way to bridge the gap between theory and thick 
description.  
 
Agenda for Future Research 
 
 Suggestions for further research arise logically from the limitations of this study. 
An important methodological concern would involve complementing the current research 
based on document analysis with a series of structured interviews with decision-makers. 
This would help reveal underlying motivations for particular policy actions. In addition to 
the key decision-makers, interviewing individuals engaged in policy implementation at 
lower levels may prove to be especially rewarding because these individuals may be 
more inclined to truthfully disclose social and utilitarian concerns influencing German 
politics at the time. Social interaction processes including persuasion affect individuals in 
both formal and informal settings. Including information from interviews would reveal 
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informal social pressure on decision-makers from their peers in other countries and from 
international organizations.  
 A second methodological suggestion for further research would be the extension 
of the study to include a comparison of several incidents of security policy orientation. 
This dissertation examined one reorientation over a five year period and the findings 
represent only a first cut at the information that could be garnered on the understudied 
phenomenon of foreign policy reorientation through social pressure. Multiple case studies 
should help answer questions about the relative weighting of social and instrumental 
motivations of decision-makers. Numerous cases should also assist in the effort of 
improving role theory. 
 Social roles of states are largely the product of the international environment 
which means that expectations of appropriate role behavior are based on systemic 
characteristics. The precise definition of social expectations ultimately requires the 
formulation of a comprehensive role theory for the international system. This has turned 
out to be a difficult enterprise. Tentative role categories for international relations were 
developed by Holsti (1970) and Walker (1987) but no full systemic theory has been 
formulated as yet. This dissertation loosely applied assumptions of both structural and 
symbolic interactionist role theory to make the claim that Germany had its role behavior 
imposed on it by international society due to its social position but also continued to 
negotiate its role behavior on the basis of its identity as indicated by the reservations that 
continue to be attached to deployments of the Bundeswehr. Thus, the dissertation 
sidestepped the question of how the international system creates and confers roles on 
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states. The specification of roles and the explication of their origin on the basis of cultural 
or material system factors would present a worthwhile venue of future exploration. 
 Another question that was largely bracketed was the issue of situation-specific 
roles. The conceptions of appropriate German behavior in the Persian Gulf region held by
elites would have differed from those in Yugoslavia where involvement was tainted by 
the burden of history. Future studies should devise models that take into account both 
regional and situational contexts on role conceptions held by state actors.  
 The final suggestions for future research are addressed to the civilian power 
research paradigm. The basic premise of the paradigm resting on the work of R secrance 
and Maull was that the evolution of international relations towards greater 
interdependence influenced state roles within the system. The new category of the 
civilian power emerged because states relying on international law instead of military 
capabilities were better adapted to system characteristics. But the ‘ideal type’ of the 
civilian power seems to have been associated with the more stable bipolar world order. 
This ideal type appears to be undergoing changes for great powers in the more unstable 
context emerging since the end of the Cold War. Germany and Japan will face pressure to 
act in military ways to preserve international peace and security. This suggests that social 
position and status as well as systemic parameters have to be more fully incl ded in 
future studies of civilian power conduct. At the very least, it appears that the behavior of 
great civilian powers has to be distinguished from that of lesser civilian powers.   








 The evolution of Germany’s contributions to multilateral efforts that involve the 
use of force since the policy reorientation of the mid-90s indicate that policy elites have 
decisively shifted their country’s role in line with international expectations. In 1996, the 
Federal Republic contributed to NATO’s stabilization force (SFOR) in Bosnia which 
succeeded the IFOR deployment. As part of this operation, 1500 Bundeswehr soldiers 
including infantry and armored reconnaissance troops were deployed for monitoring and 
security functions as part of larger French-German unit (Duffield 1998, 216). At the time, 
Defense Minister Rühe commented that Germany had finally assumed the same risks and 
responsibilities as other allies (Die Welt, October 5, 1996). In the Bundestag, the mission 
received widespread support with 499 parliamentarians supporting the deployment 
(Duffield 1998, 216). In a dramatic expansion of German military responsibilities s nce 
reorientation, Luftwaffe jets participated in full combat missions over Kosovo in March 
1999. Germany’s contributions to peace enforcement in Kosovo included 5000 ground 
troops, making it the largest deployment of the Bundeswehr since World War II. German 
politicians also played a leading diplomatic role during the conflict. The action was the 
more remarkable because it took place during the rule of the Red-Green coalition 
government headed by Chancellor Schröder. Left-of-center elites including Forei n 
Minister Fischer who had opposed role adaptation during the early 1990s now supported 
Germany’s new role and the use of force. They risked their own political futures and 
overcame public and inner-party opposition in the interest of maintaining alliance 
solidarity and demonstrating responsibility for international peace and stability.  
Struggles between pragmatists and traditionalists within the Alliance 90/Green party 
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continued and the party barely survived a fundamental split. Public opinion remained 
antimilitant and domestic tension mounted as it became clear that the German public 
would not accept Bundeswehr participation in a potential escalation towards ground 
combat. In 2001, Germany contributed to the NATO operations in Afghanistan (ISAF) 
with about 1000 Bundeswehr soldiers who were deployed in the northern part of the 
country. Again, the desire to demonstrate solidarity and responsibility remain d  vital 
factor in explaining the use of force with Foreign Minister Steinmeier stating like his 
predecessors that “the Tornado Deployment is an indication of our support of ISAF and 
NATO in Afghanistan in difficult times…I say, in my opinion we owe this solidarity to 
the alliance”.350 In another noteworthy action during the process of role adaptation, the 
Federal Republic was willing to commit troops and the Federal Navy in its most 
significant deployment since World War II in 2006. The forces were dispatched to patrol 
the Lebanese-Syrian border as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Leba on after 
the end of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah.  
 In their military commitments since reorientation, policy elites have shown 
greater compliance with international expectations when these demands came from an 
authoritative organization enforcing a clear and coherently applied normative st ndard. 
Thus, Germany declined to comply with US pressure to partake in the military campaign 
against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003. Without the support of the multilatera 
United Nations, expectations were unclear and allowed German elites greater policy 
latitude. Cases since 1995 also show a German tendency to support peacekeeping 
missions rather than the more challenging tasks of peace-building. Military contributions 
                                                
350 PB 16/6282, February 28, 2007, 8128. 
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since reorientation continue to be associated with complex limitations on the use of the 
provided troop and equipment contingents. The reduction of combat risk continues to be 
a major issue in securing cross-party support for the use of force.351 In Afghanistan, for 
instance, German forces were deployed in the areas least likely to see extensive combat. 
German elites, despite considerable prodding by allies, have also not shown much of an 
inclination to increase national defense spending which continues to lack behind those of 
other great powers except Japan by a considerable margin.352 These factors suggest that 
powerful constraints on the use of force continue to exist that will delay or prevent full 
normalization of German role conceptions. The first one of these constraints clearly is the 
value of antimilitarism contained in strategic culture which has public opinion showing 
no pattern towards the increasing acceptance of the use of force. A second fact r is 
institutional in nature. The Constitutional Court ruling of 1994 allowed for the use of 
force but also limited the government’s ability to deploy the Bundeswehr unless 
supported by a Bundestag majority. Coalition politics in the multiparty system of the 
Federal Republic will act as break on too ambitious an escalation of Bundeswehr 
deployments. The traditional institutions of German civil-military relations will further 
limit normalization through the integrative functions they perform in linking state with its 
antimilitant society.    
 In a final word addressed to policy-makers and those interested in contemporary 
German foreign policy, major deviations from current parameters in German security 
                                                
351 Duffield (1998, 217) argues that agreement on the critical IFOR deployment decision was possible 
because of provisions limiting the combat risks of German soldiers. 
 
352 In 2006, Germany spent 1.3 percent of GDP on military expenditures which compared to 2.4 percent for 
France, 2.6 percent for the United Kingdom and 4 percent for the United States (Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, http://milexdata.sipri.org, accessed March 24, 2009). With that number, the 
country is voluntarily approaching Japan’s constitutionally imposed 1 percent barrier.  
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policy are not to be expected. Policy will remain predominantly multilateral and military 
force will be applied on the basis of a mandate established by authoritative international 
institutions. Even though external pressure allowed for reorientation, the country’s unique 
burden of history continues to profoundly shape the political possibilities of the present.    
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